FKIE_CVE-2026-98642
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix UAF due to concurrent consumption of ttrace lists in alloc_bulk
Syzkaller repeatedly triggered UAF splats related to nodes in
waiting_for_gp_ttrace within the bpf memalloc:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881572cd080 by task syz.4.470/5112
...
llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61
alloc_bulk+0x193/0x460 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:229
bpf_mem_refill+0x386/0x560 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:436
Freed by task 14:
...
__free_rcu kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:281 [inline]
__free_rcu_tasks_trace+0x48/0xd0 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:291
rcu_tasks_invoke_cbs+0x1ec/0x3e0 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:571
rcu_tasks_one_gp+0x13d/0x220 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:621
rcu_tasks_kthread+0xf3/0x120 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:651
The reason is that the UAF occurs after the RCU Tasks Trace GP expires:
when the __free_rcu() callback runs, there is no synchronization
protecting llist_del_all() against concurrent alloc_bulk() operating on
waiting_for_gp_ttrace, leading to the race condition below:
CPU0 CPU1
__free_rcu (RCU Tasks Trace callback)
alloc_bulk
llist_del_first(&c->waiting_for_gp_ttrace)
entry = smp_load_acquire(&head->first);
do {
if (entry == NULL)
return NULL;
free_all(llist_del_all(&c->waiting_for_gp_ttrace))
llist_for_each_safe(pos, t, llnode)
free_one(pos);
next = READ_ONCE(entry->next); <-- trigger UAF
} while (!try_cmpxchg(&head->first, &entry, next));
In addition, there is also a theoretical race condition on the
free_by_rcu_ttrace list. This race requires two preconditions: an
in-flight Tasks Trace GP keeping c->call_rcu_ttrace_in_progress == 1,
and concurrent cross-CPU frees repopulating c->free_by_rcu_ttrace with
new nodes. Under these conditions, the following scenario triggers UAF:
// CPU0
// irq work is still busy (on PREEMPT_RT)
alloc_bulk()
llist_del_first(&c->free_by_rcu_ttrace)
entry = smp_load_acquire(&head->first);
do {
if (entry == NULL)
return NULL;
// CPU1
bpf_mem_alloc_destroy()
WRITE_ONCE(c->draining, true)
// wait for CPU0
irq_work_sync()
// CPU2
do_call_rcu_ttrace(tgt(CPU0))
if (c->draining) {
llist_del_all(&c->free_by_rcu_ttrace)
free_all()
}
// CPU0 continue
next = READ_ONCE(entry->next); <-- trigger UAF
while (!try_cmpxchg(&head->first, &entry, next));
Fix this by introducing a raw spinlock to synchronize the concurrent
consumption on waiting_for_gp_ttrace and free_by_rcu_ttrace.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/memalloc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a0e150a118025a05c8662c536ba2a865da86419c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "04fabf00b4d3aff5d010ecb617001814e409e24a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1d6581b544a88cf4348c2fb60dcb50ad63f012da",
"status": "affected",
"version": "04fabf00b4d3aff5d010ecb617001814e409e24a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f101602415fb39a58941bec444df65634d5a6844",
"status": "affected",
"version": "04fabf00b4d3aff5d010ecb617001814e409e24a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1c21452d02eec2f008e2c5535820f85adbd7587a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "04fabf00b4d3aff5d010ecb617001814e409e24a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/memalloc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix UAF due to concurrent consumption of ttrace lists in alloc_bulk\n\nSyzkaller repeatedly triggered UAF splats related to nodes in\nwaiting_for_gp_ttrace within the bpf memalloc:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff8881572cd080 by task syz.4.470/5112\n ...\n llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61\n alloc_bulk+0x193/0x460 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:229\n bpf_mem_refill+0x386/0x560 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:436\n\nFreed by task 14:\n ...\n __free_rcu kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:281 [inline]\n __free_rcu_tasks_trace+0x48/0xd0 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:291\n rcu_tasks_invoke_cbs+0x1ec/0x3e0 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:571\n rcu_tasks_one_gp+0x13d/0x220 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:621\n rcu_tasks_kthread+0xf3/0x120 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:651\n\nThe reason is that the UAF occurs after the RCU Tasks Trace GP expires:\nwhen the __free_rcu() callback runs, there is no synchronization\nprotecting llist_del_all() against concurrent alloc_bulk() operating on\nwaiting_for_gp_ttrace, leading to the race condition below:\n\nCPU0 CPU1\n __free_rcu (RCU Tasks Trace callback)\nalloc_bulk\n llist_del_first(\u0026c-\u003ewaiting_for_gp_ttrace)\n entry = smp_load_acquire(\u0026head-\u003efirst);\n do {\n if (entry == NULL)\n return NULL;\n free_all(llist_del_all(\u0026c-\u003ewaiting_for_gp_ttrace))\n llist_for_each_safe(pos, t, llnode)\n free_one(pos);\n next = READ_ONCE(entry-\u003enext); \u003c-- trigger UAF\n } while (!try_cmpxchg(\u0026head-\u003efirst, \u0026entry, next));\n\nIn addition, there is also a theoretical race condition on the\nfree_by_rcu_ttrace list. This race requires two preconditions: an\nin-flight Tasks Trace GP keeping c-\u003ecall_rcu_ttrace_in_progress == 1,\nand concurrent cross-CPU frees repopulating c-\u003efree_by_rcu_ttrace with\nnew nodes. Under these conditions, the following scenario triggers UAF:\n\n// CPU0\n// irq work is still busy (on PREEMPT_RT)\nalloc_bulk()\n llist_del_first(\u0026c-\u003efree_by_rcu_ttrace)\n entry = smp_load_acquire(\u0026head-\u003efirst);\n do {\n if (entry == NULL)\n return NULL;\n\n // CPU1\n bpf_mem_alloc_destroy()\n WRITE_ONCE(c-\u003edraining, true)\n // wait for CPU0\n irq_work_sync()\n\n // CPU2\n do_call_rcu_ttrace(tgt(CPU0))\n if (c-\u003edraining) {\n llist_del_all(\u0026c-\u003efree_by_rcu_ttrace)\n free_all()\n }\n\n// CPU0 continue\n next = READ_ONCE(entry-\u003enext); \u003c-- trigger UAF\n while (!try_cmpxchg(\u0026head-\u003efirst, \u0026entry, next));\n\nFix this by introducing a raw spinlock to synchronize the concurrent\nconsumption on waiting_for_gp_ttrace and free_by_rcu_ttrace."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98642",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:28.443",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:17.367",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c21452d02eec2f008e2c5535820f85adbd7587a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d6581b544a88cf4348c2fb60dcb50ad63f012da"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0e150a118025a05c8662c536ba2a865da86419c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f101602415fb39a58941bec444df65634d5a6844"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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