FKIE_CVE-2026-98959
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-23 13:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 14:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item
If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we
replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)
with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully
initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree
checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.
This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with
multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)
we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new
one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in
the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,
the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not
initialized and we only copy the value's data and set the value's length
in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name's length,
the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and
transaction ID.
The following script reproduces the issue:
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
touch $MNT/testfile
# Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their
# name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.
setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile
setfattr -n user.WvG1c1Td -v qwerty $MNT/testfile
# Verify the xattrs are present.
echo "xattrs before:"
getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile
# Now replace the value of the foobar xattr with a significantly larger
# value.
setfattr -n user.foobar -v abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz $MNT/testfile
# Check the xattrs have the expected values.
echo "xattrs after:"
getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile
umount $MNT
Running it:
$ ./test.sh
(...)
xattrs before:
# file: /mnt/sdi/testfile
user.WvG1c1Td="qwerty"
user.foobar="123"
xattrs after:
# file: /mnt/sdi/testfile
user.WvG1c1Td="qwerty"
So the "user.foobar" xattr is missing and there was a transaction abort
when unmounting the fs with the following traces in dmesg:
$ dmesg
[869800.159271] BTRFS warning (device sdi): access to eb bytenr 30474240 len 16384 out of range start 16015 len 25964
[869800.159293] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[869800.159296] WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4408 at report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs], CPU#8: getfattr/2605179
[869800.168961] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_thin_pool (...)
[869800.190527] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 2605179 Comm: getfattr Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-244+ #1 PREEMPT(full)
[869800.193726] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[869800.194502] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[869800.197576] RIP: 0010:report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs]
[869800.198985] Code: 48 8b 7b 18 (...)
[869800.203531] RSP: 0018:ffffce4541937d58 EFLAGS: 00010246
[869800.204609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8dde054b8738 RCX: 0000000000000000
[869800.206137] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc04c92a0
[869800.207645] RBP: 0000000000003e8f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3fffffffffefffff
[869800.226175] R10: ffffce4541937a88 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 000000000000656c
[869800.227594] R13: ffff8dde14be800f R14: 000000000000656c R15: 0000000000000069
[869800.229097] FS: 00007f59023bb780(0000) GS:ffff8de5788ed000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[869800.231137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[869800.232321] CR2: 0000558dc45e6a78 CR3: 0000000765b16004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[869800.233783] Call Trace:
[869800.234330] <TASK>
[869800.234791] read_extent_buffer+0x4d/0x100 [btrfs]
[869800.235898] btrfs_listxattr+0x199/0x240 [btrfs]
[869800.236912] vfs_listxattr+0x51/0
---truncated---
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/btrfs/xattr.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7a53bb4668b319fc6c8a3ce2c21635125c7d2712",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5877d7138cc4359d26fd7b010eedfd1b3162348f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a97114b9b00ed3d05156f3b2ddbf797296260389",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c1803697a60f22743aa28ad522f805e92d45e3f0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "858bee1c77857aabcc2327cd32dd8266332de332",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5f5bc6b1e2d5a6f827bc860ef2dc5b6f365d1339",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "43f2e3615d181a7028ab797114c5960977669b2a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "a873146ce4fb025c0b5c1322af5a6bad042f5363",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "02590fd855d1690568b2fa439c942e933221b57a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "55e97f654cbbbef70f9714f0e113604dd931e360",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.10.83",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.12.45",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.15",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.14.47",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.19",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.18.19",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/btrfs/xattr.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.113",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.57",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item\n\nIf we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we\nreplace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)\nwith another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully\ninitialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree\nchecker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.\n\nThis is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with\nmultiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)\nwe delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new\none, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in\nthe leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,\nthe new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not\ninitialized and we only copy the value\u0027s data and set the value\u0027s length\nin the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name\u0027s length,\nthe key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and\ntransaction ID.\n\nThe following script reproduces the issue:\n\n $ cat test.sh\n #!/bin/bash\n\n DEV=/dev/sdi\n MNT=/mnt/sdi\n\n mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV\n mount $DEV $MNT\n\n touch $MNT/testfile\n\n # Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their\n # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.\n setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile\n setfattr -n user.WvG1c1Td -v qwerty $MNT/testfile\n\n # Verify the xattrs are present.\n echo \"xattrs before:\"\n getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile\n\n # Now replace the value of the foobar xattr with a significantly larger\n # value.\n setfattr -n user.foobar -v abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz $MNT/testfile\n\n # Check the xattrs have the expected values.\n echo \"xattrs after:\"\n getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile\n\n umount $MNT\n\nRunning it:\n\n $ ./test.sh\n (...)\n xattrs before:\n # file: /mnt/sdi/testfile\n user.WvG1c1Td=\"qwerty\"\n user.foobar=\"123\"\n\n xattrs after:\n # file: /mnt/sdi/testfile\n user.WvG1c1Td=\"qwerty\"\n\nSo the \"user.foobar\" xattr is missing and there was a transaction abort\nwhen unmounting the fs with the following traces in dmesg:\n\n $ dmesg\n [869800.159271] BTRFS warning (device sdi): access to eb bytenr 30474240 len 16384 out of range start 16015 len 25964\n [869800.159293] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n [869800.159296] WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4408 at report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs], CPU#8: getfattr/2605179\n [869800.168961] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_thin_pool (...)\n [869800.190527] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 2605179 Comm: getfattr Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-244+ #1 PREEMPT(full)\n [869800.193726] Tainted: [W]=WARN\n [869800.194502] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n [869800.197576] RIP: 0010:report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs]\n [869800.198985] Code: 48 8b 7b 18 (...)\n [869800.203531] RSP: 0018:ffffce4541937d58 EFLAGS: 00010246\n [869800.204609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8dde054b8738 RCX: 0000000000000000\n [869800.206137] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc04c92a0\n [869800.207645] RBP: 0000000000003e8f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3fffffffffefffff\n [869800.226175] R10: ffffce4541937a88 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 000000000000656c\n [869800.227594] R13: ffff8dde14be800f R14: 000000000000656c R15: 0000000000000069\n [869800.229097] FS: 00007f59023bb780(0000) GS:ffff8de5788ed000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n [869800.231137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n [869800.232321] CR2: 0000558dc45e6a78 CR3: 0000000765b16004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\n [869800.233783] Call Trace:\n [869800.234330] \u003cTASK\u003e\n [869800.234791] read_extent_buffer+0x4d/0x100 [btrfs]\n [869800.235898] btrfs_listxattr+0x199/0x240 [btrfs]\n [869800.236912] vfs_listxattr+0x51/0\n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98959",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T14:16:49.307",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-23T13:17:17.233",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5877d7138cc4359d26fd7b010eedfd1b3162348f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a53bb4668b319fc6c8a3ce2c21635125c7d2712"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/858bee1c77857aabcc2327cd32dd8266332de332"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a97114b9b00ed3d05156f3b2ddbf797296260389"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1803697a60f22743aa28ad522f805e92d45e3f0"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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