GHSA-GJ9M-F8PH-PMHR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 22:15 – Updated: 2026-11-09 22:15
VLAI
Summary
GPUStack: Authentication bypass via trusted loopback source (reverse-proxy TCP peer or X-GPUStack-Real-IP header) grants unauthenticated admin
Details

Impact

In GPUStack before v2.2.0, get_current_user (in gpustack/api/auth.py) promotes any request whose source is considered loopback to the built-in administrator account when force_auth_localhost is False (the default). The "source" is derived by client_ip_getter, which can be made to report 127.0.0.1 without any credentials in two ways:

  1. Same-host reverse proxy (TCP peer). In the canonical self-hosted shape — GPUStack behind a same-host reverse proxy with proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:<port> — every remote request arrives at GPUStack with TCP peer 127.0.0.1, so the loopback auto-admin branch fires. No header or credential is required. Verified end-to-end against HEAD 6bee5883.
  2. X-GPUStack-Real-IP header. A forged X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1 header can cause the request source to be treated as loopback.

Either path yields full, unauthenticated administrative access over the network: enumerate and modify users, models, workers, and configuration; mint persistent admin API keys (scope ["*"], valid from any source IP thereafter); read worker credentials and cloud/provider secrets. Combined with admin-only functionality such as POST /v2/inference-backends/from yaml, this leads to code execution on worker hosts.

This vulnerability has been observed exploited in the wild against a v2.1.1 deployment (attacker-created custom backends running reverse shells).

Root cause

Trusting the network source of a request (socket peer, or a client-controllable header) as an authentication signal. When GPUStack is fronted by a same-host reverse proxy, the socket peer is always loopback, so the "localhost is trusted" assumption no longer holds.

Patches

Fixed in gpustack 2.2.0: the loopback auto-admin path was removed and client-IP / forwarding-header handling was hardened. Upgrade to 2.2.0 or later.

Workarounds

  • Set force_auth_localhost=true to require authentication even for loopback requests.
  • Ensure the reverse proxy / gateway cannot cause GPUStack to treat external traffic as loopback, and strip any client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP header at the edge.
  • Keep the API off untrusted networks (VPN / edge authentication).

Remediation (in the fix)

Do not derive authentication from the request's network source. Remove implicit loopback-based admin, and only accept a real client-IP header from an authenticated/trusted gateway (never from arbitrary clients).

Credit

Independently reported by Nikko Enggaliano; Wei Yunzhou; and Rui Yang & Haoyu Wang (Johns Hopkins University). Active in the-wild exploitation was reported by Javier Sixto (ulex.fr).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "gpustack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102895"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T22:15:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-04T22:17:44Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIn GPUStack before v2.2.0, `get_current_user` (in `gpustack/api/auth.py`) promotes any request whose source is considered loopback to the built-in administrator account when `force_auth_localhost` is `False` (the default). The \"source\" is derived by `client_ip_getter`, which can be made to report `127.0.0.1` without any credentials in two ways:\n\n1. **Same-host reverse proxy (TCP peer).** In the canonical self-hosted shape \u2014\n   GPUStack behind a same-host reverse proxy with `proxy_pass\n   http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e` \u2014 every remote request arrives at GPUStack with TCP\n   peer `127.0.0.1`, so the loopback auto-admin branch fires. No header or\n   credential is required. Verified end-to-end against HEAD `6bee5883`.\n2. **`X-GPUStack-Real-IP` header.** A forged `X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1`\n   header can cause the request source to be treated as loopback.\n\nEither path yields **full, unauthenticated administrative access** over the network: enumerate and modify users, models, workers, and configuration; mint persistent admin API keys (scope `[\"*\"]`, valid from any source IP thereafter); read worker credentials and cloud/provider secrets. Combined with admin-only functionality such as `POST /v2/inference-backends/from yaml`, this leads to code execution on worker hosts.\n\nThis vulnerability has been observed exploited in the wild against a v2.1.1 deployment (attacker-created custom backends running reverse shells).\n\n### Root cause\n\nTrusting the network source of a request (socket peer, or a client-controllable header) as an authentication signal. When GPUStack is fronted by a same-host reverse proxy, the socket peer is always loopback, so the \"localhost is trusted\" assumption no longer holds.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `gpustack` `2.2.0`: the loopback auto-admin path was removed and client-IP / forwarding-header handling was hardened. Upgrade to `2.2.0` or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Set `force_auth_localhost=true` to require authentication even for loopback\n  requests.\n- Ensure the reverse proxy / gateway cannot cause GPUStack to treat external\n  traffic as loopback, and strip any client-supplied `X-GPUStack-Real-IP`\n  header at the edge.\n- Keep the API off untrusted networks (VPN / edge authentication).\n\n### Remediation (in the fix)\n\nDo not derive authentication from the request\u0027s network source. Remove implicit loopback-based admin, and only accept a real client-IP header from an authenticated/trusted gateway (never from arbitrary clients).\n\n### Credit\n\nIndependently reported by Nikko Enggaliano; Wei Yunzhou; and Rui Yang \u0026 Haoyu Wang (Johns Hopkins University). Active in the-wild exploitation was reported by Javier Sixto (ulex.fr).",
  "id": "GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr",
  "modified": "2026-11-09T22:15:27Z",
  "published": "2026-11-09T22:15:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102895"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5346"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/53f42a6a553542974396d16a4ff6b12bcbedb48d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/releases/tag/v2.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-102895"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GPUStack: Authentication bypass via trusted loopback source (reverse-proxy TCP peer or X-GPUStack-Real-IP header) grants unauthenticated admin"
}



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