GHSA-44QR-RRJG-2CQQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 18:05 – Updated: 2026-10-20 18:05
VLAI
Summary
ApostropheCMS: CAPTCHA response token not URL-encoded
Details

Summary Form and login CAPTCHA verification interpolate the user-supplied widget token unencoded into the server-side verification URL/body, allowing a crafted token to inject query parameters into the reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha verify request.

Details - packages/form/lib/recaptcha.js:39 — recaptchaUri = 'https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify?secret=${recaptchaSecret}&response=${input.recaptcha}' - packages/login-recaptcha/index.js:44 — same pattern for login - packages/login-hcaptcha/index.js:47 — body: 'response=${token}&secret=${secret}'

PoC

input.recaptcha = 'attacker_token&secret=INJECTED_SECRET&something=1'
→ resulting verify URL:
   https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify?secret=<real>&response=attacker_token&secret=INJECTED_SECRET&something=1
# (replicated exactly from recaptcha.js:39)

Impact Low: a crafted token smuggles extra key=value pairs (secret, extra response) into the outbound verify call, forcing verification failures (DoS of the captcha gate and of captcha-gated login/form flows) and enabling automated bypass probing; no secret exfiltration.

Remediation — Build the verify request with URL + searchParams (or encodeURIComponent on both secret and response), and validate the token against ^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,2048}$ before use.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apostrophecms/form"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apostrophecms/login-recaptcha"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apostrophecms/login-hcaptcha"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-113667"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T18:05:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Summary**\nForm and login CAPTCHA verification interpolate the user-supplied widget token unencoded into the server-side verification URL/body, allowing a crafted token to inject query parameters into the reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha verify request.\n\n**Details**\n- `packages/form/lib/recaptcha.js:39` \u2014 `recaptchaUri = \u0027https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify?secret=${recaptchaSecret}\u0026response=${input.recaptcha}\u0027`\n- `packages/login-recaptcha/index.js:44` \u2014 same pattern for login\n- `packages/login-hcaptcha/index.js:47` \u2014 `body: \u0027response=${token}\u0026secret=${secret}\u0027`\n\n**PoC**\n```\ninput.recaptcha = \u0027attacker_token\u0026secret=INJECTED_SECRET\u0026something=1\u0027\n\u2192 resulting verify URL:\n   https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api/siteverify?secret=\u003creal\u003e\u0026response=attacker_token\u0026secret=INJECTED_SECRET\u0026something=1\n# (replicated exactly from recaptcha.js:39)\n```\n\n**Impact**\nLow: a crafted token smuggles extra `key=value` pairs (`secret`, extra `response`) into the outbound verify call, forcing verification failures (DoS of the captcha gate and of captcha-gated login/form flows) and enabling automated bypass probing; no secret exfiltration.\n\n**Remediation** \u2014 Build the verify request with `URL` + `searchParams` (or `encodeURIComponent` on both `secret` and `response`), and validate the token against `^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,2048}$` before use.",
  "id": "GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq",
  "modified": "2026-10-20T18:05:36Z",
  "published": "2026-10-20T18:05:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-44qr-rrjg-2cqq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/@apostrophecms/form@1.5.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ApostropheCMS: CAPTCHA response token not URL-encoded"
}



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