GHSA-86M8-88FQ-XFXP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 16:50 – Updated: 2026-05-29 16:50
VLAI
Summary
Gotenberg has an SSRF deny-list bypass in IsPublicIP via IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local prefixes
Details

Summary

IsPublicIP in pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go incorrectly classifies IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / deprecated site-local addresses as public IPs, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to reach internal destinations (e.g., cloud metadata services at 169.254.169.254) via a single crafted DNS AAAA record. This is a variant of CVE-2026-44430 (modelcontextprotocol/registry).

Details

IsPublicIP uses Go stdlib helpers (IsLoopback, IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, etc.) to block internal IPs. However, these helpers do not recognize IPv6 prefixes that embed IPv4 addresses:

Prefix RFC Tunnels to
2002::/16 RFC 3056 (6to4) IPv4 in bits 16-47
64:ff9b::/96 RFC 6052 (NAT64 well-known) IPv4 in low 32 bits
64:ff9b:1::/48 RFC 8215 (NAT64 local-use) IPv4 in low 32 bits
fec0::/10 RFC 3879 (deprecated site-local) internal routing

addr.Unmap() only handles ::ffff:0:0/96 (IPv4-mapped) and has no effect on these prefixes. On dual-stack or NAT64-enabled cloud hosts, the OS kernel transparently routes these addresses to their embedded internal IPv4 destinations.

Vulnerable code (pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go L53-69, commit 93d0103):

func IsPublicIP(addr netip.Addr) bool {
    addr = addr.Unmap() // only handles ::ffff:x.x.x.x
    switch {
    case addr.IsLoopback(), addr.IsPrivate(),
         addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast(), ...:
        return false
    }
    return true // 6to4/NAT64/site-local incorrectly reaches here
}

PoC

cd poc/
./build.sh   # docker build (~30s)
./run.sh     # docker run — exits with code 1 (bug detected)

Expected output: IsPublicIP(2002:a9fe:a9fe::) = true — the function returns true for 3 addresses that wrap 169.254.169.254 (AWS IMDS). Full test file available via GHSA private comment on request.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker controlling a DNS AAAA record can tunnel gotenberg's outbound HTTP client to AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS (169.254.169.254), leaking IAM credentials. The Chromium URL convert route returns the full response as a PDF (full-read SSRF). Affects all deployments with WithDenyPrivateIPs(true) on dual-stack or NAT64-enabled hosts.

Suggested Fix

Add explicit prefix checks after addr.Unmap():

var blockedIPv6Prefixes = []netip.Prefix{
    netip.MustParsePrefix("2002::/16"),
    netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b::/96"),
    netip.MustParsePrefix("64:ff9b:1::/48"),
    netip.MustParsePrefix("fec0::/10"),
}
for _, p := range blockedIPv6Prefixes {
    if p.Contains(addr) { return false }
}
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "8.32.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45741"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T16:50:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`IsPublicIP` in `pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go` incorrectly classifies IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / deprecated site-local addresses as public IPs, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to reach internal destinations (e.g., cloud metadata services at `169.254.169.254`) via a single crafted DNS AAAA record. This is a variant of CVE-2026-44430 (modelcontextprotocol/registry).\n\n### Details\n\n`IsPublicIP` uses Go stdlib helpers (`IsLoopback`, `IsPrivate`, `IsLinkLocalUnicast`, etc.) to block internal IPs. However, these helpers do not recognize IPv6 prefixes that embed IPv4 addresses:\n\n| Prefix | RFC | Tunnels to |\n|--------|-----|-----------|\n| `2002::/16` | RFC 3056 (6to4) | IPv4 in bits 16-47 |\n| `64:ff9b::/96` | RFC 6052 (NAT64 well-known) | IPv4 in low 32 bits |\n| `64:ff9b:1::/48` | RFC 8215 (NAT64 local-use) | IPv4 in low 32 bits |\n| `fec0::/10` | RFC 3879 (deprecated site-local) | internal routing |\n\n`addr.Unmap()` only handles `::ffff:0:0/96` (IPv4-mapped) and has no effect on these prefixes. On dual-stack or NAT64-enabled cloud hosts, the OS kernel transparently routes these addresses to their embedded internal IPv4 destinations.\n\nVulnerable code (`pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go` L53-69, commit `93d0103`):\n\n```go\nfunc IsPublicIP(addr netip.Addr) bool {\n    addr = addr.Unmap() // only handles ::ffff:x.x.x.x\n    switch {\n    case addr.IsLoopback(), addr.IsPrivate(),\n         addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast(), ...:\n        return false\n    }\n    return true // 6to4/NAT64/site-local incorrectly reaches here\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n```\ncd poc/\n./build.sh   # docker build (~30s)\n./run.sh     # docker run \u2014 exits with code 1 (bug detected)\n```\n\nExpected output: `IsPublicIP(2002:a9fe:a9fe::) = true` \u2014 the function returns true for 3 addresses that wrap 169.254.169.254 (AWS IMDS). Full test file available via GHSA private comment on request.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker controlling a DNS AAAA record can tunnel gotenberg\u0027s outbound HTTP client to AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS (169.254.169.254), leaking IAM credentials. The Chromium URL convert route returns the full response as a PDF (full-read SSRF). Affects all deployments with `WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)` on dual-stack or NAT64-enabled hosts.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nAdd explicit prefix checks after `addr.Unmap()`:\n```\nvar blockedIPv6Prefixes = []netip.Prefix{\n    netip.MustParsePrefix(\"2002::/16\"),\n    netip.MustParsePrefix(\"64:ff9b::/96\"),\n    netip.MustParsePrefix(\"64:ff9b:1::/48\"),\n    netip.MustParsePrefix(\"fec0::/10\"),\n}\nfor _, p := range blockedIPv6Prefixes {\n    if p.Contains(addr) { return false }\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-86m8-88fq-xfxp",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T16:50:37Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T16:50:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-86m8-88fq-xfxp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gotenberg has an SSRF deny-list bypass in IsPublicIP via IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local prefixes"
}



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