FKIE_CVE-2026-99092
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-26 15:16 - Updated: 2026-10-26 15:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: patch: fix handling of bpf-jit execmem addresses
Commit 8718e5a3090b ("riscv: patch: skip fixmap mapping when kernel text
is already writable") gated the core_kernel_text() branch of patch_map()
on CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, and explicitly left the vmalloc branch
unchanged. That branch has a separate problem.
That branch only creates a temporary writable fixmap alias when
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, and otherwise assumes the target is
directly writable and returns the address unchanged. That assumption no
longer holds: bpf_prog_pack_alloc calls set_memory_rox() on every pack
unconditionally in alloc_new_pack(), independently of any
CONFIG_STRICT_*_RWX option, so BPF text in the vmalloc area is read-only
regardless of what CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX says.
With CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n, patch_map() returns the read-only
address directly, the subsequent copy_to_kernel_nofault() takes a
page fault and returns -EFAULT. bpf_arch_text_copy() turns that into
-EINVAL, which propagates through bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() to the
WARN_ON() in bpf_int_jit_compile() and leaves the program un-JITed.
Note that BPF cannot be fixed the way kprobes was in
commit bdc46e507b59 ("riscv: mm: make EXECMEM_KPROBES writable without
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX"). EXECMEM_BPF is already PAGE_KERNEL, i.e.
writable at allocation time; the read-only mapping is established
afterwards by generic code in alloc_new_pack(), which arch code cannot
influence. The only place this can be handled is patch_map().
This is the same problem that was fixed on arm64 by commit b1480ed230ac
("arm64: patching: fix handling of execmem addresses"), and the fix is
the same: CONFIG_EXECMEM is what actually tracks whether the vmalloc
area can hold executable memory that needs a temporary alias to be
written. CONFIG_BPF_JIT, CONFIG_KPROBES and CONFIG_MODULES all select
it.
Note that this is not limited to CONFIG_MODULES=n. Unlike arm64, riscv
selects CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX, so CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX can
be disabled with CONFIG_MODULES=y as well, and the bug is reachable in
that configuration too.
The !CONFIG_MMU build is unaffected: it has its own __patch_insn_set()
and __patch_insn_write() implementations and never calls patch_map().
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "562a35b9e0b3d9483d9472995219cadb3592db3d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9e8fc7972b398e9dc2415ece283d8f64edac3858",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f71d6ea3843c8038c431c2699482f246aea37ca0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a510e1ae8c9030750c2edf7b0bc9b186cd8c7a06",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c9e5d4a008293407836d29d35dfd4353615bd2f",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.114",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.58",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv: patch: fix handling of bpf-jit execmem addresses\n\nCommit 8718e5a3090b (\"riscv: patch: skip fixmap mapping when kernel text\nis already writable\") gated the core_kernel_text() branch of patch_map()\non CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, and explicitly left the vmalloc branch\nunchanged. That branch has a separate problem.\n\nThat branch only creates a temporary writable fixmap alias when\nCONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, and otherwise assumes the target is\ndirectly writable and returns the address unchanged. That assumption no\nlonger holds: bpf_prog_pack_alloc calls set_memory_rox() on every pack\nunconditionally in alloc_new_pack(), independently of any\nCONFIG_STRICT_*_RWX option, so BPF text in the vmalloc area is read-only\nregardless of what CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX says.\n\nWith CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n, patch_map() returns the read-only\naddress directly, the subsequent copy_to_kernel_nofault() takes a\npage fault and returns -EFAULT. bpf_arch_text_copy() turns that into\n-EINVAL, which propagates through bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() to the\nWARN_ON() in bpf_int_jit_compile() and leaves the program un-JITed.\n\nNote that BPF cannot be fixed the way kprobes was in\ncommit bdc46e507b59 (\"riscv: mm: make EXECMEM_KPROBES writable without\nCONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX\"). EXECMEM_BPF is already PAGE_KERNEL, i.e.\nwritable at allocation time; the read-only mapping is established\nafterwards by generic code in alloc_new_pack(), which arch code cannot\ninfluence. The only place this can be handled is patch_map().\n\nThis is the same problem that was fixed on arm64 by commit b1480ed230ac\n(\"arm64: patching: fix handling of execmem addresses\"), and the fix is\nthe same: CONFIG_EXECMEM is what actually tracks whether the vmalloc\narea can hold executable memory that needs a temporary alias to be\nwritten. CONFIG_BPF_JIT, CONFIG_KPROBES and CONFIG_MODULES all select\nit.\n\nNote that this is not limited to CONFIG_MODULES=n. Unlike arm64, riscv\nselects CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX, so CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX can\nbe disabled with CONFIG_MODULES=y as well, and the bug is reachable in\nthat configuration too.\n\nThe !CONFIG_MMU build is unaffected: it has its own __patch_insn_set()\nand __patch_insn_write() implementations and never calls patch_map()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99092",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T15:16:48.110",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-26T15:16:48.110",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/562a35b9e0b3d9483d9472995219cadb3592db3d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e8fc7972b398e9dc2415ece283d8f64edac3858"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a510e1ae8c9030750c2edf7b0bc9b186cd8c7a06"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f71d6ea3843c8038c431c2699482f246aea37ca0"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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