GHSA-CHP3-J5QR-2VFR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:57 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:57
VLAI
Summary
Effect: Cookie attribute injection via domain, path, and name fields in @effect/platform makeCookie()
Details

Impact

The name, domain, and path fields of makeCookie() were validated with a regex that allows ;, the attribute separator in Set-Cookie headers. Because serializeCookie() writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.

For example, a domain of "legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld" serializes to session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets SameSite=None or Max-Age when the caller has not set those options itself.

The value field is unaffected: it passes through encodeURIComponent, which encodes ;. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.

Patches

Fixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject ;, and serializeCookie() now validates before writing the header.

Workarounds

Do not pass user input into name, domain, or path; set them from application constants.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@effect/platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.97.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "effect"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-beta.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0-beta.103"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-115779"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-74"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:57:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T21:17:02Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe `name`, `domain`, and `path` fields of `makeCookie()` were validated with a regex that allows `;`, the attribute separator in `Set-Cookie` headers. Because `serializeCookie()` writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header.\n\nFor example, a `domain` of `\"legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld\"` serializes to `session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld`. RFC 6265 \u00a75.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets `SameSite=None` or `Max-Age` when the caller has not set those options itself.\n\nThe `value` field is unaffected: it passes through `encodeURIComponent`, which encodes `;`. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject `;`, and `serializeCookie()` now validates before writing the header.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not pass user input into `name`, `domain`, or `path`; set them from application constants.",
  "id": "GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfr",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T15:57:32Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T15:57:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115779"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/pull/6763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/pull/6765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/commit/4a57af24011db1d66e947289d2f7ffc2074696d2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/commit/5859b373b9be04d5037a594196b4743ad80379bd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/releases/tag/@effect/platform@0.97.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/releases/tag/effect@4.0.0-beta.103"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Effect: Cookie attribute injection via domain, path, and name fields in @effect/platform makeCookie()"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…