GHSA-4FQR-96Q8-XRFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 18:57 – Updated: 2026-11-13 18:57Summary
sqlite3-ruby cast Ruby string lengths (long) to int before passing them to SQLite. On 64-bit platforms, a string of 4 GiB (2^32 bytes) or larger had its length wrap, so SQLite saw only the first length mod 2^32 bytes. An attacker who controls the length of a SQL string could truncate the query, for example dropping a trailing WHERE clause. The affected paths are:
- the SQL passed to
Database#prepare,#execute, and related methods - String and Blob values passed to
Statement#bind_paramand related methods - String and Blob values returned from SQL functions and aggregates defined in Ruby (
Database#create_function,#create_aggregate, and related methods)
sqlite3 v2.10.2 raises RangeError when any of these strings is longer than INT_MAX bytes.
Severity
The sqlite3-ruby maintainers have evaluated this as medium severity (CVSS 4.8). Exploitation requires an attacker to get at least 4 GiB into a single SQL string or bound value. Most deployments reject a request body that large before the application sees it, and the server must hold several copies of the string in memory.
A truncated bound value is only a prefix of the attacker's input, so the bind paths matter only where the application validated the full value. A truncated SQL string is more serious: when the attacker's input is inlined into the SQL, the clauses that follow it are dropped. If a dropped clause contained a bind placeholder, binding raises SQLite3::RangeException instead of running the query.
Mitigation
Upgrade to sqlite3 v2.10.2 or later.
As a workaround for earlier versions, reject SQL strings and bound values of 4 GiB or larger before passing them to sqlite3-ruby, or limit request body size well below 4 GiB.
Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by Luke Jahnke from elttam.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.10.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "sqlite3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-128084"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T18:57:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nsqlite3-ruby cast Ruby string lengths (`long`) to `int` before passing them to SQLite. On 64-bit platforms, a string of 4 GiB (2^32 bytes) or larger had its length wrap, so SQLite saw only the first `length mod 2^32` bytes. An attacker who controls the length of a SQL string could truncate the query, for example dropping a trailing `WHERE` clause. The affected paths are:\n\n- the SQL passed to `Database#prepare`, `#execute`, and related methods\n- String and Blob values passed to `Statement#bind_param` and related methods\n- String and Blob values returned from SQL functions and aggregates defined in Ruby (`Database#create_function`, `#create_aggregate`, and related methods)\n\nsqlite3 v2.10.2 raises `RangeError` when any of these strings is longer than `INT_MAX` bytes.\n\n### Severity\n\nThe sqlite3-ruby maintainers have evaluated this as medium severity (CVSS 4.8). Exploitation requires an attacker to get at least 4 GiB into a single SQL string or bound value. Most deployments reject a request body that large before the application sees it, and the server must hold several copies of the string in memory.\n\nA truncated bound value is only a prefix of the attacker\u0027s input, so the bind paths matter only where the application validated the full value. A truncated SQL string is more serious: when the attacker\u0027s input is inlined into the SQL, the clauses that follow it are dropped. If a dropped clause contained a bind placeholder, binding raises `SQLite3::RangeException` instead of running the query.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to sqlite3 v2.10.2 or later.\n\nAs a workaround for earlier versions, reject SQL strings and bound values of 4 GiB or larger before passing them to sqlite3-ruby, or limit request body size well below 4 GiB.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was responsibly reported by Luke Jahnke from elttam.",
"id": "GHSA-4fqr-96q8-xrfx",
"modified": "2026-11-13T18:57:58Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T18:57:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/sqlite3-ruby/security/advisories/GHSA-4fqr-96q8-xrfx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/sqlite3-ruby/pull/762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/sqlite3-ruby/commit/41059aa3ccc2c0f910d6df4fccfe36b3c3c6c649"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/sqlite3/GHSA-4fqr-96q8-xrfx.yml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/sqlite3-ruby"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/sqlite3-ruby/releases/tag/v2.10.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "sqlite3-ruby: Possible SQL query truncation when a string is 4 GiB or larger"
}
Sightings
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|---|
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