GHSA-FR5M-676F-94FG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 15:34 – Updated: 2026-11-06 18:35CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand().
The secret that signs session cookies is built from two calls to the built-in rand(), which is seeded with 32 bits. The secret therefore has at most 2**32 possible values, and one signed cookie is enough to test each candidate offline.
An attacker who obtains a single session cookie can recover the secret and sign cookies for any user, including an administrator.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-118986"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-338"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T14:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl allow session cookie forgery via a signing secret generated with rand().\n\nThe secret that signs session cookies is built from two calls to the built-in rand(), which is seeded with 32 bits. The secret therefore has at most 2**32 possible values, and one signed cookie is enough to test each candidate offline.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a single session cookie can recover the secret and sign cookies for any user, including an administrator.",
"id": "GHSA-fr5m-676f-94fg",
"modified": "2026-11-06T18:35:00Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T15:34:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/OETIKER/CallBackery-0.62.0/changes"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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