FKIE_CVE-2026-98802
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA
advance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6
destination address without ensuring the packet data is writable.
seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the
NEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address.
The skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on
the ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg()
then write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that
socket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The
simplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg():
__netif_receive_skb_one_core
__netif_receive_skb_core
deliver_skb [orig: users=2, cloned=0]
packet_rcv
skb_clone clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket
consume_skb(orig) [orig: users=1, cloned=1]
ipv6_rcv
ip6_rcv_core skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1]
[...]
input_action_end_core
advance_nextseg writes into the data shared with the clone
Call skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in
seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data.
skb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb->head, which invalidates the
pointers into the packet data taken before the call.
advance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if
skb_ensure_writable() fails.
seg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination
address from the skb after skb_ensure_writable().
On failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv6/seg6_local.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e9141fdb7a2ead48cfcd60c681aba91d3014255b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "140f04c33bbcf89440dcaf8bef04918abff5a52d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8ae3f4067ba4ae3a15581392f6dac422e3d3def0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "140f04c33bbcf89440dcaf8bef04918abff5a52d",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ipv6/seg6_local.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nseg6: ensure packet data is writable before modifying SRH and IPv6 DA\n\nadvance_nextseg() modifies the SRH Segments Left field and the IPv6\ndestination address without ensuring the packet data is writable.\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() has the same problem when it advances the\nNEXT-C-SID argument in the destination address.\n\nThe skb may be cloned, for example by an AF_PACKET socket receiving on\nthe ingress device. advance_nextseg() and seg6_next_csid_advance_arg()\nthen write into the packet data shared with the clone. A read from that\nsocket can return the modified packet instead of the received one. The\nsimplified path below shows this for advance_nextseg():\n\n__netif_receive_skb_one_core\n __netif_receive_skb_core\n deliver_skb [orig: users=2, cloned=0]\n packet_rcv\n skb_clone clone queued to the AF_PACKET socket\n consume_skb(orig) [orig: users=1, cloned=1]\n ipv6_rcv\n ip6_rcv_core skb_share_check: no-op [orig: users=1]\n [...]\n input_action_end_core\n advance_nextseg writes into the data shared with the clone\n\nCall skb_ensure_writable() in advance_nextseg() and in\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() before they modify the packet data.\nskb_ensure_writable() may reallocate skb-\u003ehead, which invalidates the\npointers into the packet data taken before the call.\nadvance_nextseg() now returns a valid SRH pointer, or NULL if\nskb_ensure_writable() fails.\nseg6_next_csid_advance_arg() takes the pointer to the destination\naddress from the skb after skb_ensure_writable().\nOn failure, the callers drop the packet with SKB_DROP_REASON_NOMEM."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98802",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:44.260",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:34.250",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ae3f4067ba4ae3a15581392f6dac422e3d3def0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9141fdb7a2ead48cfcd60c681aba91d3014255b"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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