GHSA-52CR-C2C7-9X84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
neighbour: Enforce min/max to NDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS.
NDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS sets .type and .min but misses .validation_type, so no validation is applied:
# ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \ --json '{"name": "arp_cache", "parms": {"interval-probe-time-ms": 0}}'
# ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \ jq '.[] | select(.name == "arp_cache" and has("config")) | .parms["interval-probe-time-ms"]' 0
Moreover, nla_get_msecs() uses msecs_to_jiffies(), and u64 is silently cast to u32, so a larger value can bypass the min check:
e.g. 4294967296 == 0x100000000
# ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \ --json '{"name": "arp_cache", "parms": {"interval-probe-time-ms": 4294967296}}'
# ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \ jq '.[] | select(.name == "arp_cache" and has("config")) | .parms["interval-probe-time-ms"]' 0
msecs_to_jiffies() returns MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET if the value is larger than INT_MAX. Also, INT_MAX ms overflows int NEIGH_VAR() when HZ > 1000 (Alpha, MIPS), and passing a negative integer to queue_delayed_work(unsigned long delay) causes sign extension, which wraps around the expiry time to the past, resulting in it being handled as 0 delay in the timer wheel.
Let's use NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE() and limit the max to 1 day.
The same max check is applied to sysctl as well.
Note that this controls the probe interval for NTF_MANAGED entries, so the max of 1 day is unlikely to break any deployments.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98317"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:18:23Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nneighbour: Enforce min/max to NDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS.\n\nNDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS sets .type and .min but misses\n.validation_type, so no validation is applied:\n\n # ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \\\n --json \u0027{\"name\": \"arp_cache\", \"parms\": {\"interval-probe-time-ms\": 0}}\u0027\n\n # ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \\\n jq \u0027.[] | select(.name == \"arp_cache\" and has(\"config\"))\n | .parms[\"interval-probe-time-ms\"]\u0027\n 0\n\nMoreover, nla_get_msecs() uses msecs_to_jiffies(), and u64 is\nsilently cast to u32, so a larger value can bypass the min check:\n\n e.g. 4294967296 == 0x100000000\n\n # ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \\\n --json \u0027{\"name\": \"arp_cache\", \"parms\": {\"interval-probe-time-ms\": 4294967296}}\u0027\n\n # ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \\\n jq \u0027.[] | select(.name == \"arp_cache\" and has(\"config\"))\n | .parms[\"interval-probe-time-ms\"]\u0027\n 0\n\nmsecs_to_jiffies() returns MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET if the value is\nlarger than INT_MAX. Also, INT_MAX ms overflows int NEIGH_VAR()\nwhen HZ \u003e 1000 (Alpha, MIPS), and passing a negative integer to\nqueue_delayed_work(unsigned long delay) causes sign extension,\nwhich wraps around the expiry time to the past, resulting in it\nbeing handled as 0 delay in the timer wheel.\n\nLet\u0027s use NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE() and limit the max to 1 day.\n\nThe same max check is applied to sysctl as well.\n\nNote that this controls the probe interval for NTF_MANAGED\nentries, so the max of 1 day is unlikely to break any\ndeployments.",
"id": "GHSA-52cr-c2c7-9x84",
"modified": "2026-10-06T09:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98317"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d79b223ec44ada58ad37db42f539b60985a7722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8550b50e49b01b572e653e572f24ddd73949aa74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/982c7f66c04134b77126edbfd8a63ecd6928cfd9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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