GHSA-367G-M7CR-7MF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-02 18:32 – Updated: 2026-11-03 21:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.
There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind
l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock
l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN)
chan->state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND
lock_sock <------------------ release_sock
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second __l2cap_chan_add.
Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so there can be other TOCTOUC problems.
Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99239"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-02T16:17:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn\n\nl2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in\nseveral places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.\n\nThere is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:\n\n [Task 1] [Task 2]\n l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind\n l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock\n l2cap_state_change if (sk-\u003esk_state != BT_OPEN)\n chan-\u003estate = BT_CONNECT\n l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan-\u003estate = BT_BOUND\n sk-\u003esk_state = BT_BOUND\n lock_sock \u003c------------------ release_sock\n sk-\u003esk_state = BT_CONNECT\n\nl2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk-\u003esk_state, so since chan-\u003estate\nis now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second\n__l2cap_chan_add.\n\nExplicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with\nWARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is\nl2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on\nchan-\u003estate. chan-\u003estate read/write is not properly guarded currently so\nthere can be other TOCTOUC problems.\n\nAdd l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan-\u003estate write.",
"id": "GHSA-367g-m7cr-7mf6",
"modified": "2026-11-03T21:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-11-02T18:32:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99239"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10c705dd706aa93164ba41f2566f15206d6c178e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52fe88e4ef87311eee32b45c65603e7c69e75e7d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73820561d8cbfd3364a29b8fa77f1707f26029da"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/820579652b24ce277e0097cd65b42bd9b7b8bf07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85cc289eb08afa975375f838187369e68b429ee0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86b55991d3cd690e73c5ef8d20b75ae4905b357a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3afd7803f9bc2a8c4270199497b60158b2fc647"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e618d928ec7f88cbeadfa3542adcac40f474e629"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fabaff1c59ff2cc89cb7e5bd0186a5e15f0c73b2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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