FKIE_CVE-2026-99042
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 13:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 14:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6
io_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for
AF_INET6 only when addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28
bytes.
The IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which
already holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to
the socket layer unchanged.
At addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address
zero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that
denies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P
rejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.
Use SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when
absent.
The threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)
comparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my
instructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified
the bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same
code.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/net.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "899bea8248cee35d54760a5e7d61a76af8e64411",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20",
"status": "affected",
"version": "899bea8248cee35d54760a5e7d61a76af8e64411",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/net.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6\n\nio_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for\nAF_INET6 only when addr_len \u003e= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28\nbytes.\n\nThe IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which\nalready holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to\nthe socket layer unchanged.\n\nAt addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address\nzero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that\ndenies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P\nrejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.\n\nUse SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when\nabsent.\n\nThe threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)\ncomparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my\ninstructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified\nthe bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same\ncode."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99042",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T14:16:53.347",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.0,
"impactScore": 5.8,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:27.610",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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