GHSA-9W6V-M7WP-JWG4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-04-29 17:58 – Updated: 2021-08-25 21:03
VLAI
Summary
Http request which redirect to another hostname do not strip authorization header in @actions/http-client
Details

Impact

If consumers of the http-client: 1. make an http request with an authorization header 2. that request leads to a redirect (302) and 3. the redirect url redirects to another domain or hostname

The authorization header will get passed to the other domain.

Note that since this library is for actions, the GITHUB_TOKEN that is available in actions is generated and scoped per job with these permissions.

Patches

The problem is fixed in 1.0.8 at npm here. In 1.0.8, the authorization header is stripped before making the redirected request if the hostname is different.

Workarounds

None.

References

https://github.com/actions/http-client/pull/27

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in https://github.com/actions/http-client/issues

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@actions/http-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-11021"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-04-29T17:58:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-04-29T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nIf consumers of the http-client:\n  1. make an http request with an authorization header\n  2. that request leads to a redirect (302) and\n  3. the redirect url redirects to another domain or hostname \n\nThe authorization header will get passed to the other domain.\n\nNote that since this library is for actions, the GITHUB_TOKEN that is available in actions is generated and scoped per job with [these permissions](https://help.github.com/en/actions/configuring-and-managing-workflows/authenticating-with-the-github_token#permissions-for-the-github_token).\n\n### Patches\nThe problem is fixed in 1.0.8 at [npm here](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@actions/http-client).  In 1.0.8, the authorization header is stripped before making the redirected request if the hostname is different.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone.\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/actions/http-client/pull/27\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in https://github.com/actions/http-client/issues",
  "id": "GHSA-9w6v-m7wp-jwg4",
  "modified": "2021-08-25T21:03:11Z",
  "published": "2020-04-29T17:58:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actions/http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-9w6v-m7wp-jwg4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actions/http-client/pull/27"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actions/http-client/commit/f6aae3dda4f4c9dc0b49737b36007330f78fd53a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actions/http-client"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Http request which redirect to another hostname do not strip authorization header in @actions/http-client"
}



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