GHSA-CWW6-G46X-9CMQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (hp-wmi-sensors) Fix use-after-free in fungible_show()
nsensor->current_state is dynamically replaced as the sensor's state changes. update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() does this by freeing the old string and installing a new one:
if (strcmp(trimmed, nsensor->current_state)) {
new_string = hp_wmi_strdup(dev, trimmed);
if (new_string) {
devm_kfree(dev, nsensor->current_state);
nsensor->current_state = new_string;
}
}
This function is only ever called from hp_wmi_update_info() while state->lock is held, so the free-and-replace itself is properly serialized against concurrent updates.
fungible_show(), however, reads the same pointer after the lock has already been dropped:
err = hp_wmi_update_info(state, info);
if (err)
return err;
switch (prop) {
...
case HP_WMI_PROPERTY_CURRENT_STATE:
seq_printf(seqf, "%s\n", nsensor->current_state);
break;
hp_wmi_update_info() takes state->lock internally and releases it before returning, so by the time fungible_show() dereferences nsensor->current_state in seq_printf(), no lock is held. Two processes reading a sensor's current_state debugfs entry at overlapping times (or one reading it while another read of the same sensor triggers a refresh) can race: one thread's seq_printf() can be part-way through printing the string at the moment another thread's call into update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() frees it with devm_kfree() and installs a new pointer, causing a use-after-free read.
Take state->lock around the read in fungible_show() as well, so it can never run concurrently with the free-and-replace in update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98200"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:18:05Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (hp-wmi-sensors) Fix use-after-free in fungible_show()\n\nnsensor-\u003ecurrent_state is dynamically replaced as the sensor\u0027s state\nchanges. update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() does this by freeing the\nold string and installing a new one:\n\n\tif (strcmp(trimmed, nsensor-\u003ecurrent_state)) {\n\t\tnew_string = hp_wmi_strdup(dev, trimmed);\n\t\tif (new_string) {\n\t\t\tdevm_kfree(dev, nsensor-\u003ecurrent_state);\n\t\t\tnsensor-\u003ecurrent_state = new_string;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\nThis function is only ever called from hp_wmi_update_info() while\nstate-\u003elock is held, so the free-and-replace itself is properly\nserialized against concurrent updates.\n\nfungible_show(), however, reads the same pointer after the lock has\nalready been dropped:\n\n\terr = hp_wmi_update_info(state, info);\n\tif (err)\n\t\treturn err;\n\n\tswitch (prop) {\n\t...\n\tcase HP_WMI_PROPERTY_CURRENT_STATE:\n\t\tseq_printf(seqf, \"%s\\n\", nsensor-\u003ecurrent_state);\n\t\tbreak;\n\nhp_wmi_update_info() takes state-\u003elock internally and releases it\nbefore returning, so by the time fungible_show() dereferences\nnsensor-\u003ecurrent_state in seq_printf(), no lock is held. Two\nprocesses reading a sensor\u0027s current_state debugfs entry at\noverlapping times (or one reading it while another read of the same\nsensor triggers a refresh) can race: one thread\u0027s seq_printf() can\nbe part-way through printing the string at the moment another\nthread\u0027s call into update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() frees it with\ndevm_kfree() and installs a new pointer, causing a use-after-free\nread.\n\nTake state-\u003elock around the read in fungible_show() as well, so it\ncan never run concurrently with the free-and-replace in\nupdate_numeric_sensor_from_wobj().",
"id": "GHSA-cww6-g46x-9cmq",
"modified": "2026-10-06T09:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72c85149794a1ccf8d718ffed1521106b5d31968"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c1e65bc79ff104914b11e6ad972139296ec86fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6b2a638aa36c441b2c8d0b6bd8ed2bb9701e795"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6cb0b4d4ecb8e71fd2200d907ab2e9663356f69"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f59ecfd2c58bace39538f3fff7f43788b3fdb539"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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