GHSA-CHP3-J5QR-2VFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:57 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:57Impact
The name, domain, and path fields of makeCookie() were validated with a regex that allows ;, the attribute separator in Set-Cookie headers. Because serializeCookie() writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.
For example, a domain of "legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld" serializes to session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets SameSite=None or Max-Age when the caller has not set those options itself.
The value field is unaffected: it passes through encodeURIComponent, which encodes ;. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.
Patches
Fixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject ;, and serializeCookie() now validates before writing the header.
Workarounds
Do not pass user input into name, domain, or path; set them from application constants.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@effect/platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.97.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "effect"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0-beta.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0-beta.103"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115779"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-74"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:57:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T21:17:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe `name`, `domain`, and `path` fields of `makeCookie()` were validated with a regex that allows `;`, the attribute separator in `Set-Cookie` headers. Because `serializeCookie()` writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.\n\nFor example, a `domain` of `\"legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld\"` serializes to `session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld`. RFC 6265 \u00a75.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets `SameSite=None` or `Max-Age` when the caller has not set those options itself.\n\nThe `value` field is unaffected: it passes through `encodeURIComponent`, which encodes `;`. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject `;`, and `serializeCookie()` now validates before writing the header.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not pass user input into `name`, `domain`, or `path`; set them from application constants.",
"id": "GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfr",
"modified": "2026-11-10T15:57:32Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T15:57:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/pull/6763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/pull/6765"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/commit/4a57af24011db1d66e947289d2f7ffc2074696d2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/commit/5859b373b9be04d5037a594196b4743ad80379bd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/releases/tag/@effect/platform@0.97.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/releases/tag/effect@4.0.0-beta.103"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Effect: Cookie attribute injection via domain, path, and name fields in @effect/platform makeCookie()"
}
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