GHSA-9WG5-MJ3P-V49Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:57 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:57
VLAI
Summary
Forge: Certificate signature verified with the issuer's RSA signature scheme
Details

Summary

When verifying a certificate, node-forge chose the RSA padding scheme (PKCS#1 v1.5 or RSASSA-PSS) and PSS parameters from the issuer certificate's own signature algorithm instead of the certificate being verified. A certificate labeled as signed with RSASSA-PSS could pass verifyCertificateChain() with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.

Details

certificate.verify(child) in lib/x509.js hashes the child's TBSCertificate with the digest of the child's signature algorithm, then calls _verifySignature() with the issuer certificate. _verifySignature() selected the padding scheme from that certificate's signatureOid and signatureParameters, so the child was verified with the issuer's own scheme rather than the one the child declares.

As a result, a child certificate whose signature algorithm says RSASSA-PSS was accepted with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature when the issuer itself was signed with PKCS#1 v1.5. The outer signatureAlgorithm field of a certificate is not covered by the signature, so an existing PKCS#1 v1.5 (SHA-256) certificate can be relabeled as RSASSA-PSS and still pass verification. The signature itself must still be made with the issuer's private key over the certificate's contents; no certificate can be forged.

The same cause made correctly signed chains fail: a PKCS#1 v1.5 certificate issued by an RSASSA-PSS-signed certificate, or the reverse, was rejected.

The fix verifies with the child certificate's signature scheme and parameters and the issuer's public key.

Patches

Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. Certificate signatures are verified with the scheme of the certificate's own signature algorithm.

Workarounds

Applications that make decisions based on a certificate's signature algorithm can verify the signature themselves with that algorithm's scheme and the issuer's public key.

References

  • https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4055#section-3 (RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm in certificates)
  • https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 (Certificate signatureAlgorithm)
  • https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html (CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature)

Severity

CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (3.7, Low) CVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.3) CVSS 4.0 rates this Moderate because its integrity weighting is higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.

Credits

Reported by Brian Lee (@hibrian827, Georgia Tech SSLab, Team Atlanta), who also suggested the fix.

Proof of concept

Create a CA certificate signed with sha256WithRSAEncryption, and a leaf certificate whose signature algorithm fields (outer and in the TBSCertificate) are RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256/MGF1-SHA-256/salt 32, but sign the leaf's TBSCertificate with the CA key using PKCS#1 v1.5 (caKey.sign(sha256)).

On 1.4.0, forge.pki.verifyCertificateChain(forge.pki.createCaStore([ca]), [leaf]) returns true, although verifying the leaf's signature with RSASSA-PSS fails. On 1.4.1 it throws "Certificate signature is invalid.".

No private key is needed for the same result: take any certificate signed by the CA with sha256WithRSAEncryption and replace only its outer signatureAlgorithm (outside the signed TBSCertificate) with the RSASSA-PSS identifier above. On 1.4.0 it still verifies and reports signatureOid as RSASSA-PSS; on 1.4.1 it is rejected.

Regression tests are in tests/unit/x509.js ("signature scheme of the child certificate").

Impact

Applications that rely on a certificate's declared signature algorithm, for example a policy that only accepts RSASSA-PSS-signed certificates, can be given a certificate labeled RSASSA-PSS whose signature was verified as PKCS#1 v1.5. The certificate must still have been signed by the trusted issuer's key, so the identity it certifies cannot be forged. There is no confidentiality or availability impact.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-forge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-118774"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:57:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T19:17:19Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen verifying a certificate, node-forge chose the RSA padding scheme (PKCS#1 v1.5 or RSASSA-PSS) and PSS parameters from the issuer certificate\u0027s own signature algorithm instead of the certificate being verified. A certificate labeled as signed with RSASSA-PSS could pass `verifyCertificateChain()` with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.\n\n### Details\n\n`certificate.verify(child)` in `lib/x509.js` hashes the child\u0027s TBSCertificate with the digest of the child\u0027s signature algorithm, then calls `_verifySignature()` with the issuer certificate. `_verifySignature()` selected the padding scheme from that certificate\u0027s `signatureOid` and `signatureParameters`, so the child was verified with the issuer\u0027s own scheme rather than the one the child declares.\n\nAs a result, a child certificate whose signature algorithm says RSASSA-PSS was accepted with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature when the issuer itself was signed with PKCS#1 v1.5. The outer `signatureAlgorithm` field of a certificate is not covered by the signature, so an existing PKCS#1 v1.5 (SHA-256) certificate can be relabeled as RSASSA-PSS and still pass verification. The signature itself must still be made with the issuer\u0027s private key over the certificate\u0027s contents; no certificate can be forged.\n\nThe same cause made correctly signed chains fail: a PKCS#1 v1.5 certificate issued by an RSASSA-PSS-signed certificate, or the reverse, was rejected.\n\nThe fix verifies with the child certificate\u0027s signature scheme and parameters and the issuer\u0027s public key.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in node-forge 1.4.1. Certificate signatures are verified with the scheme of the certificate\u0027s own signature algorithm.\n\n### Workarounds\nApplications that make decisions based on a certificate\u0027s signature algorithm can verify the signature themselves with that algorithm\u0027s scheme and the issuer\u0027s public key.\n\n### References\n- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4055#section-3 (RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm in certificates)\n- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 (Certificate signatureAlgorithm)\n- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html (CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature)\n\n### Severity\nCVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (3.7, Low)\nCVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.3)\nCVSS 4.0 rates this Moderate because its integrity weighting is higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.\n\n### Credits\nReported by Brian Lee (@hibrian827, Georgia Tech SSLab, Team Atlanta), who also suggested the fix.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nCreate a CA certificate signed with sha256WithRSAEncryption, and a leaf certificate whose signature algorithm fields (outer and in the TBSCertificate) are RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256/MGF1-SHA-256/salt 32, but sign the leaf\u0027s TBSCertificate with the CA key using PKCS#1 v1.5 (`caKey.sign(sha256)`).\n\nOn 1.4.0, `forge.pki.verifyCertificateChain(forge.pki.createCaStore([ca]), [leaf])` returns `true`, although verifying the leaf\u0027s signature with RSASSA-PSS fails. On 1.4.1 it throws \"Certificate signature is invalid.\".\n\nNo private key is needed for the same result: take any certificate signed by the CA with sha256WithRSAEncryption and replace only its outer signatureAlgorithm (outside the signed TBSCertificate) with the RSASSA-PSS identifier above. On 1.4.0 it still verifies and reports `signatureOid` as RSASSA-PSS; on 1.4.1 it is rejected.\n\nRegression tests are in tests/unit/x509.js (\"signature scheme of the child certificate\").\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications that rely on a certificate\u0027s declared signature algorithm, for example a policy that only accepts RSASSA-PSS-signed certificates, can be given a certificate labeled RSASSA-PSS whose signature was verified as PKCS#1 v1.5. The certificate must still have been signed by the trusted issuer\u0027s key, so the identity it certifies cannot be forged. There is no confidentiality or availability impact.",
  "id": "GHSA-9wg5-mj3p-v49q",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T15:57:48Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T15:57:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-9wg5-mj3p-v49q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118774"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/c7f42614d5166a77ddf11ce174b2601b14f6956b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/releases/tag/v1.4.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Forge: Certificate signature verified with the issuer\u0027s RSA signature scheme"
}



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