FKIE_CVE-2026-99186
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-28 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-28 11:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/insn-eval: Fix shadowed segment index in get_seg_reg_override_idx()
Commit 45e1dccc0653 ("x86/insn: Simplify for_each_insn_prefix()") made
for_each_insn_prefix() declare its own loop counter named idx.
get_seg_reg_override_idx() keeps its result in a local of the same name,
so the assignments in the loop body now write the loop counter:
- the function always returns INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT, so FS and GS
overrides are ignored;
- a CS override sets the counter to INAT_SEG_REG_CS (2), the increment
makes it 3, and prefixes.bytes[3] holds the last prefix, 0x2e again,
so the loop never terminates.
The UMIP emulation reaches this from the #GP handler for user space: an
SGDT, SIDT or SMSW with a memory operand and a CS prefix leaves the task
spinning in the kernel, never returning to user space, with a SIGKILL
that is never delivered. Any user can thus tie up CPUs until reboot.
With an FS or GS prefix, the emulated result is written to the wrong
address.
Rename the internal macro iterator variable.
[ Lukas' original patch renamed the use site, I changed it to rename the
iterator in the macro instead, but left Lukas' commit message and
authorship - Linus ]
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h",
"tools/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0efe927053f7eabd1e8658cbda96ee3d78bd1765",
"status": "affected",
"version": "45e1dccc0653c50e377dae57ef086a8d0f71061d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "32c52ec87d6245ee2d12ed5dd509e40062939b50",
"status": "affected",
"version": "45e1dccc0653c50e377dae57ef086a8d0f71061d",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h",
"tools/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.13",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/insn-eval: Fix shadowed segment index in get_seg_reg_override_idx()\n\nCommit 45e1dccc0653 (\"x86/insn: Simplify for_each_insn_prefix()\") made\nfor_each_insn_prefix() declare its own loop counter named idx.\nget_seg_reg_override_idx() keeps its result in a local of the same name,\nso the assignments in the loop body now write the loop counter:\n\n - the function always returns INAT_SEG_REG_DEFAULT, so FS and GS\n overrides are ignored;\n\n - a CS override sets the counter to INAT_SEG_REG_CS (2), the increment\n makes it 3, and prefixes.bytes[3] holds the last prefix, 0x2e again,\n so the loop never terminates.\n\nThe UMIP emulation reaches this from the #GP handler for user space: an\nSGDT, SIDT or SMSW with a memory operand and a CS prefix leaves the task\nspinning in the kernel, never returning to user space, with a SIGKILL\nthat is never delivered. Any user can thus tie up CPUs until reboot.\nWith an FS or GS prefix, the emulated result is written to the wrong\naddress.\n\nRename the internal macro iterator variable.\n\n[ Lukas\u0027 original patch renamed the use site, I changed it to rename the\n iterator in the macro instead, but left Lukas\u0027 commit message and\n authorship - Linus ]"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99186",
"lastModified": "2026-10-28T11:17:39.497",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-28T11:17:39.497",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0efe927053f7eabd1e8658cbda96ee3d78bd1765"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32c52ec87d6245ee2d12ed5dd509e40062939b50"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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