GHSA-2P6H-WR8G-2XQX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: reject mdsmaps that claim more than CEPH_MAX_MDS ranks
check_new_map() sizes its export-target bitmap from CEPH_MAX_MDS but walks it with newmap->possible_max_rank, which comes straight off the wire: ceph_mdsmap_decode() sets it to max(m_num_active_mds, m_max_mds), then overwrites it with the size of the "in" set. Neither is bounded by CEPH_MAX_MDS, only by m_info allocating, so a monitor announcing more ranks than the bitmap holds makes test_bit() read past the end of targets[]. The clear_bit() loop above indexes the same bitmap, though it is additionally bounded by mdsc->max_sessions. The map arrives on the monitor connection, which is unauthenticated in legacy msgr mode.
CEPH_MAX_MDS is a protocol constant from src/mds/mdstypes.h, and the reserved inode ranges in super.h are laid out one rank apart over that span, so a map claiming more ranks is corrupt. Reject it where the rank space is established rather than letting the count reach check_new_map().
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5968) Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000ac7798 by task kworker/1:2/127 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200) check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5968) ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7060) extra_mon_dispatch (fs/ceph/super.c:802) mon_dispatch (net/ceph/mon_client.c:1483) ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424) ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430) ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) The buggy address belongs to stack of task kworker/1:2/127 and is located at offset 288 in frame: check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5846) This frame has 1 object: [32, 288) 'targets'
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99306"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:05Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: reject mdsmaps that claim more than CEPH_MAX_MDS ranks\n\ncheck_new_map() sizes its export-target bitmap from CEPH_MAX_MDS but walks\nit with newmap-\u003epossible_max_rank, which comes straight off the wire:\nceph_mdsmap_decode() sets it to max(m_num_active_mds, m_max_mds), then\noverwrites it with the size of the \"in\" set. Neither is bounded by\nCEPH_MAX_MDS, only by m_info allocating, so a monitor announcing more ranks\nthan the bitmap holds makes test_bit() read past the end of targets[]. The\nclear_bit() loop above indexes the same bitmap, though it is additionally\nbounded by mdsc-\u003emax_sessions. The map arrives on the monitor connection,\nwhich is unauthenticated in legacy msgr mode.\n\nCEPH_MAX_MDS is a protocol constant from src/mds/mdstypes.h, and the\nreserved inode ranges in super.h are laid out one rank apart over that\nspan, so a map claiming more ranks is corrupt. Reject it where the rank\nspace is established rather than letting the count reach check_new_map().\n\n BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5968)\n Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000ac7798 by task kworker/1:2/127\n Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)\n print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)\n kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)\n kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200)\n check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5968)\n ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7060)\n extra_mon_dispatch (fs/ceph/super.c:802)\n mon_dispatch (net/ceph/mon_client.c:1483)\n ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424)\n ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430)\n ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576)\n process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)\n worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n The buggy address belongs to stack of task kworker/1:2/127\n and is located at offset 288 in frame:\n check_new_map (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:5846)\n This frame has 1 object:\n [32, 288) \u0027targets\u0027",
"id": "GHSA-2p6h-wr8g-2xqx",
"modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99306"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0574e4aff8e4b28e0d5636204ed4ba2350b8701a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7931e6798f419bda9ac8cf0c095323eff90a7f52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1742590d2b2fc5fb217e1a9b520108f1fe282e5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9d72cf5d1bf5b4ddfe86707ada614973d75bf64"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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