FKIE_CVE-2026-98560
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: size a connection's path set by the transport it ends up with
__rds_conn_create() computes npaths from the caller's transport before
it decides whether a connection to one of the host's own addresses is
to be handled by the loopback transport instead. That substitution is
what an RDS/TCP socket sending to a local address gets, and after it
the path init loop still runs for the TCP transport's RDS_MPATH_WORKERS
paths and allocates an ordered workqueue for each, while
rds_loop_conn_alloc() only ever provides transport data for path 0.
rds_conn_destroy() sizes its teardown from c_trans, by then the
loopback transport, so it visits path 0 only - and
rds_conn_path_destroy() would skip the other paths anyway, since it
returns before destroy_workqueue() for a path without transport data.
kfree(c_path) then drops the last pointers to seven workqueues. That
repeats for every such connection, on every netns teardown or module
unload, and every distinct local destination address is a separate
connection.
Recompute npaths once the transport is final, so that creation and
destruction agree on the set of paths. The c_path array stays sized
for the caller's transport; the unused entries are freed with it.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "670f303169d2d36f315c40f6d3d18b5ee8498fea",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4716af3897e95997d08183d351cece2dec9ee0c0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ba3d1f480c7a3fba963e7867ad6cc557c197acbc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4716af3897e95997d08183d351cece2dec9ee0c0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: size a connection\u0027s path set by the transport it ends up with\n\n__rds_conn_create() computes npaths from the caller\u0027s transport before\nit decides whether a connection to one of the host\u0027s own addresses is\nto be handled by the loopback transport instead. That substitution is\nwhat an RDS/TCP socket sending to a local address gets, and after it\nthe path init loop still runs for the TCP transport\u0027s RDS_MPATH_WORKERS\npaths and allocates an ordered workqueue for each, while\nrds_loop_conn_alloc() only ever provides transport data for path 0.\n\nrds_conn_destroy() sizes its teardown from c_trans, by then the\nloopback transport, so it visits path 0 only - and\nrds_conn_path_destroy() would skip the other paths anyway, since it\nreturns before destroy_workqueue() for a path without transport data.\nkfree(c_path) then drops the last pointers to seven workqueues. That\nrepeats for every such connection, on every netns teardown or module\nunload, and every distinct local destination address is a separate\nconnection.\n\nRecompute npaths once the transport is final, so that creation and\ndestruction agree on the set of paths. The c_path array stays sized\nfor the caller\u0027s transport; the unused entries are freed with it."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98560",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:12.577",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:08.143",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/670f303169d2d36f315c40f6d3d18b5ee8498fea"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba3d1f480c7a3fba963e7867ad6cc557c197acbc"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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