FKIE_CVE-2026-98643
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.
SEC("sockops")
int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
{
switch (skops->op) {
case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */
...
}
}
For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.
Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.
Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset
offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)
(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.
Before patch:
0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v
After patch:
0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9
1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock
2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -> 0
3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v
6: goto pc+2
7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
8: r1 = 0
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03",
"status": "affected",
"version": "44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/filter.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.271",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.222",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops\n\nA sockops prog reading skops-\u003ertt_min never checks the sk type: on the\ntcp_conn_request() path sock_ops-\u003esk is a request_sock (non-full), and the\nctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of\nthe request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.\n\n\tSEC(\"sockops\")\n\tint prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)\n\t{\n\t\tswitch (skops-\u003eop) {\n\t\tcase BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:\n\t\t\tleak = skops-\u003ertt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */\n\t\t...\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\nFor instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a\nleaked kernel pointer.\n\nGuarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks\nis_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops-\u003esk is not a locked full\nsocket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is\nthe only one open-coded, so it skips the check.\n\nRead rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:\nit is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass\nrtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset\n\n\toffsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)\n\n(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()\nreturns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is\nadded. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset\nare no longer needed.\n\nBefore patch:\n\n\t0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops-\u003esk\n\t1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)-\u003ertt_min.s[0].v\n\nAfter patch:\n\n\t0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9\n\t1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock\n\t2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -\u003e 0\n\t3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops-\u003esk\n\t5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v\n\t6: goto pc+2\n\t7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)\n\t8: r1 = 0"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98643",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:28.573",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:17.490",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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