Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-FM76-W8JW-XF8M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-03 22:21 – Updated: 2024-10-03 22:21

Summary

@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source

Details

Summary

When creating a new plugin using the git source, the user-controlled value req.body.name is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the git clone command with the user-controlled data is child_process.execSync. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.

Details

Relevant code from source (req.body) to sink (child_process.execSync).

file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400

router.post(
  "/",
  isAdmin,
  error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
    const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1] 
      [...]
      try {
        await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3] 
          plugin,
          schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github"
        );
        [...]
    }
  })
);

file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44

class Plugin {
  [...]
  constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {
    [...]
    this.name = o.name; // [2] 
    [...]
}

file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65

const loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) => {
  [...]
  const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4] 
  const res = await loader.install(force); // [7] 
  [...]
};

file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js#L41-L61

class PluginInstaller {
  constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {
    [...]
    const tokens =
      plugin.source === "npm"
        ? plugin.location.split("/")
        : plugin.name.split("/"); // [5] 
    [...]
    this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [6] 
    [...]
  }


  async install(force) {
    [...]
    if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8] 
    [...]
  }

  async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {
    [...]
    switch (this.plugin.source) {
      [...]
      case "git":
        if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) { 
          await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9] 
      [...]
  }

file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js#L112

const gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) => {
  [...]
  if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {
    execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);
  } else {
    execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10] 
  }
  [...]
};

PoC

check that the file will be created by the command echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED does not exists:

cat /tmp/HACKED
cat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory

login with an admin account
visit http://localhost:3000/plugins/new
enter the following fields:
- Name: ;echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED
- Source: git
- other fields blank
click Create
you will get an error saying ENOENT: no such file or directory, .... but the command touch /tmp/HACKED will be executed
to verify:

cat /tmp/HACKED
hello

Impact

Remote code execution

Recommended Mitigation

Sanitize the pluginDir value before passing to execSync. Alternatively, use child_process. execFileSync API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)

Severity

7.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

7.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-beta.13"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@saltcorn/plugins-loader"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0-beta.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-03T22:21:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen creating a new plugin using the `git` source, the user-controlled value `req.body.name` is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the `git clone` command with the user-controlled data is `child_process.execSync`. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.\n\n### Details\n\nRelevant code from source (`req.body`) to sink (`child_process.execSync`).\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400\n\n```js\nrouter.post(\n  \"/\",\n  isAdmin,\n  error_catcher(async (req, res) =\u003e {\n    const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1] \n      [...]\n      try {\n        await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3] \n          plugin,\n          schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === \"github\"\n        );\n        [...]\n    }\n  })\n);\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44\n```js\nclass Plugin {\n  [...]\n  constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {\n    [...]\n    this.name = o.name; // [2] \n    [...]\n}\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65\n```js\nconst loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) =\u003e {\n  [...]\n  const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4] \n  const res = await loader.install(force); // [7] \n  [...]\n};\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js#L41-L61\n```js\nclass PluginInstaller {\n  constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {\n    [...]\n    const tokens =\n      plugin.source === \"npm\"\n        ? plugin.location.split(\"/\")\n        : plugin.name.split(\"/\"); // [5] \n    [...]\n    this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, \"temp_install\", ...tokens); // [6] \n    [...]\n  }\n\n  \n  async install(force) {\n    [...]\n    if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8] \n    [...]\n  }\n\n  async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {\n    [...]\n    switch (this.plugin.source) {\n      [...]\n      case \"git\":\n        if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) { \n          await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9] \n\t  [...]\n  }\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js#L112\n```js\nconst gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) =\u003e {\n  [...]\n  if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {\n    execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);\n  } else {\n    execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10] \n  }\n  [...]\n};\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n- check that the file will be created by the command `echo \"hello\"\u003e/tmp/HACKED` does not exists:\n```\ncat /tmp/HACKED\ncat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory\n```\n- login with an admin account\n- visit `http://localhost:3000/plugins/new`\n- enter the following fields:\n\t- Name: `;echo \"hello\"\u003e/tmp/HACKED`\n\t- Source: `git`\n\t- other fields blank\n- click `Create`\n- you will get an error saying `ENOENT: no such file or directory,  ....` but the command `touch /tmp/HACKED` will be executed\n- to verify:\n```\ncat /tmp/HACKED\nhello\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nRemote code execution\n\n### Recommended Mitigation\n\nSanitize the `pluginDir` value before passing to `execSync`. Alternatively, use `child_process. execFileSync` API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m",
  "modified": "2024-10-03T22:21:24Z",
  "published": "2024-10-03T22:21:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/security/advisories/GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/commit/024f19a7e079913f62f4a2335ab04116ddb68192"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js#L112"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js#L41-L61"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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GHSA-FM76-W8JW-XF8M

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Mitigation

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