FKIE_CVE-2026-99039
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 13:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:21
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card
In memstick_alloc_card() and memstick_set_rw_addr(),
wait_for_completion_timeout() is used to wait for device identification
and address configuration requests to complete.
The memstick subsystem does not provide an abort or cancellation
callback in struct memstick_host for in-flight requests. If
wait_for_completion_timeout() expires (for instance, when a USB transfer
or command retry is delayed), memstick_alloc_card() returns an error and
frees the memstick_dev structure via kfree(card).
However, the host controller driver (such as rtsx_usb_ms) is still
running the request asynchronously in worker context. When the transfer
eventually finishes, the driver writes into host->req->data, which
points to memory inside the already freed card structure. This leads to
a KASAN slab-use-after-free write:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88813c188079 by task kworker/1:5/5239
Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req
Call Trace:
ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:450
rtsx_usb_ms_issue_cmd drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:477 [inline]
rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req+0x557/0x1a00 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:531
process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3560
kthread+0x373/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
Allocated by task 1662:
memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:383 [inline]
memstick_check+0x2c1/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452
process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396
Freed by task 1662:
kfree+0x20c/0x650 mm/slub.c:6792
memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:420 [inline]
memstick_check+0x72b/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452
process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396
Host controller drivers (rtsx_usb_ms, jmb38x_ms, tifm_ms, r592) already
implement their own hardware and bus timeouts, and callers in
mspro_block and ms_block already rely on wait_for_completion()
unconditionally.
Replace wait_for_completion_timeout() with wait_for_completion() in
memstick_set_rw_addr() and memstick_alloc_card() so that the card
structure is never freed while an asynchronous request is in flight.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b90f33ad9179c69658342323382bfed158f88cb9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1c23da6f148089d59b3d3e9b2e7f1eefa927cab9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a2f1aa3341f185ca52103dc4908647570b208855",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c3ab92542475d59ae685cbb294e70ca4d0ba38e9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "810580cf60edc75c9891c2de3225e4cda78e4d9f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f2795c50144d528dabc2cf2fd53c0f0c63a823a1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3af81770e2011c6ac7bb597a4af2e4f3591f928c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "aa0a37b5024d921e96ac4f8f487c8bfbf1f1a582",
"status": "affected",
"version": "baf8532a147d5b76681ce040e2c8f25a3f0e718d",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.25"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.25",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.273",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.224",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.113",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmemstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card\n\nIn memstick_alloc_card() and memstick_set_rw_addr(),\nwait_for_completion_timeout() is used to wait for device identification\nand address configuration requests to complete.\n\nThe memstick subsystem does not provide an abort or cancellation\ncallback in struct memstick_host for in-flight requests. If\nwait_for_completion_timeout() expires (for instance, when a USB transfer\nor command retry is delayed), memstick_alloc_card() returns an error and\nfrees the memstick_dev structure via kfree(card).\n\nHowever, the host controller driver (such as rtsx_usb_ms) is still\nrunning the request asynchronously in worker context. When the transfer\neventually finishes, the driver writes into host-\u003ereq-\u003edata, which\npoints to memory inside the already freed card structure. This leads to\na KASAN slab-use-after-free write:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990\n Write of size 1 at addr ffff88813c188079 by task kworker/1:5/5239\n Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req\n Call Trace:\n ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:450\n rtsx_usb_ms_issue_cmd drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:477 [inline]\n rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req+0x557/0x1a00 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:531\n process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396\n worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3560\n kthread+0x373/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436\n\n Allocated by task 1662:\n memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:383 [inline]\n memstick_check+0x2c1/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452\n process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396\n\n Freed by task 1662:\n kfree+0x20c/0x650 mm/slub.c:6792\n memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:420 [inline]\n memstick_check+0x72b/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452\n process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396\n\nHost controller drivers (rtsx_usb_ms, jmb38x_ms, tifm_ms, r592) already\nimplement their own hardware and bus timeouts, and callers in\nmspro_block and ms_block already rely on wait_for_completion()\nunconditionally.\n\nReplace wait_for_completion_timeout() with wait_for_completion() in\nmemstick_set_rw_addr() and memstick_alloc_card() so that the card\nstructure is never freed while an asynchronous request is in flight."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99039",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:21:41.050",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:27.223",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c23da6f148089d59b3d3e9b2e7f1eefa927cab9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3af81770e2011c6ac7bb597a4af2e4f3591f928c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/810580cf60edc75c9891c2de3225e4cda78e4d9f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2f1aa3341f185ca52103dc4908647570b208855"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa0a37b5024d921e96ac4f8f487c8bfbf1f1a582"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b90f33ad9179c69658342323382bfed158f88cb9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3ab92542475d59ae685cbb294e70ca4d0ba38e9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2795c50144d528dabc2cf2fd53c0f0c63a823a1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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