GHSA-4QQV-FGH9-MG86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:34In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
calipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr()
calipso_skbuff_setattr() adjusts payload_len by the length of the option it inserts or resizes:
payload = ntohs(ip6_hdr->payload_len);
ip6_hdr->payload_len = htons(payload + len_delta);
GRO can build BIG TCP packets larger than IPV6_MAXPLEN, and stores payload_len == 0 for them; ipv6_payload_len() then falls back to skb->len. For such a packet forwarded to a destination mapped to CALIPSO, the code above writes len_delta (or 65536 + len_delta when shrinking) into payload_len, and ipv6_payload_len() no longer falls back to skb->len. nf_tables, conntrack and sch_cake rely on it.
The same arithmetic also wraps when a packet grows past IPV6_MAXPLEN, and a BIG TCP packet that shrinks below IPV6_MAXPLEN should get its real length back.
Set payload_len from the skb length with ipv6_set_payload_len(), which stores 0 above IPV6_MAXPLEN and the real length otherwise, as ipv6_gro_complete() does. The network header was just reset to skb->data, so skb->len - sizeof(*ip6_hdr) is the payload length.
Tested on one kernel (arm64, QEMU) with SELinux permissive, a minimal mdp-generated policy (network_peer_controls=1), "netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:16" and a NetLabel mapping of fd00:2::/64 to CALIPSO DOI 16. calipso_skbuff_setattr() was called through netlbl_skbuff_setattr() from a test-only debugfs hook (not part of this patch) adding a level-only label; payload_len after the call:
case before fix after fix real length 1000, unlabeled 1016 1016 1016 70000 GSO, payload_len 0 16 0 70016 65530 GSO, grows past MAXPLEN 10 0 65546 65540 GSO with a 24 byte hop header, shrinks below MAXPLEN 65528 65532 65532 1000 with a 24 byte hop header 992 992 992
(0 means ipv6_payload_len() returns the real length.) On the forward path, with a client injecting unlabeled UDP through a router to a server, the router adds the CALIPSO option and the server delivers all datagrams (Udp6InDatagrams 5, Ip6InTruncatedPkts 0) with this patch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99191"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:40Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncalipso: keep BIG TCP payload_len in calipso_skbuff_setattr()\n\ncalipso_skbuff_setattr() adjusts payload_len by the length of the\noption it inserts or resizes:\n\n\tpayload = ntohs(ip6_hdr-\u003epayload_len);\n\tip6_hdr-\u003epayload_len = htons(payload + len_delta);\n\nGRO can build BIG TCP packets larger than IPV6_MAXPLEN, and stores\npayload_len == 0 for them; ipv6_payload_len() then falls back to\nskb-\u003elen. For such a packet forwarded to a destination mapped to\nCALIPSO, the code above writes len_delta (or 65536 + len_delta when\nshrinking) into payload_len, and ipv6_payload_len() no longer falls\nback to skb-\u003elen. nf_tables, conntrack and sch_cake rely on it.\n\nThe same arithmetic also wraps when a packet grows past IPV6_MAXPLEN,\nand a BIG TCP packet that shrinks below IPV6_MAXPLEN should get its\nreal length back.\n\nSet payload_len from the skb length with ipv6_set_payload_len(), which\nstores 0 above IPV6_MAXPLEN and the real length otherwise, as\nipv6_gro_complete() does. The network header was just reset to\nskb-\u003edata, so skb-\u003elen - sizeof(*ip6_hdr) is the payload length.\n\nTested on one kernel (arm64, QEMU) with SELinux permissive, a minimal\nmdp-generated policy (network_peer_controls=1), \"netlabelctl calipso\nadd pass doi:16\" and a NetLabel mapping of fd00:2::/64 to CALIPSO\nDOI 16. calipso_skbuff_setattr() was called through\nnetlbl_skbuff_setattr() from a test-only debugfs hook (not part of\nthis patch) adding a level-only label; payload_len after the call:\n\n case before fix after fix real length\n 1000, unlabeled 1016 1016 1016\n 70000 GSO, payload_len 0 16 0 70016\n 65530 GSO, grows past MAXPLEN 10 0 65546\n 65540 GSO with a 24 byte hop\n header, shrinks below MAXPLEN 65528 65532 65532\n 1000 with a 24 byte hop header 992 992 992\n\n(0 means ipv6_payload_len() returns the real length.) On the forward\npath, with a client injecting unlabeled UDP through a router to a\nserver, the router adds the CALIPSO option and the server delivers all\ndatagrams (Udp6InDatagrams 5, Ip6InTruncatedPkts 0) with this patch.",
"id": "GHSA-4qqv-fgh9-mg86",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:34:24Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c9fcfca51e3c5cd46dd72a4da74d56eff183513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8070ed578b6b9134e045627fb745c887a806d46e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ee0e03663826a76507048d58466b29321a57656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/929dc8e2c9165bb651dca26b2c68067a3880406b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e29d0a00c619ac794b05d64f4438204478137365"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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