GHSA-2M9M-6CR5-9X25
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 00:46 – Updated: 2026-11-19 00:46Several tools in mssql-mcp-core built T-SQL by string-interpolating caller-supplied identifiers and predicates directly into the statement passed to the node-mssql Request.query() batch API. Only data values were parameterized.
Affected tools and inputs:
- update_data, delete_data: tableName and the free-form whereClause were interpolated raw.
- insert_data: tableName and column names (object keys) were interpolated raw.
- execute_transaction: the same raw tableName/whereClause interpolation per operation.
- create_table, create_index, drop_table: table/column/index/schema identifiers were interpolated with no or insufficient validation.
- list_databases (reader tier): the stateFilter argument was interpolated raw into the query, with only a non-enforced inputSchema enum guarding it.
The only check on whereClause was that it was non-empty. Because the row-count and preview queries run before the confirmUpdate/confirmDelete step, a malicious whereClause or tableName executed on the first call, bypassing the preview/confirmation and maxRows safety controls. Request.query() submits a multi-statement T-SQL batch, so a crafted input enabled stacked statements (arbitrary DDL/DML), sub-selects, and (with a privileged login and xp_cmdshell enabled) OS command execution. Because list_databases is a read-only tool, the stateFilter sink makes the reader package injectable as well.
Impact
An actor who can supply tool arguments (a malicious or compromised MCP client, or an LLM agent steered via indirect prompt injection) could read, modify, or drop arbitrary data, bypass the read_data allow/deny validation and the preview/confirmation/maxRows safeguards, and conditionally achieve OS command execution.
Patches
Fixed in @connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core 0.6.0:
- All identifiers are validated against a strict allowlist and bracket-quoted via a shared helper.
- The free-form whereClause string parameter is removed (breaking change) and replaced with structured, parameterized filters ({ column, operator, value }) using an operator allowlist. Values are always bound, never interpolated.
- list_databases validates stateFilter against a fixed allowlist before use.
Upgrade the consumer packages: mssql-mcp-reader 0.5.0, mssql-mcp-writer 0.5.0, mssql-mcp-server 0.6.0 (all depend on core ^0.6.0).
Workarounds
Upgrading is the only complete fix; the list_databases (stateFilter) sink is reachable even under READONLY=true and in the reader package. As defense in depth, run the server under a least-privilege SQL login with xp_cmdshell disabled, and restrict which MCP clients can invoke the tools.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@connorbritain/mssql-mcp-reader"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@connorbritain/mssql-mcp-writer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@connorbritain/mssql-mcp-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63129"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T00:46:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T20:19:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Several tools in `mssql-mcp-core` built T-SQL by string-interpolating caller-supplied identifiers and predicates directly into the statement passed to the node-mssql `Request.query()` batch API. Only data values were parameterized.\n\nAffected tools and inputs:\n- `update_data`, `delete_data`: `tableName` and the free-form `whereClause` were interpolated raw.\n- `insert_data`: `tableName` and column names (object keys) were interpolated raw.\n- `execute_transaction`: the same raw `tableName`/`whereClause` interpolation per operation.\n- `create_table`, `create_index`, `drop_table`: table/column/index/schema identifiers were interpolated with no or insufficient validation.\n- `list_databases` (reader tier): the `stateFilter` argument was interpolated raw into the query, with only a non-enforced inputSchema enum guarding it.\n\nThe only check on `whereClause` was that it was non-empty. Because the row-count and preview queries run before the `confirmUpdate`/`confirmDelete` step, a malicious `whereClause` or `tableName` executed on the first call, bypassing the preview/confirmation and `maxRows` safety controls. `Request.query()` submits a multi-statement T-SQL batch, so a crafted input enabled stacked statements (arbitrary DDL/DML), sub-selects, and (with a privileged login and `xp_cmdshell` enabled) OS command execution. Because `list_databases` is a read-only tool, the `stateFilter` sink makes the reader package injectable as well.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn actor who can supply tool arguments (a malicious or compromised MCP client, or an LLM agent steered via indirect prompt injection) could read, modify, or drop arbitrary data, bypass the `read_data` allow/deny validation and the preview/confirmation/`maxRows` safeguards, and conditionally achieve OS command execution.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `@connorbritain/mssql-mcp-core` 0.6.0:\n- All identifiers are validated against a strict allowlist and bracket-quoted via a shared helper.\n- The free-form `whereClause` string parameter is removed (breaking change) and replaced with structured, parameterized filters (`{ column, operator, value }`) using an operator allowlist. Values are always bound, never interpolated.\n- `list_databases` validates `stateFilter` against a fixed allowlist before use.\n\nUpgrade the consumer packages: `mssql-mcp-reader` 0.5.0, `mssql-mcp-writer` 0.5.0, `mssql-mcp-server` 0.6.0 (all depend on core `^0.6.0`).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrading is the only complete fix; the `list_databases` (`stateFilter`) sink is reachable even under `READONLY=true` and in the reader package. As defense in depth, run the server under a least-privilege SQL login with `xp_cmdshell` disabled, and restrict which MCP clients can invoke the tools.",
"id": "GHSA-2m9m-6cr5-9x25",
"modified": "2026-11-19T00:46:38Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T00:46:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/security/advisories/GHSA-2m9m-6cr5-9x25"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/pull/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/commit/227e2efc4e3311c477b7ae509c3ae15437a4f815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core/commit/a9727f83768598e4fdbddfbc717ccfebb84ae7af"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ConnorBritain/mssql-mcp-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mssql-mcp-core: SQL injection in mssql-mcp write tools via unparameterized table names and WHERE clauses"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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