GHSA-5J9R-FX4X-RPVG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 19:50 – Updated: 2026-10-28 19:50Summary
The /credentials/signurl endpoint decides authorization from the client-supplied X-Rucio-Account HTTP header instead of the authenticated token's account. Any client holding any valid auth token (even a low-privilege account they legitimately own) can send X-Rucio-Account: root to pass the root-only permission check and have the Rucio server mint a presigned read / write / delete URL for an arbitrary object, signed with the RSE's stored S3 / GCS / Swift credentials.
Details
SignURL.get() takes the authorization principal from a request header and
never uses the token-authenticated identity:
# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/credentials.py
account = request.headers.get('X-Rucio-Account', default=None) # L165 (attacker-controlled)
...
result = get_signed_url(account, rse=rse, service=service, # L194
operation=operation, url=url, lifetime=lifetime, vo=vo)
The gateway then uses that header value as the issuer for the permission check:
# lib/rucio/gateway/credential.py
auth_result = permission.has_permission(issuer=account, vo=vo, # L57
action='get_signed_url', kwargs=kwargs, ...)
and the permission function is root-only:
# lib/rucio/core/permission/generic.py
def perm_get_signed_url(issuer, kwargs, session):
return _is_root(issuer) # _is_root(x) -> x.external == 'root'
InternalAccount('root', vo).external == 'root' unconditionally, so the gate passes whenever the header is root. The endpoint is on AuthenticatedBlueprint, whose before_request hook validates the token and sets request.environ['issuer'] from the token — but nothing ever compares X-Rucio-Account to it:
# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/common.py (request_auth_env)
flask.request.environ['issuer'] = auth.get('account') # L168 (the real account; unused by SignURL)
This is anomalous: every other authenticated handler derives the account from request.environ['issuer']; credentials.py is the only one that trusts the header. Additionally, core.credential.get_signed_url never checks that the supplied url's host/bucket belongs to the target RSE, so even a legitimate root caller gets an arbitrary-object signing oracle. In multi-VO the VO is also read from the X-Rucio-VO header, allowing cross-tenant targeting.
Proof of concept
Request (any valid token + spoofed account):
GET /credentials/signurl?rse=<cloudRSE>&svc=s3&op=delete&url=https://victim-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/important/dataset.root HTTP/1.1
X-Rucio-Auth-Token: <any valid token, even a low-privilege account>
X-Rucio-Account: root
Accept: application/octet-stream
Response: 200 OK with a presigned DELETE URL the attacker replays directly against the storage backend.
Impact
A low-privilege Rucio user can read, overwrite, and delete arbitrary objects on any cloud-backed (S3/GCS/Swift) RSE using the server's stored credentials — enabling data exfiltration, tampering, and destruction, and cross-tenant access in multi-VO deployments.
Credit
Reported by seankohjs. Found via static analysis + manual verification.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "rucio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.16.1"
},
{
"fixed": "35.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "rucio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "36.0.0rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "38.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "rucio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "39.0.0rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "41.0.0rc1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58273"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T19:50:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe `/credentials/signurl` endpoint decides authorization from the client-supplied `X-Rucio-Account` HTTP header instead of the authenticated token\u0027s account. Any client holding **any** valid auth token (even a low-privilege account they legitimately own) can send `X-Rucio-Account: root` to pass the root-only permission check and have the Rucio server mint a presigned **read / write / delete** URL for an **arbitrary** object, signed with the RSE\u0027s stored S3 / GCS / Swift credentials.\n\n## Details\n`SignURL.get()` takes the authorization principal from a request header and\nnever uses the token-authenticated identity:\n\n```python\n# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/credentials.py\naccount = request.headers.get(\u0027X-Rucio-Account\u0027, default=None) # L165 (attacker-controlled)\n...\nresult = get_signed_url(account, rse=rse, service=service, # L194\n operation=operation, url=url, lifetime=lifetime, vo=vo)\n```\n\nThe gateway then uses that header value as the `issuer` for the permission check:\n\n```python\n# lib/rucio/gateway/credential.py\nauth_result = permission.has_permission(issuer=account, vo=vo, # L57\n action=\u0027get_signed_url\u0027, kwargs=kwargs, ...)\n```\n\nand the permission function is root-only:\n\n```python\n# lib/rucio/core/permission/generic.py\ndef perm_get_signed_url(issuer, kwargs, session):\n return _is_root(issuer) # _is_root(x) -\u003e x.external == \u0027root\u0027\n```\n\n`InternalAccount(\u0027root\u0027, vo).external == \u0027root\u0027` unconditionally, so the gate passes whenever the header is `root`. The endpoint is on `AuthenticatedBlueprint`, whose `before_request` hook validates the token and sets `request.environ[\u0027issuer\u0027]` **from the token** \u2014 but nothing ever compares `X-Rucio-Account` to it:\n\n```python\n# lib/rucio/web/rest/flaskapi/v1/common.py (request_auth_env)\nflask.request.environ[\u0027issuer\u0027] = auth.get(\u0027account\u0027) # L168 (the real account; unused by SignURL)\n```\n\nThis is anomalous: every other authenticated handler derives the account from `request.environ[\u0027issuer\u0027]`; `credentials.py` is the only one that trusts the header. Additionally, `core.credential.get_signed_url` never checks that the supplied `url`\u0027s host/bucket belongs to the target RSE, so even a legitimate `root` caller gets an arbitrary-object signing oracle. In multi-VO the VO is also read from the `X-Rucio-VO` header, allowing cross-tenant targeting.\n\n## Proof of concept\nRequest (any valid token + spoofed account):\n```\nGET /credentials/signurl?rse=\u003ccloudRSE\u003e\u0026svc=s3\u0026op=delete\u0026url=https://victim-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/important/dataset.root HTTP/1.1\nX-Rucio-Auth-Token: \u003cany valid token, even a low-privilege account\u003e\nX-Rucio-Account: root\nAccept: application/octet-stream\n```\nResponse: `200 OK` with a presigned DELETE URL the attacker replays directly against the storage backend.\n\n## Impact\nA low-privilege Rucio user can read, overwrite, and delete arbitrary objects on any cloud-backed (S3/GCS/Swift) RSE using the server\u0027s stored credentials \u2014 enabling data exfiltration, tampering, and destruction, and cross-tenant access in multi-VO deployments.\n\n## Credit\nReported by seankohjs. Found via static analysis + manual verification.",
"id": "GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg",
"modified": "2026-10-28T19:50:05Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T19:50:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/security/advisories/GHSA-5j9r-fx4x-rpvg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/commit/64c0e6a6a93ae88427ff3b7d77532ce08c8a69ec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/commit/8bdc38994a8766658d0314d36afc104c9242c96f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/commit/8d9ba31514e6f5dca32b8c1db4738582cb37ec3a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/35.9.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/38.6.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rucio/rucio/releases/tag/41.0.0rc1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "rucio has an Authorization Bypass on REST API endpoint for signing URLs"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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