GHSA-GM9R-HVC9-96GV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 22:50 – Updated: 2026-11-19 22:50
VLAI
Summary
Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob pattern
Details

Summary

_extract_from_forwarded_header() (guard_core/utils.py:172-181 in 3.12.0; :179 on master 08780f1) returns the selected X-Forwarded-For entry without any ipaddress validation. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes client_ip and flows into BehaviorTracker (guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a KEYS glob pattern:

key = f"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}"
await self.redis_handler.set_key("behavior_usage", f"{key}:{current_time}", "1", ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f"behavior_usage:{key}:*"
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern)      # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace

Same shape in track_return_pattern() (behavior_handler.py:135-142). redis_handler.keys() maps to the blocking Redis KEYS command (guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275).

Details

Three consequences, in increasing severity:

  1. Cross-client counter contamination. X-Forwarded-For: * makes the glob match every client's behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client 9.9.9.9 hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying XFF: * issued the pattern behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*, counted the victim's events, and tripped the rule on its first request. An embedded : also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (behavior_handler.py:94-100).
  2. Unbounded key-space growth + blocking scans. Each request creates a new unique key (f"{key}:{current_time}") and then issues a blocking KEYS scan whose cost grows with total keys — on the shared Redis instance, degrading every guard-core instance using it. Rotating arbitrary XFF strings multiplies distinct keys without bound.
  3. Error path. A tripped ban action passes the non-IP string to ip_ban_manager.ban_ip(), whose ipaddress validation raises ValueError uncaught in the behavioral processor — the request 500s.

PoC

import asyncio
from types import SimpleNamespace
from guard_core.models import SecurityConfig
from guard_core.utils import extract_client_ip

class CIHeaders(dict):
    def get(self, key, default=None):
        for k, v in self.items():
            if k.lower() == key.lower():
                return v
        return default

class FakeRequest:
    def __init__(self, xff):
        self.state = SimpleNamespace()
        self.client_host = "10.0.0.1"          # the TRUSTED proxy
        self.headers = CIHeaders({"X-Forwarded-For": xff})

async def main():
    config = SecurityConfig(trusted_proxies=("10.0.0.1",), enable_redis=False)
    ip = await extract_client_ip(FakeRequest("*"), config)
    print(repr(ip))        # -> '*'  (arbitrary string, no validation)

asyncio.run(main())

Then BehaviorTracker.track_endpoint_usage("app.login", "*", rule) issues KEYS behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:* — matching other clients' keys (full fake-Redis script: poc_xff_redis.py, available on request).

Impact

Integrity and availability of the behavioral-analytics subsystem and the shared Redis instance, in deployments where the extracted XFF position is attacker-controllable. No data exposure; not reachable with default settings (trusted_proxies defaults empty).

Fix: validate the extracted XFF entry with ipaddress.ip_address() before returning it from extract_client_ip() (fall back to the connecting IP on failure); escape glob metacharacters (*?[]) in anything interpolated into a KEYS pattern — or replace the KEYS+per-request-key design with an atomic counter / Lua sliding window (the rate-limit Lua script already shows the right shape).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "guard-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-129304"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:50:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T20:19:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`_extract_from_forwarded_header()` (`guard_core/utils.py:172-181` in 3.12.0; `:179` on master `08780f1`) returns the selected `X-Forwarded-For` entry **without any `ipaddress` validation**. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes `client_ip` and flows into `BehaviorTracker` (`guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102`), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a `KEYS` glob pattern:\n\n```python\nkey = f\"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}\"\nawait self.redis_handler.set_key(\"behavior_usage\", f\"{key}:{current_time}\", \"1\", ttl=rule.window)\npattern = f\"behavior_usage:{key}:*\"\nkeys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern)      # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace\n```\n\nSame shape in `track_return_pattern()` (`behavior_handler.py:135-142`). `redis_handler.keys()` maps to the blocking Redis `KEYS` command (`guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275`).\n\n### Details\n\nThree consequences, in increasing severity:\n\n1. **Cross-client counter contamination.** `X-Forwarded-For: *` makes the glob match *every* client\u0027s behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client `9.9.9.9` hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying `XFF: *` issued the pattern `behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*`, counted the victim\u0027s events, and tripped the rule on its **first** request. An embedded `:` also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (`behavior_handler.py:94-100`).\n2. **Unbounded key-space growth + blocking scans.** Each request creates a **new unique key** (`f\"{key}:{current_time}\"`) and then issues a blocking `KEYS` scan whose cost grows with total keys \u2014 on the shared Redis instance, degrading every guard-core instance using it. Rotating arbitrary XFF strings multiplies distinct keys without bound.\n3. **Error path.** A tripped `ban` action passes the non-IP string to `ip_ban_manager.ban_ip()`, whose `ipaddress` validation raises `ValueError` uncaught in the behavioral processor \u2014 the request 500s.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport asyncio\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\nfrom guard_core.models import SecurityConfig\nfrom guard_core.utils import extract_client_ip\n\nclass CIHeaders(dict):\n    def get(self, key, default=None):\n        for k, v in self.items():\n            if k.lower() == key.lower():\n                return v\n        return default\n\nclass FakeRequest:\n    def __init__(self, xff):\n        self.state = SimpleNamespace()\n        self.client_host = \"10.0.0.1\"          # the TRUSTED proxy\n        self.headers = CIHeaders({\"X-Forwarded-For\": xff})\n\nasync def main():\n    config = SecurityConfig(trusted_proxies=(\"10.0.0.1\",), enable_redis=False)\n    ip = await extract_client_ip(FakeRequest(\"*\"), config)\n    print(repr(ip))        # -\u003e \u0027*\u0027  (arbitrary string, no validation)\n\nasyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nThen `BehaviorTracker.track_endpoint_usage(\"app.login\", \"*\", rule)` issues `KEYS behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*` \u2014 matching other clients\u0027 keys (full fake-Redis script: `poc_xff_redis.py`, available on request).\n\n### Impact\n\nIntegrity and availability of the behavioral-analytics subsystem and the shared Redis instance, in deployments where the extracted XFF position is attacker-controllable. No data exposure; not reachable with default settings (`trusted_proxies` defaults empty).\n\n**Fix:** validate the extracted XFF entry with `ipaddress.ip_address()` before returning it from `extract_client_ip()` (fall back to the connecting IP on failure); escape glob metacharacters (`*?[]`) in anything interpolated into a `KEYS` pattern \u2014 or replace the KEYS+per-request-key design with an atomic counter / Lua sliding window (the rate-limit Lua script already shows the right shape).",
  "id": "GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T22:50:33Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T22:50:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/security/advisories/GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129304"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/pull/68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/commit/c07239fa1c5aa93e3f179440e79dad652977d3e4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Guard-Core/guard-core/releases/tag/3.13.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rennf93/guard-core"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob pattern"
}



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