FKIE_CVE-2026-98989
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 13:17 - Updated: 2026-11-10 19:22
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops
do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that
is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds
a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But
it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC
everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes
CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are
copied.
That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every
mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was
bind-mounted. It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace.
may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter
what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns> and pidfds
can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces
file descriptors the kernel will copy them irrespective of their
ancestoral relationship to the mount namespace in question:
151 146 0:7 net:[4026531833] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw
152 151 0:7 mnt:[4026532293] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw
Mount 152 is a mount of the mount namespace file of mount namespace
4026532293 inside mount namespace 4026532293. That namespace and every
mount in it are leaked... All it takes is a process in an older mount
namespace that stacks the file and repeating it leaks without limit:
after control: Shmem: 380 kB
child: mount(/proc/self/fd/6, MS_BIND|MS_REC): ok
after cycle: Shmem: 65916 kB
do_move_mount() runs check_for_nsfs_mounts() over a detached tree for
exactly that reason. Do the same for the copy before it is grafted.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/namespace.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b82f3c1131456537a514595c3991b62652507c9d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e149ed2b805fefdccf7ccdfc19eca22fdd4514ac",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a0ba48256f5dff6f75a45f8ce39fe57f21df1022",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e149ed2b805fefdccf7ccdfc19eca22fdd4514ac",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "37a82f400efa4d263542a5fa41755b21057f1e5d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e149ed2b805fefdccf7ccdfc19eca22fdd4514ac",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c640a01a78e42302879006ed7b7d5a9a943ba815",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e149ed2b805fefdccf7ccdfc19eca22fdd4514ac",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/namespace.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.117",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnamespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops\n\ndo_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that\nis as old as the caller\u0027s or older because a mount namespace that holds\na mount of its own file, or of an ancestor\u0027s, would cause a cycle. But\nit only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC\neverything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes\nCL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are\ncopied.\n\nThat\u0027s fine for a source in the caller\u0027s own mount namespace. Every\nmount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was\nbind-mounted. It isn\u0027t fine for a source in another mount namespace.\nmay_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter\nwhat mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/ns/\u003cns\u003e and pidfds\ncan be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces\nfile descriptors the kernel will copy them irrespective of their\nancestoral relationship to the mount namespace in question:\n\n 151 146 0:7 net:[4026531833] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw\n 152 151 0:7 mnt:[4026532293] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw\n\nMount 152 is a mount of the mount namespace file of mount namespace\n4026532293 inside mount namespace 4026532293. That namespace and every\nmount in it are leaked... All it takes is a process in an older mount\nnamespace that stacks the file and repeating it leaks without limit:\n\n after control: Shmem: 380 kB\n child: mount(/proc/self/fd/6, MS_BIND|MS_REC): ok\n after cycle: Shmem: 65916 kB\n\ndo_move_mount() runs check_for_nsfs_mounts() over a detached tree for\nexactly that reason. Do the same for the copy before it is grafted."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98989",
"lastModified": "2026-11-10T19:22:28.763",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:20.863",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37a82f400efa4d263542a5fa41755b21057f1e5d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0ba48256f5dff6f75a45f8ce39fe57f21df1022"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b82f3c1131456537a514595c3991b62652507c9d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c640a01a78e42302879006ed7b7d5a9a943ba815"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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