GHSA-FX6J-W5W5-H468
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 15:49 – Updated: 2026-07-08 17:35Summary
navigateTo() with external: true generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a <meta http-equiv="refresh"> tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing " with %22, leaving <, >, &, and ' unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to navigateTo(url, { external: true }) can break out of the content="…" attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application's origin.
This is a different root cause from CVE-2024-34343 (GHSA-vf6r-87q4-2vjf), which addressed javascript: protocol bypass. The issue here is triggered by any valid URL containing >.
Impact
Applications that pass user-controlled input to navigateTo(url, { external: true }) — typically via a ?next= / ?redirect= query parameter used for post-login or "return to" flows — are vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting. The injected script runs in the context of the application's origin during the server-rendered redirect response, before the meta-refresh fires.
Details
In packages/nuxt/src/app/composables/router.ts, the SSR redirect path builds an HTML response body with only " percent-encoded in the destination URL:
const encodedLoc = location.replace(/"/g, '%22')
nuxtApp.ssrContext!['~renderResponse'] = {
status: sanitizeStatusCode(options?.redirectCode || 302, 302),
body: `<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url=${encodedLoc}"></head></html>`,
headers: { location: encodeURL(location, isExternalHost) },
}
The Location header is normalised through encodeURL() (which uses the URL constructor and correctly percent-encodes attribute-significant characters). The HTML body uses a narrower sanitiser. That mismatch is the root cause.
Proof of concept
Global middleware that forwards a query parameter to navigateTo:
// middleware/redirect.global.ts
export default defineNuxtRouteMiddleware((to) => {
const next = to.query.next as string | undefined
if (next) {
return navigateTo(next, { external: true })
}
})
Request:
GET /?next=https://evil.example/x><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
Response body:
<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url=https://evil.example/x><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>"></head></html>
The > after evil.example/x terminates the content="…" attribute, and the <img onerror> tag executes JavaScript in the application's origin before any redirect
occurs.
Patches
Fixed in nuxt@4.4.6 and nuxt@3.21.6 by #35052. The fix percent-encodes the full set of HTML-attribute-significant characters (&, ", ', <, >) before interpolating the URL into the meta-refresh body
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade immediately, validate user-controlled URLs before passing them to navigateTo(url, { external: true }). At minimum, normalise through new URL(input).toString() and reject inputs containing < or > (a normalised URL with these characters is malformed and safe to refuse).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.21.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nuxt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.4.3"
},
{
"fixed": "3.21.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.4.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nuxt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45669"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-83"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:49:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T14:16:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`navigateTo()` with `external: true` generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing `\"` with `%22`, leaving `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `\u0026`, and `\u0027` unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` can break out of the `content=\"\u2026\"` attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application\u0027s origin.\n\nThis is a different root cause from CVE-2024-34343 (GHSA-vf6r-87q4-2vjf), which addressed `javascript:` protocol bypass. The issue here is triggered by any valid URL containing `\u003e`.\n\n### Impact\nApplications that pass user-controlled input to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` \u2014 typically via a `?next=` / `?redirect=` query parameter used for post-login or \"return to\" flows \u2014 are vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting. The injected script runs in the context of the application\u0027s origin during the server-rendered redirect response, before the meta-refresh fires.\n\n### Details\nIn `packages/nuxt/src/app/composables/router.ts`, the SSR redirect path builds an HTML response body with only `\"` percent-encoded in the destination URL:\n\n```ts\nconst encodedLoc = location.replace(/\"/g, \u0027%22\u0027)\nnuxtApp.ssrContext![\u0027~renderResponse\u0027] = {\nstatus: sanitizeStatusCode(options?.redirectCode || 302, 302),\nbody: `\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0; url=${encodedLoc}\"\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003c/html\u003e`,\nheaders: { location: encodeURL(location, isExternalHost) },\n}\n```\n\nThe `Location` header is normalised through `encodeURL()` (which uses the `URL` constructor and correctly percent-encodes attribute-significant characters). The HTML body uses a narrower sanitiser. That mismatch is the root cause.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nGlobal middleware that forwards a query parameter to `navigateTo`:\n\n```ts\n// middleware/redirect.global.ts\nexport default defineNuxtRouteMiddleware((to) =\u003e {\nconst next = to.query.next as string | undefined\nif (next) {\n return navigateTo(next, { external: true })\n}\n})\n```\n\nRequest:\n\n```\nGET /?next=https://evil.example/x\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e\n```\n\nResponse body:\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0; url=https://evil.example/x\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e\"\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe `\u003e` after `evil.example/x` terminates the `content=\"\u2026\"` attribute, and the `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` tag executes JavaScript in the application\u0027s origin before any redirect\noccurs.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `nuxt@4.4.6` and `nuxt@3.21.6` by [#35052](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35052). The fix percent-encodes the full set of HTML-attribute-significant characters (`\u0026`, `\"`, `\u0027`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`) before interpolating the URL into the meta-refresh body\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you can\u0027t upgrade immediately, validate user-controlled URLs before passing them to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })`. At minimum, normalise through `new URL(input).toString()` and reject inputs containing `\u003c` or `\u003e` (a normalised URL with these characters is malformed and safe to refuse).",
"id": "GHSA-fx6j-w5w5-h468",
"modified": "2026-07-08T17:35:00Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T15:49:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-fx6j-w5w5-h468"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45669"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35052"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Nuxt: Reflected XSS in `navigateTo()` external redirect"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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