FKIE_CVE-2026-98789
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix objects stuck in free_by_rcu_ttrace
do_call_rcu_ttrace() returns early when call_rcu_ttrace_in_progress is set
and leaves the objects in free_by_rcu_ttrace. __free_rcu() frees
waiting_for_gp_ttrace only and clears the flag. Hence the objects that
free_bulk() or __free_by_rcu() added while RCU tasks trace GP was in flight
stay in free_by_rcu_ttrace until free_bulk() or alloc_bulk() is called for
the same bpf_mem_cache again, which may never happen. The number of such
objects is not bounded.
Turn call_rcu_ttrace_in_progress into three states:
0 - idle
1 - __free_rcu() is queued
2 - __free_rcu() is queued and free_by_rcu_ttrace got more objects since
do_call_rcu_ttrace() sets 2. __free_rcu() does cmpxchg(1 -> 0) and starts
the next GP when it fails. It cannot clear the flag first and check
free_by_rcu_ttrace later, since bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() frees bpf_mem_cache
without waiting for RCU callbacks when the flag is zero.
Now __free_rcu() queues itself, so the one that didn't see 'draining' may
do call_rcu_tasks_trace() after rcu_barrier_tasks_trace() in
free_mem_alloc(). Queue it under rcu_read_lock() and do synchronize_rcu()
before the barriers. Calling rcu_barrier_tasks_trace() twice works too, but
creating and destroying hash maps in a loop on many cpus slows down to one
free_mem_alloc() per GP and kworkers pile up.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/memalloc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "33d0a5d2fee06a51f2f056dd901296515912e954",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8d5a8011b35d387c490a5c977b1d9eb4798aa071",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fbd97dd1d3ce32d32fb7be86acc3fdb7c04fa043",
"status": "affected",
"version": "8d5a8011b35d387c490a5c977b1d9eb4798aa071",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/memalloc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix objects stuck in free_by_rcu_ttrace\n\ndo_call_rcu_ttrace() returns early when call_rcu_ttrace_in_progress is set\nand leaves the objects in free_by_rcu_ttrace. __free_rcu() frees\nwaiting_for_gp_ttrace only and clears the flag. Hence the objects that\nfree_bulk() or __free_by_rcu() added while RCU tasks trace GP was in flight\nstay in free_by_rcu_ttrace until free_bulk() or alloc_bulk() is called for\nthe same bpf_mem_cache again, which may never happen. The number of such\nobjects is not bounded.\n\nTurn call_rcu_ttrace_in_progress into three states:\n0 - idle\n1 - __free_rcu() is queued\n2 - __free_rcu() is queued and free_by_rcu_ttrace got more objects since\n\ndo_call_rcu_ttrace() sets 2. __free_rcu() does cmpxchg(1 -\u003e 0) and starts\nthe next GP when it fails. It cannot clear the flag first and check\nfree_by_rcu_ttrace later, since bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() frees bpf_mem_cache\nwithout waiting for RCU callbacks when the flag is zero.\n\nNow __free_rcu() queues itself, so the one that didn\u0027t see \u0027draining\u0027 may\ndo call_rcu_tasks_trace() after rcu_barrier_tasks_trace() in\nfree_mem_alloc(). Queue it under rcu_read_lock() and do synchronize_rcu()\nbefore the barriers. Calling rcu_barrier_tasks_trace() twice works too, but\ncreating and destroying hash maps in a loop on many cpus slows down to one\nfree_mem_alloc() per GP and kworkers pile up."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98789",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:42.963",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:32.887",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33d0a5d2fee06a51f2f056dd901296515912e954"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbd97dd1d3ce32d32fb7be86acc3fdb7c04fa043"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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