GHSA-GPWP-5797-MJFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 18:47 – Updated: 2026-11-13 18:47Summary
The default and explicit MaxDepth limits added for CVE-2026-32933 don't apply to several mapping paths. Mapping a deeply nested source through any of them recurses without bound and throws a StackOverflowException, which can't be caught and terminates the process.
Affected paths
- Polymorphic maps: derived type maps (
Include/IncludeBase) didn't inherit the base map'sMaxDepth, and the default limit for self-referential maps was only applied to the base map. A chain of derived objects was mapped without a limit, even withMaxDepthset on the base map. - Runtime-typed members: members typed as
objector an interface aren't seen by self-reference detection, so the default limit isn't applied. - Dictionary and dynamic sources: mapping a nested
Dictionary<string, object>orExpandoObject(for example, deserialized JSON) onto typed destinations recurses with no depth tracking.MaxDepthhas no effect. - Recursive type converters:
ConvertUsingthat callscontext.Mapper.MapignoresMaxDepth.
Impact
An application that maps attacker-influenced, deeply nested data through one of these paths can be crashed. On a 1 MB stack (the Windows default), a few thousand levels of nesting are enough.
Fix
- Derived type maps inherit
MaxDepth, and the default limit is applied to them. - Every runtime map call checks for sufficient stack, and fails with a catchable
InsufficientExecutionStackExceptioninstead of overflowing.
Workarounds
Set MaxDepth explicitly on derived maps and on maps reached through object or interface members. There is no configuration workaround for dictionary or dynamic sources, or for recursive type converters, other than limiting input depth before mapping.
Related
- CVE-2026-32933 (GHSA-rvv3-g6hj-g44x)
- GHSA-6vhm-j9h7-f9gh:
MaxDepthnot enforced through constructor parameters and positional records, fixed in the same releases.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "AutoMapper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "16.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "16.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "AutoMapper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "15.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-128081"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T18:47:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe default and explicit `MaxDepth` limits added for CVE-2026-32933 don\u0027t apply to several mapping paths. Mapping a deeply nested source through any of them recurses without bound and throws a `StackOverflowException`, which can\u0027t be caught and terminates the process.\n\n### Affected paths\n- **Polymorphic maps:** derived type maps (`Include` / `IncludeBase`) didn\u0027t inherit the base map\u0027s `MaxDepth`, and the default limit for self-referential maps was only applied to the base map. A chain of derived objects was mapped without a limit, even with `MaxDepth` set on the base map.\n- **Runtime-typed members:** members typed as `object` or an interface aren\u0027t seen by self-reference detection, so the default limit isn\u0027t applied.\n- **Dictionary and dynamic sources:** mapping a nested `Dictionary\u003cstring, object\u003e` or `ExpandoObject` (for example, deserialized JSON) onto typed destinations recurses with no depth tracking. `MaxDepth` has no effect.\n- **Recursive type converters:** `ConvertUsing` that calls `context.Mapper.Map` ignores `MaxDepth`.\n\n### Impact\nAn application that maps attacker-influenced, deeply nested data through one of these paths can be crashed. On a 1 MB stack (the Windows default), a few thousand levels of nesting are enough.\n\n### Fix\n- Derived type maps inherit `MaxDepth`, and the default limit is applied to them.\n- Every runtime map call checks for sufficient stack, and fails with a catchable `InsufficientExecutionStackException` instead of overflowing.\n\n### Workarounds\nSet `MaxDepth` explicitly on derived maps and on maps reached through `object` or interface members. There is no configuration workaround for dictionary or dynamic sources, or for recursive type converters, other than limiting input depth before mapping.\n\n### Related\n- CVE-2026-32933 (GHSA-rvv3-g6hj-g44x)\n- GHSA-6vhm-j9h7-f9gh: `MaxDepth` not enforced through constructor parameters and positional records, fixed in the same releases.",
"id": "GHSA-gpwp-5797-mjff",
"modified": "2026-11-13T18:47:17Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T18:47:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LuckyPennySoftware/AutoMapper/security/advisories/GHSA-gpwp-5797-mjff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LuckyPennySoftware/AutoMapper/commit/aee81b50574c3c7005283cca2b2396e295bd8ed9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/LuckyPennySoftware/AutoMapper"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LuckyPennySoftware/AutoMapper/releases/tag/v15.1.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LuckyPennySoftware/AutoMapper/releases/tag/v16.3.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AutoMapper: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion that bypasses MaxDepth"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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