GHSA-GFWJ-45PC-W6R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 00:21 – Updated: 2026-11-20 00:21Summary
parseServerSignature in the v1 module only initializes ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra inside the if err == nil branch after url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData). Go's url.ParseQuery returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into Extra, regardless of err, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a VerificationData string with a bad %-escape (e.g. x=1&%zz=2).
This is reachable pre-authentication: parseServerSignature is called by the exported VerifyServerSignature / VerifyServerSignatureSafe before any HMAC/signature check, and VerificationData is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.
Impact
Any application calling VerifyServerSignature or VerifyServerSignatureSafe on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.
Proof Of Concept
payload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{
Algorithm: SHA256,
VerificationData: "x=1&%zz=2",
Signature: "irrelevant",
Verified: true,
})
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)
VerifyServerSignature(encoded, "some-secret") // panics: assignment to entry in nil map
Patch
Extra is now initialized unconditionally before the url.ParseQuery error check, so it's always safe to write into regardless of parse errors.
Workarounds
Recover from panics around calls to VerifyServerSignature/VerifyServerSignatureSafe, or reject/sanitize VerificationData before calling them, until upgrading.
Patch
Patch commit: 2c4fc27
Credit
Reported by Arpit Jain (@arpitjain099) via private disclosure.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103033"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T00:21:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T21:17:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`parseServerSignature` in the v1 module only initializes `ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra` inside the `if err == nil` branch after `url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData)`. Go\u0027s `url.ParseQuery` returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into `Extra`, regardless of `err`, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a `VerificationData` string with a bad %-escape (e.g. `x=1\u0026%zz=2`).\n\nThis is reachable pre-authentication: `parseServerSignature` is called by the exported `VerifyServerSignature` / `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` before any HMAC/signature check, and `VerificationData` is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application calling `VerifyServerSignature` or `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n```go\npayload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{\n Algorithm: SHA256,\n VerificationData: \"x=1\u0026%zz=2\",\n Signature: \"irrelevant\",\n Verified: true,\n})\nencoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)\nVerifyServerSignature(encoded, \"some-secret\") // panics: assignment to entry in nil map\n\n```\n\n### Patch\n\n`Extra` is now initialized unconditionally before the `url.ParseQuery` error check, so it\u0027s always safe to write into regardless of parse errors.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRecover from panics around calls to `VerifyServerSignature`/`VerifyServerSignatureSafe`, or reject/sanitize `VerificationData` before calling them, until upgrading.\n\n### Patch\n\nPatch commit: 2c4fc27\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Arpit Jain (@arpitjain099) via private disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5",
"modified": "2026-11-20T00:21:19Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T00:21:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/security/advisories/GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/commit/2c4fc27a7b2d5b89f7175676445efcacc564c27c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/releases/tag/v2.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ALTCHA: Nil-map panic (pre-verification DoS) in v1 parseServerSignature on malformed VerificationData"
}
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|---|
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