GHSA-GJ7R-P794-HHQ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 22:18 – Updated: 2026-11-16 22:18
VLAI
Summary
Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path
Details

Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand) Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool download_file Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) Patched version: v53.4.0 Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

Summary

The download_file MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied path from the Kubeshark Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied dest on the local filesystem with no validation of dest. An attacker who can influence the MCP tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.kube/config, ~/.bashrc), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints. download_file is registered unconditionally (available in the default, non---allow-destructive posture).

Introduced in

Commit eb7dc42b — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)", 2026-03-04 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~1). An earlier attempt (dbfd17d9) was reverted (a46f05c4) before any release, so no tag before v53.1.0 is affected.

Details

In callDownloadFile (cmd/mcpRunner.go), both path and dest come straight from the tool arguments: - dest was passed directly to os.Create(dest) with no confinement — no filepath.Clean, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute paths or ../ traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable. - path was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.

Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)

The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. But the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default kubeshark tap the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic (credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is not part of this advisory's fix.

Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)

Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install: export_snapshot_pcap → obtain a relative path → download_file with that path and an attacker-chosen dest. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic PCAP and recovered a planted canary Authorization: Bearer … credential from it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.

Impact

  • Integrity (local): arbitrary file write on the machine running kubeshark mcp, as that user.
  • Confidentiality: read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
  • Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).

Severity rationale

Kubeshark scores this 5.3 Medium, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:

  • AV:N → AV:L. The vulnerable component has no network listener the attacker reaches. kubeshark mcp is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.
  • I:H → I:L. The write is confined to paths writable by the user running kubeshark mcp (normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user modification. The attacker also controls where the bytes land, not what they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.
  • A:L → A:N. Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the Hub, or the host; the original A:L is unsupported.

Kubeshark kept C:H: on a default community install the Hub API answers unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept AC:H (the attacker must land an injection in content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), PR:N (download_file is registered unconditionally — no --allow-destructive needed), UI:R (an operator must be driving an agent against kubeshark mcp), and S:U (the impact stays within the local user's authorization scope).

Patches

Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit a76a1920 (PR #1957).

Changes in cmd/mcpRunner.go: - dest is resolved through secureDownloadDest and confined to a base directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR); a dest that resolves outside the base (via ../ or an absolute path) is rejected. - path is rejected if it contains .. segments. - Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked subdirectory inside the base (or a dest that is itself a symlink) cannot redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with O_NOFOLLOW where the platform provides it. - Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the gated-auth refactor).

Workarounds

  • Run kubeshark mcp as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.
  • Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
  • Enable Hub authentication (AUTH_ENABLED=true + an IdP/license) to close the unauthenticated read path.

Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)

  • Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub path (current fix only rejects ..).
  • Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-129235"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T22:18:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T17:17:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Ecosystem / package:** Go \u2014 `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`\nCLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)\n**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`\n**Affected versions:** `\u003e= v53.1.0`, `\u003c v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the\ntool\u0027s first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)\n**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`\n**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.\n\n## Summary\nThe `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark\nHub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local\nfilesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP\ntool arguments \u2014 e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving\n`kubeshark mcp` \u2014 can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path\nwritable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,\n`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.\n`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,\nnon-`--allow-destructive` posture).\n\n## Introduced in\nCommit `eb7dc42b` \u2014 \"Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)\",\n2026-03-04 \u2014 first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt\n(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before\nv53.1.0 is affected.\n\n## Details\nIn `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight\nfrom the tool arguments:\n- `dest` was passed directly to `os.Create(dest)` with no confinement \u2014 no\n  `filepath.Clean`, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute\n  paths or `../` traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.\n- `path` was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any\n  Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.\n\n## Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)\nThe tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication\ngap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now\nforwards the operator\u0027s Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and\nrejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. **But**\nthe Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default\n`kubeshark tap` the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic\n(credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing\nHub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is **not**\npart of this advisory\u0027s fix.\n\n## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)\nFollowing the tool\u0027s documented workflow on a default community install:\n`export_snapshot_pcap` \u2192 obtain a relative path \u2192 `download_file` with that\n`path` and an attacker-chosen `dest`. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic\nPCAP and recovered a planted canary `Authorization: Bearer \u2026` credential from\nit, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.\n\n## Impact\n- **Integrity (local):** arbitrary file write on the machine running\n  `kubeshark mcp`, as that user.\n- **Confidentiality:** read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic\n  (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.\n- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).\n\n## Severity rationale\nKubeshark scores this **5.3 Medium**, down from the reporter\u0027s 7.1, on two metrics:\n\n- **`AV:N` \u2192 `AV:L`.** The vulnerable component has no network listener the\n  attacker reaches. `kubeshark mcp` is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker\u0027s\n  input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then\n  replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross\n  a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.\n- **`I:H` \u2192 `I:L`.** The write is confined to paths writable by the user running\n  `kubeshark mcp` (normally unprivileged) \u2014 no system-file or other-user\n  modification. The attacker also controls *where* the bytes land, not *what*\n  they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is\n  constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.\n- **`A:L` \u2192 `A:N`.** Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the\n  Hub, or the host; the original `A:L` is unsupported.\n\nKubeshark kept **`C:H`**: on a default community install the Hub API answers\nunauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely\nreadable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept **`AC:H`** (the attacker must land an injection in\ncontent the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), **`PR:N`**\n(`download_file` is registered unconditionally \u2014 no `--allow-destructive`\nneeded), **`UI:R`** (an operator must be driving an agent against\n`kubeshark mcp`), and **`S:U`** (the impact stays within the local user\u0027s\nauthorization scope).\n\n## Patches\nFixed in **v53.4.0** by commit\n[`a76a1920`](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214)\n(PR [#1957](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957)).\n\nChanges in `cmd/mcpRunner.go`:\n- `dest` is resolved through `secureDownloadDest` and confined to a base\n  directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via `KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR`);\n  a `dest` that resolves outside the base (via `../` or an absolute path) is\n  rejected.\n- `path` is rejected if it contains `..` segments.\n- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked\n  subdirectory inside the base (or a `dest` that is itself a symlink) cannot\n  redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with `O_NOFOLLOW` where the\n  platform provides it.\n- Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the\n  gated-auth refactor).\n\n## Workarounds\n- Run `kubeshark mcp` as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.\n- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.\n- Enable Hub authentication (`AUTH_ENABLED=true` + an IdP/license) to close the\n  unauthenticated read path.\n\n## Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)\n- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub `path` (current fix only rejects `..`).\n- Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).",
  "id": "GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T22:18:58Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T22:18:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129235"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path"
}



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