GHSA-6889-VF6X-F3G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:18 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:18Summary
ed25519.verify() does not reject public keys of small order, such as the identity point. Under such a key, a signature with S = 0 and a small-order R verifies for many messages, or for every message with the identity key, without any private key. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.
Details
crypto_sign_open() in lib/ed25519.js decodes the public key A with unpackneg(), which only checks that the point is on the curve, and then checks R == [S]B - [k]A with k = SHA-512(R || A || M). Nothing rejects public keys of small order: the identity point, the other 7 points of order 2, 4 or 8, and their non-canonical encodings with y >= p.
With S = 0, the check becomes R == [k](-A). For a small-order A, [k](-A) is one of at most 8 small-order points, so an attacker can make a valid signature by trying the small-order values of R. For the identity key (01 00 … 00), R = identity and S = 0 verifies for every message. For the other small-order keys, a given message can be forged with high probability. No private key is involved. The S < L check added for CVE-2026-33895 (GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw) doesn't apply, because S = 0 is canonical.
Keys produced by Ed25519 key generation (ed25519.generateKeyPair() or any RFC 8032 implementation) are never small-order, so signatures under them cannot be forged this way. Applications are affected when they verify signatures against a public key an attacker can choose (for example a key included with the signed data, a self-registered key, or a key in an attacker-controlled document) and rely on the signature being bound to the message: proof of possession, attribution, non-repudiation or deduplication.
RFC 8032 doesn't require rejecting small-order public keys, and implementations differ. libsodium rejects them, and Node.js crypto.verify() (OpenSSL) rejects these signatures.
The fix rejects a public key A when [8]A is the identity point. This covers all small-order points and their non-canonical encodings.
Patches
Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3. ed25519.verify() returns false for small-order public keys.
Workarounds
Before calling ed25519.verify() with a public key from untrusted input, reject keys whose 32-byte encoding is one of the small-order points (the identity 01 00 … 00 and the other encodings that libsodium blocks), or only verify against keys you generated or have otherwise validated.
Resources
- RFC 8032, Section 5.1.7 (Ed25519 verification): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032#section-5.1.7
- GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw / CVE-2026-33895 (a different Ed25519 verification issue, fixed in 1.4.0): https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw
Severity
CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (3.7, Low) CVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.3) CVSS 4.0 rates this Moderate because its integrity weighting is higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.
Credits
Reported by @analisaperlengkapan.
Proof of concept
Identity public key A = 01 00 … 00 (32 bytes) and signature R = 01 00 … 00, S = 00 … 00 (64 bytes):
forge.ed25519.verify({message: 'admin=true', encoding: 'utf8',
signature: SIG, publicKey: IDENTITY});
// <= 1.4.2: true for any message; node:crypto.verify(): false
// 1.4.3: false
Other small-order public keys (orders 2, 4 and 8, and non-canonical encodings) give forgeries for many messages with S = 0 and a small-order R.
Regression tests are in tests/unit/ed25519.js, and the reporter's PoC is in tests/pocs/ghsa-6889-vf6x-f3g5.js.
Impact
Applications that verify Ed25519 signatures with node-forge against a public key that an attacker can choose are affected. An attacker can provide a small-order public key and then produce signatures that verify for many or all messages without a private key, defeating checks that rely on a signature being bound to its message under that key (proof of possession, attribution, non-repudiation, deduplication). Signatures under keys from honest key generation cannot be forged, and applications that only verify against their own or otherwise trusted keys are not affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "node-forge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125335"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:18:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`ed25519.verify()` does not reject public keys of small order, such as the identity point. Under such a key, a signature with `S = 0` and a small-order `R` verifies for many messages, or for every message with the identity key, without any private key. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.\n\n### Details\n`crypto_sign_open()` in `lib/ed25519.js` decodes the public key `A` with `unpackneg()`, which only checks that the point is on the curve, and then checks `R == [S]B - [k]A` with `k = SHA-512(R || A || M)`. Nothing rejects public keys of small order: the identity point, the other 7 points of order 2, 4 or 8, and their non-canonical encodings with `y \u003e= p`.\n\nWith `S = 0`, the check becomes `R == [k](-A)`. For a small-order `A`, `[k](-A)` is one of at most 8 small-order points, so an attacker can make a valid signature by trying the small-order values of `R`. For the identity key (`01 00 \u2026 00`), `R = identity` and `S = 0` verifies for every message. For the other small-order keys, a given message can be forged with high probability. No private key is involved. The `S \u003c L` check added for CVE-2026-33895 (GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw) doesn\u0027t apply, because `S = 0` is canonical.\n\nKeys produced by Ed25519 key generation (`ed25519.generateKeyPair()` or any RFC 8032 implementation) are never small-order, so signatures under them cannot be forged this way. Applications are affected when they verify signatures against a public key an attacker can choose (for example a key included with the signed data, a self-registered key, or a key in an attacker-controlled document) and rely on the signature being bound to the message: proof of possession, attribution, non-repudiation or deduplication.\n\nRFC 8032 doesn\u0027t require rejecting small-order public keys, and implementations differ. libsodium rejects them, and Node.js `crypto.verify()` (OpenSSL) rejects these signatures.\n\nThe fix rejects a public key `A` when `[8]A` is the identity point. This covers all small-order points and their non-canonical encodings.\n\n#### Patches\nFixed in node-forge 1.4.3. `ed25519.verify()` returns `false` for small-order public keys.\n\n#### Workarounds\nBefore calling `ed25519.verify()` with a public key from untrusted input, reject keys whose 32-byte encoding is one of the small-order points (the identity `01 00 \u2026 00` and the other encodings that libsodium blocks), or only verify against keys you generated or have otherwise validated.\n\n#### Resources\n- RFC 8032, Section 5.1.7 (Ed25519 verification): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032#section-5.1.7\n- GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw / CVE-2026-33895 (a different Ed25519 verification issue, fixed in 1.4.0): https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw\n\n#### Severity\nCVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (3.7, Low)\nCVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.3)\nCVSS 4.0 rates this Moderate because its integrity weighting is higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.\n\n#### Credits\nReported by @analisaperlengkapan.\n\n### Proof of concept\nIdentity public key `A = 01 00 \u2026 00` (32 bytes) and signature `R = 01 00 \u2026 00`, `S = 00 \u2026 00` (64 bytes):\n\n forge.ed25519.verify({message: \u0027admin=true\u0027, encoding: \u0027utf8\u0027,\n signature: SIG, publicKey: IDENTITY});\n // \u003c= 1.4.2: true for any message; node:crypto.verify(): false\n // 1.4.3: false\n\nOther small-order public keys (orders 2, 4 and 8, and non-canonical encodings) give forgeries for many messages with `S = 0` and a small-order `R`.\n\nRegression tests are in tests/unit/ed25519.js, and the reporter\u0027s PoC is in tests/pocs/ghsa-6889-vf6x-f3g5.js.\n\n### Impact\nApplications that verify Ed25519 signatures with node-forge against a public key that an attacker can choose are affected. An attacker can provide a small-order public key and then produce signatures that verify for many or all messages without a private key, defeating checks that rely on a signature being bound to its message under that key (proof of possession, attribution, non-repudiation, deduplication). Signatures under keys from honest key generation cannot be forged, and applications that only verify against their own or otherwise trusted keys are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-6889-vf6x-f3g5",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:18:23Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:18:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-6889-vf6x-f3g5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/pull/1169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/1b77e6f20082d7484479303d0252d5f427651295"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/releases/tag/v1.4.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Forge: Ed25519 signature verification accepts small-order public keys"
}
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|---|
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