FKIE_CVE-2026-99285
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-10 18:17 - Updated: 2026-11-10 18:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_byteorder: remove multi-register support
64bit byteorder conversion is broken when several registers need to be
converted because the source register array advances in steps for 4 bytes
instead of 8:
for (i = ...
src64 = nft_reg_load64(&src[i]);
~~~~~ u32 *src
nft_reg_store64(&dst64[i],
Remove the multi-register support, it has other issues as well:
Pablo points out that commit
caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval")
alters semantics: before the loop operated on registers, i.e.
for ( ... )
dst32[i] = htons((u16)src32[i])
.. but after the patch it will operate on bytes, which makes this
useless to convert e.g. concatenations, which store each compound
in its own register.
Multi-convert of u32 has one theoretical application:
ct mark . meta mark . tcp dport @intervalset
Because ct mark and meta mark are host byte order, use with
intervals has to convert the byteorder for ct/meta mark value
to network byte order (bigendian).
nftables emits this:
[ meta load mark => reg 1 ]
[ byteorder reg 1 = hton(reg 1, 4, 4) ]
[ ct load mark => reg 9 ]
[ byteorder reg 9 = hton(reg 9, 4, 4) ]
...
I.e. two separate calls. Theoretically it could be changed to do:
[ meta load mark => reg 1 ]
[ ct load mark => reg 9 ]
[ byteorder reg 1 = htonl(reg 1, 4, 8) ]
...
But then all it would take to change the set to
meta mark . tcp dport . ct mark
... and we'd be back to two "byteorder" calls. IOW, support to
convert a range of registers is both dysfunctional and dubious.
Simplify this: remove the feature.
Pablo Neira Ayuso points out that nftables before 1.1.0 can generate
incorrect byteorder conversions, see 9fe58952c45a,
"evaluate: skip byteorder conversion for selector smaller than 2 bytes"
in nftables.git). Affected rulesets fail to load with this change and
old userspace due to 'len != size' check.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3c5fb3a6c8118d15e60295e76fb5b879021eef43",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c301f0981fdd3fd1ffac6836b423c4d7a8e0eb63",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dc29c0478b8564feb9371e715b5a0016eb8903fd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c301f0981fdd3fd1ffac6836b423c4d7a8e0eb63",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bb061d3de41707415269be75ebf700efb03ec212",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c301f0981fdd3fd1ffac6836b423c4d7a8e0eb63",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "fca41e5b687e029f69e3a35a2fa31e2560e538dc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "25b42be4e067e107a2559266b54bf07fa5b094fb",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "9a865a11d6890d4a789db1eaafebdc8bd092b12c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "b8b514b2a6cdfac24911e4910461bcb9db15ca8d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "18a169810cff769a7a697b35058c756805f589e0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "1a605657adc58b3c8e2c1c66aaa5fecd29072135",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "013deed31ab15ef287b0045e4e7bd8f250e75b94",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.20",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.19.307",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.4.269",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.10.210",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15.140",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.5.13",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6.3",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.115",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.59",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nft_byteorder: remove multi-register support\n\n64bit byteorder conversion is broken when several registers need to be\nconverted because the source register array advances in steps for 4 bytes\ninstead of 8:\n\n for (i = ...\n src64 = nft_reg_load64(\u0026src[i]);\n ~~~~~ u32 *src\n nft_reg_store64(\u0026dst64[i],\n\nRemove the multi-register support, it has other issues as well:\n\nPablo points out that commit\ncaf3ef7468f7 (\"netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval\")\nalters semantics: before the loop operated on registers, i.e.\n for ( ... )\n dst32[i] = htons((u16)src32[i])\n\n .. but after the patch it will operate on bytes, which makes this\n useless to convert e.g. concatenations, which store each compound\n in its own register.\n\nMulti-convert of u32 has one theoretical application:\n\nct mark . meta mark . tcp dport @intervalset\n\nBecause ct mark and meta mark are host byte order, use with\nintervals has to convert the byteorder for ct/meta mark value\nto network byte order (bigendian).\n\nnftables emits this:\n [ meta load mark =\u003e reg 1 ]\n [ byteorder reg 1 = hton(reg 1, 4, 4) ]\n [ ct load mark =\u003e reg 9 ]\n [ byteorder reg 9 = hton(reg 9, 4, 4) ]\n ...\n\nI.e. two separate calls. Theoretically it could be changed to do:\n [ meta load mark =\u003e reg 1 ]\n [ ct load mark =\u003e reg 9 ]\n [ byteorder reg 1 = htonl(reg 1, 4, 8) ]\n ...\n\nBut then all it would take to change the set to\nmeta mark . tcp dport . ct mark\n\n... and we\u0027d be back to two \"byteorder\" calls. IOW, support to\nconvert a range of registers is both dysfunctional and dubious.\n\nSimplify this: remove the feature.\n\nPablo Neira Ayuso points out that nftables before 1.1.0 can generate\nincorrect byteorder conversions, see 9fe58952c45a,\n\"evaluate: skip byteorder conversion for selector smaller than 2 bytes\"\nin nftables.git). Affected rulesets fail to load with this change and\nold userspace due to \u0027len != size\u0027 check."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99285",
"lastModified": "2026-11-10T18:17:49.147",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-10T18:17:49.147",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c5fb3a6c8118d15e60295e76fb5b879021eef43"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb061d3de41707415269be75ebf700efb03ec212"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc29c0478b8564feb9371e715b5a0016eb8903fd"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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