GHSA-CPMX-JHR8-W3F4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 03:30 – Updated: 2026-11-12 15:31
VLAI
Details

Versa has confirmed a buffer overflow vulnerability in the IPsec implementation on VOS, aka Versa FlexVNF.

Buffer Overflow Vulnerability Description

When a maliciously crafted IKE Auth packet is sent to VOS, the vsmd process crashes, thereby resulting in a Denial of Service. An attacker can create a Denial-of-Service attack on the VOS appliances by crafting a malicious IKE Auth packet and sending it to the WAN interfaces on the VOS.

During the IKE Authentication phase, if the IKE SA negotiation fails, and the size of the Remote ID is larger than the buffer size used to process the Remote ID, it will result in a crash of the vsmd process on the VOS appliance.

What is impacted?

VOS nodes configured with IPsec VPN profiles of type controller-staging-sdwan or remote-access-server using a WAN interface as the IPsec endpoint are vulnerable. (IPsec profiles configured with an overlay interface as the IPsec endpoint are not affected.) This configuration typically applies to all Controllers, Hub Controllers, and SSE Gateways. Additionally, site-to-site VPN profiles configured without a peer IP address, hostname, or FQDN are also vulnerable.

What is not impacted?

The VOS nodes listed above are not vulnerable if they are not accessible from the Internet.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107245"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-121"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T01:17:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Versa has confirmed a\u202fbuffer overflow\u202fvulnerability\u202fin the\u202fIPsec implementation\u202fon VOS, aka Versa\u202fFlexVNF. \n \n\u202fBuffer Overflow Vulnerability Description \n \nWhen a maliciously crafted IKE\u202fAuth packet is sent to VOS, the\u202fvsmd\u202fprocess crashes, thereby\u202fresulting in\u202fa Denial of Service.\u202fAn\u202fattacker\u202fcan\u202fcreate\u202fa Denial-of-Service\u202fattack on\u202fthe VOS appliances by\u202fcrafting a\u202fmalicious IKE Auth\u202fpacket and sending it to the\u202fWAN\u202finterfaces on the VOS. \n \nDuring the\u202fIKE\u202fAuthentication\u202fphase, if the IKE SA negotiation fails, and the size of the Remote ID\u202fis\u202flarger than the buffer size used to process the Remote ID,\u202fit will result in a crash of the\u202fvsmd\u202fprocess on the VOS appliance. \n \nWhat is impacted? \n \nVOS nodes configured with IPsec VPN profiles of type\u202fcontroller-staging-sdwan\u202for remote-access-server\u202fusing a WAN interface as the IPsec endpoint are vulnerable. (IPsec profiles configured with an overlay interface as the IPsec endpoint are\u202fnot\u202faffected.)\u202fThis configuration typically applies to all\u202fControllers,\u202fHub Controllers, and\u202fSSE Gateways. Additionally,\u202fsite-to-site\u202fVPN profiles configured without a peer IP address, hostname, or FQDN are also vulnerable. \n \nWhat is not impacted?  \n \nThe VOS nodes listed above are not vulnerable if they are not accessible from the Internet.",
  "id": "GHSA-cpmx-jhr8-w3f4",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T15:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T03:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-portal.versa-networks.com/emailbulletins/6a663c9aabeebad826bc8d29"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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