GHSA-8V59-QMWV-4P6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:58 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:58Impact
0.31.0 fixed GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, where text from a Compose file became GitHub Actions workflow commands in compose-lint's output. The fix escapes the command openers in compose-lint's own output, but not in the argument parser's error messages. When a repository path reaches compose-lint's arguments without a -- before it, the argument parser prints it raw in its error message. That includes a carriage return, which the runner treats as a line break, so a command can also start a new line there.
A pull request can therefore create annotations, fold or hide parts of the job log, or issue other commands the runner accepts, when CI runs compose-lint over it, before anyone reviews it. The pass/fail result is not changed.
Affected setups pass repository paths to compose-lint without a -- before them: the pre-commit hook when args: is set without the documented trailing --, or the compose-lint package or Docker image called that way in a workflow. The pre-commit hook's default configuration passes -- and is not affected. The GitHub Action turns command processing off around each compose-lint run, so it is not affected.
Found during an internal pre-1.0 security review. It was first published as part of GHSA-r7j4-crjv-h467, together with four other gaps in the same fix. Each gap now has its own advisory.
Docker image. composelint/compose-lint tag 0.31.0 and the matching minor tag are affected, as was latest while it pointed to 0.31.0.
Releases before 0.31.0 are covered by GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6.
Patches
Fixed in 0.32.0. The argument parser's messages go through the same sanitizer as the rest of compose-lint's output.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to 0.32.0 or later.
- End the pre-commit hook's
args:with--, and put--before file paths when calling compose-lint directly. - On GitHub Actions, use the
tmatens/compose-lintAction, or bracket the compose-lint step with::stop-commands::<random token>and::<token>::, as the Action does.
Reproduction
On compose-lint 0.31.0 on a GitHub-hosted runner (runner 2.337.0), compose-lint '--##[warning]X/compose.yml' with no -- creates an annotation. The same path after -- creates none. The composelint/compose-lint:0.31.0 image produces byte-identical output to the package.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "compose-lint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.31.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.31.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-117",
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:58:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T17:17:26Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n0.31.0 fixed GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, where text from a Compose file became GitHub Actions workflow commands in compose-lint\u0027s output. The fix escapes the command openers in compose-lint\u0027s own output, but not in the argument parser\u0027s error messages. When a repository path reaches compose-lint\u0027s arguments without a `--` before it, the argument parser prints it raw in its error message. That includes a carriage return, which the runner treats as a line break, so a command can also start a new line there.\n\nA pull request can therefore create annotations, fold or hide parts of the job log, or issue other commands the runner accepts, when CI runs compose-lint over it, before anyone reviews it. The pass/fail result is not changed.\n\nAffected setups pass repository paths to compose-lint without a `--` before them: the pre-commit hook when `args:` is set without the documented trailing `--`, or the `compose-lint` package or Docker image called that way in a workflow. The pre-commit hook\u0027s default configuration passes `--` and is not affected. The GitHub Action turns command processing off around each compose-lint run, so it is not affected.\n\nFound during an internal pre-1.0 security review. It was first published as part of GHSA-r7j4-crjv-h467, together with four other gaps in the same fix. Each gap now has its own advisory.\n\n**Docker image.** `composelint/compose-lint` tag 0.31.0 and the matching minor tag are affected, as was `latest` while it pointed to 0.31.0.\n\nReleases before 0.31.0 are covered by GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 0.32.0. The argument parser\u0027s messages go through the same sanitizer as the rest of compose-lint\u0027s output.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to 0.32.0 or later.\n- End the pre-commit hook\u0027s `args:` with `--`, and put `--` before file paths when calling compose-lint directly.\n- On GitHub Actions, use the `tmatens/compose-lint` Action, or bracket the compose-lint step with `::stop-commands::\u003crandom token\u003e` and `::\u003ctoken\u003e::`, as the Action does.\n\n### Reproduction\n\nOn compose-lint 0.31.0 on a GitHub-hosted runner (runner 2.337.0), `compose-lint \u0027--##[warning]X/compose.yml\u0027` with no `--` creates an annotation. The same path after `--` creates none. The `composelint/compose-lint:0.31.0` image produces byte-identical output to the package.",
"id": "GHSA-8v59-qmwv-4p6q",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:58:53Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:58:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/security/advisories/GHSA-8v59-qmwv-4p6q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/pull/945"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/commit/542e63126f795564a65c63887ea0dc558a500688"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/releases/tag/v0.32.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "compose-lint: File paths embedded in pull requests can inject CI workflow commands through command-line error messages\u00a0"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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