GHSA-GJ9M-F8PH-PMHR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 22:15 – Updated: 2026-11-09 22:15Impact
In GPUStack before v2.2.0, get_current_user (in gpustack/api/auth.py) promotes any request whose source is considered loopback to the built-in administrator account when force_auth_localhost is False (the default). The "source" is derived by client_ip_getter, which can be made to report 127.0.0.1 without any credentials in two ways:
- Same-host reverse proxy (TCP peer). In the canonical self-hosted shape —
GPUStack behind a same-host reverse proxy with
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:<port>— every remote request arrives at GPUStack with TCP peer127.0.0.1, so the loopback auto-admin branch fires. No header or credential is required. Verified end-to-end against HEAD6bee5883. X-GPUStack-Real-IPheader. A forgedX-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1header can cause the request source to be treated as loopback.
Either path yields full, unauthenticated administrative access over the network: enumerate and modify users, models, workers, and configuration; mint persistent admin API keys (scope ["*"], valid from any source IP thereafter); read worker credentials and cloud/provider secrets. Combined with admin-only functionality such as POST /v2/inference-backends/from yaml, this leads to code execution on worker hosts.
This vulnerability has been observed exploited in the wild against a v2.1.1 deployment (attacker-created custom backends running reverse shells).
Root cause
Trusting the network source of a request (socket peer, or a client-controllable header) as an authentication signal. When GPUStack is fronted by a same-host reverse proxy, the socket peer is always loopback, so the "localhost is trusted" assumption no longer holds.
Patches
Fixed in gpustack 2.2.0: the loopback auto-admin path was removed and client-IP / forwarding-header handling was hardened. Upgrade to 2.2.0 or later.
Workarounds
- Set
force_auth_localhost=trueto require authentication even for loopback requests. - Ensure the reverse proxy / gateway cannot cause GPUStack to treat external
traffic as loopback, and strip any client-supplied
X-GPUStack-Real-IPheader at the edge. - Keep the API off untrusted networks (VPN / edge authentication).
Remediation (in the fix)
Do not derive authentication from the request's network source. Remove implicit loopback-based admin, and only accept a real client-IP header from an authenticated/trusted gateway (never from arbitrary clients).
Credit
Independently reported by Nikko Enggaliano; Wei Yunzhou; and Rui Yang & Haoyu Wang (Johns Hopkins University). Active in the-wild exploitation was reported by Javier Sixto (ulex.fr).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gpustack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-290",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T22:15:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-04T22:17:44Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIn GPUStack before v2.2.0, `get_current_user` (in `gpustack/api/auth.py`) promotes any request whose source is considered loopback to the built-in administrator account when `force_auth_localhost` is `False` (the default). The \"source\" is derived by `client_ip_getter`, which can be made to report `127.0.0.1` without any credentials in two ways:\n\n1. **Same-host reverse proxy (TCP peer).** In the canonical self-hosted shape \u2014\n GPUStack behind a same-host reverse proxy with `proxy_pass\n http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e` \u2014 every remote request arrives at GPUStack with TCP\n peer `127.0.0.1`, so the loopback auto-admin branch fires. No header or\n credential is required. Verified end-to-end against HEAD `6bee5883`.\n2. **`X-GPUStack-Real-IP` header.** A forged `X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1`\n header can cause the request source to be treated as loopback.\n\nEither path yields **full, unauthenticated administrative access** over the network: enumerate and modify users, models, workers, and configuration; mint persistent admin API keys (scope `[\"*\"]`, valid from any source IP thereafter); read worker credentials and cloud/provider secrets. Combined with admin-only functionality such as `POST /v2/inference-backends/from yaml`, this leads to code execution on worker hosts.\n\nThis vulnerability has been observed exploited in the wild against a v2.1.1 deployment (attacker-created custom backends running reverse shells).\n\n### Root cause\n\nTrusting the network source of a request (socket peer, or a client-controllable header) as an authentication signal. When GPUStack is fronted by a same-host reverse proxy, the socket peer is always loopback, so the \"localhost is trusted\" assumption no longer holds.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `gpustack` `2.2.0`: the loopback auto-admin path was removed and client-IP / forwarding-header handling was hardened. Upgrade to `2.2.0` or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Set `force_auth_localhost=true` to require authentication even for loopback\n requests.\n- Ensure the reverse proxy / gateway cannot cause GPUStack to treat external\n traffic as loopback, and strip any client-supplied `X-GPUStack-Real-IP`\n header at the edge.\n- Keep the API off untrusted networks (VPN / edge authentication).\n\n### Remediation (in the fix)\n\nDo not derive authentication from the request\u0027s network source. Remove implicit loopback-based admin, and only accept a real client-IP header from an authenticated/trusted gateway (never from arbitrary clients).\n\n### Credit\n\nIndependently reported by Nikko Enggaliano; Wei Yunzhou; and Rui Yang \u0026 Haoyu Wang (Johns Hopkins University). Active in the-wild exploitation was reported by Javier Sixto (ulex.fr).",
"id": "GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr",
"modified": "2026-11-09T22:15:27Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T22:15:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/53f42a6a553542974396d16a4ff6b12bcbedb48d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/releases/tag/v2.2.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-102895"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GPUStack: Authentication bypass via trusted loopback source (reverse-proxy TCP peer or X-GPUStack-Real-IP header) grants unauthenticated admin"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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