GHSA-5G9X-QWH5-33X4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 21:19 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:19
VLAI
Summary
djangocms-versioning: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Missing Authorization
Details

Summary

The discard and edit_redirect version transitions did not enforce a per-object change-permission check, while the sibling transitions (archive, publish, unpublish, revert) all did. As a result a low-privileged staff user could discard (delete) any draft version — and thereby the underlying content object — of content they have no change permission on, and could create an editable draft off any published version, by supplying a version primary key they should not have access to (an insecure direct object reference).

Details

Version state transitions are guarded by Conditions objects declared on djangocms_versioning.models.Version. Every transition that mutates content carries the user_can_change condition, which delegates to the content object's own permission check (Version.has_change_permission → content.has_change_permission / has_placeholder_change_permission, with a final fallback to the Django change_<model> permission).

Two conditions were missing that check:

# Before (vulnerable)
check_discard = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])

The corresponding admin views authorize only through these conditions:

  • VersionAdmin.discard_view / VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view fetch the target with the stock ModelAdmin.get_object, which is backed by the unfiltered default queryset — no per-user or per-grouper scoping.
  • The views are registered with admin_site.admin_view, which enforces only is_staff.
  • discard_view deletes the version directly via version.delete() and never consults VersionAdmin.has_delete_permission (which otherwise delegates to the content admin and honors ALLOW_DELETING_VERSIONS).

Because the only per-object gate for these two operations was the Conditions list, and that list omitted user_can_change, any staff user could invoke the operation on any version by its primary key. The changelist action buttons are disabled in the UI via check_discard.as_bool / check_edit_redirect.as_bool, but that is a client-side affordance only and does not protect the directly reachable admin URLs.

Impact

  • Type: Broken access control / missing authorization (IDOR).
  • Who is affected: Multi-editor deployments where staff users hold differentiated per-object permissions.
  • Under CMS_PERMISSION = True, authorization for these two operations was effectively reduced to is_staff, so any staff user could discard or edit-redirect any version.
  • Under the default CMS_PERMISSION = False, it degrades to the global change_<model> permission (e.g. cms.change_page) — weaker than the intended per-object check, but not absent.
  • Consequence: Unauthorized deletion of draft versions and their content objects (integrity/availability of content), and unauthorized creation of drafts from published content.

Patches

Fixed by adding the user_can_change condition to both check_discard and check_edit_redirect, restoring parity with the other content-mutating transitions:

# After (fixed)
check_discard = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),
    user_can_change(change_permission_error),
    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),
])
check_edit_redirect = Conditions([
    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _("Version is not in draft or published state")),
    user_can_change(change_permission_error),
    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),
])

discard intentionally requires change permission (not delete): it is treated as undoing changes to a draft.

Upgrade to djangocms-versioning 2.6.1 or later.

Workarounds

There is no configuration-only workaround. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict staff accounts to trusted users, since the missing gate reduces to is_staff under CMS_PERMISSION = True.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.6.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "djangocms-versioning"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69138"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T21:19:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `discard` and `edit_redirect` version transitions did not enforce a per-object change-permission check, while the sibling transitions (`archive`, `publish`, `unpublish`, `revert`) all did. As a result a low-privileged staff user could **discard (delete) any draft version \u2014 and thereby the underlying content object \u2014 of content they have no change permission on**, and could create an editable draft off any published version, by supplying a version primary key they should not have access to (an insecure direct object reference).\n\n## Details\n\nVersion state transitions are guarded by `Conditions` objects declared on `djangocms_versioning.models.Version`. Every transition that mutates content carries the `user_can_change` condition, which delegates to the *content* object\u0027s own permission check (`Version.has_change_permission` \u2192 `content.has_change_permission` / `has_placeholder_change_permission`, with a final fallback to the Django `change_\u003cmodel\u003e` permission).\n\nTwo conditions were missing that check:\n\n```python\n# Before (vulnerable)\ncheck_discard = Conditions([\n    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),\n    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),\n])\ncheck_edit_redirect = Conditions([\n    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _(\"Version is not in draft or published state\")),\n    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),\n])\n```\n\nThe corresponding admin views authorize **only** through these conditions:\n\n* `VersionAdmin.discard_view` / `VersionAdmin.edit_redirect_view` fetch the  target with the stock `ModelAdmin.get_object`, which is backed by the   **unfiltered** default queryset \u2014 no per-user or per-grouper scoping.\n* The views are registered with `admin_site.admin_view`, which enforces only  `is_staff`.\n* `discard_view` deletes the version directly via `version.delete()` and   never consults `VersionAdmin.has_delete_permission` (which otherwise   delegates to the content admin and honors `ALLOW_DELETING_VERSIONS`).\n\nBecause the only per-object gate for these two operations was the `Conditions` list, and that list omitted `user_can_change`, any staff user could invoke the operation on any version by its primary key. The changelist action buttons are disabled in the UI via `check_discard.as_bool` / `check_edit_redirect.as_bool`, but that is a client-side affordance only and does not protect the directly reachable admin URLs.\n\n## Impact\n\n* **Type:** Broken access control / missing authorization (IDOR).\n* **Who is affected:** Multi-editor deployments where staff users hold  differentiated per-object permissions.\n  * Under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`, authorization for these two operations was   effectively reduced to `is_staff`, so any staff user could discard or    edit-redirect any version.\n  * Under the default `CMS_PERMISSION = False`, it degrades to the global    `change_\u003cmodel\u003e` permission (e.g. `cms.change_page`) \u2014 weaker than the  intended per-object check, but not absent.\n* **Consequence:** Unauthorized deletion of draft versions and their content objects (integrity/availability of content), and unauthorized creation of drafts from published content.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed by adding the `user_can_change` condition to both `check_discard` and `check_edit_redirect`, restoring parity with the other content-mutating transitions:\n\n```python\n# After (fixed)\ncheck_discard = Conditions([\n    in_state([constants.DRAFT], not_draft_error),\n    user_can_change(change_permission_error),\n    is_not_locked(lock_error_message),\n])\ncheck_edit_redirect = Conditions([\n    in_state([constants.DRAFT, constants.PUBLISHED], _(\"Version is not in draft or published state\")),\n    user_can_change(change_permission_error),\n    draft_is_not_locked(lock_draft_error_message),\n])\n```\n\n`discard` intentionally requires **change** permission (not delete): it is treated as undoing changes to a draft.\n\nUpgrade to `djangocms-versioning` `2.6.1` or later.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere is no configuration-only workaround. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict staff accounts to trusted users, since the missing gate reduces to `is_staff` under `CMS_PERMISSION = True`.",
  "id": "GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4",
  "modified": "2026-11-18T21:19:05Z",
  "published": "2026-11-18T21:19:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/security/advisories/GHSA-5g9x-qwh5-33x4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/pull/573"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/commit/d8c570daa5f7805e8be51f15545fe77b24c44daf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-cms/djangocms-versioning/releases/tag/2.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "djangocms-versioning: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Missing Authorization"
}



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