FKIE_CVE-2026-99066
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 13:17 - Updated: 2026-10-23 13:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: dev: init_can_skb(): restore skb header initialization
Commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb headroom infrastructure")
removed the skb_reset_mac_header()/skb_reset_network_header()/
skb_reset_transport_header() calls from init_can_skb(). As a result, RX
skbs from alloc_can_skb() and friends again carry mac_header = 0xFFFF.
When such an skb reaches packet_rcv_spkt() (SOCK_PACKET), the push length
calculation overflows and triggers skb_under_panic -> kernel BUG -> full
machine panic.
The same issue was originally reported in 2014 on linux-can and fixed by
commit 969439016d2c ("can: add missing initialisations in CAN related
skbuffs"). packet_rcv_spkt() itself has never been hardened: only
packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() gained dev_has_header() checks in
commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices
without visible hard header").
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "8078375dfd0baecd9f1b7b06bb2d6f88d7cb8632",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9f10374bb024593a611e6845847f0444841a231b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0a04c0cb8606ff88399489d03ef255afe90d0d5f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9f10374bb024593a611e6845847f0444841a231b",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/can/dev/skb.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncan: dev: init_can_skb(): restore skb header initialization\n\nCommit 9f10374bb024 (\"can: remove private CAN skb headroom infrastructure\")\nremoved the skb_reset_mac_header()/skb_reset_network_header()/\nskb_reset_transport_header() calls from init_can_skb(). As a result, RX\nskbs from alloc_can_skb() and friends again carry mac_header = 0xFFFF.\nWhen such an skb reaches packet_rcv_spkt() (SOCK_PACKET), the push length\ncalculation overflows and triggers skb_under_panic -\u003e kernel BUG -\u003e full\nmachine panic.\n\nThe same issue was originally reported in 2014 on linux-can and fixed by\ncommit 969439016d2c (\"can: add missing initialisations in CAN related\nskbuffs\"). packet_rcv_spkt() itself has never been hardened: only\npacket_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() gained dev_has_header() checks in\ncommit d549699048b4 (\"net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices\nwithout visible hard header\")."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99066",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T13:17:30.477",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:30.477",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a04c0cb8606ff88399489d03ef255afe90d0d5f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8078375dfd0baecd9f1b7b06bb2d6f88d7cb8632"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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