FKIE_CVE-2026-98550
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 14:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow
Commit 48a5fe38772b ("tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m->bc_acked).
However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:
1. When grp->bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked > m->bc_acked
passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp->bc_ackers.
Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
all future group broadcasts on the socket.
2. During an active broadcast round (grp->bc_ackers > 0), the sender
transmits packet S and advances grp->bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt.
However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member's
m->bc_acked to prev = grp->bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
prevented from decrementing grp->bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale
value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed
by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp->bc_ackers twice in the same
round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it.
Fix this by:
- Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp->bc_ackers is zero.
- Requiring acked == grp->bc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where
m->bc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly
sequential, only grp->bc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member
can acknowledge at most once per round.
Note that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member()
(where grp->bc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does
not restore *grp->open or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed
in a separate patch.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/tipc/group.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "edc6593c442278fceff0120e8cc58bc592168c35",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9b94a90651e1fa573c6ac6a5a6b269d5874df2c0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "507a27435b2bb1f22e3a3674f6a6553eb815021b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "80a9ccfc24d3776ef6753a57315e726475fac7d7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "478fb08d0c2a53002a721d22b8d6681ec971d90f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "12cc3a1eac5a2a06b67a7b85f0f48ff241a94d1b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b0e517961f09b9f60d338d1ea4e17aacdbf206f0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "99cc2a62e07a44a22254d7beca9ef1f8ad886d0d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2f487712b89376fce267223bbb0db93d393d4b09",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/tipc/group.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.271",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.222",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow\n\nCommit 48a5fe38772b (\"tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate\nGRP_ACK_MSG\") rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()\nby returning early when less_eq(acked, m-\u003ebc_acked).\n\nHowever, that check remains incomplete in two ways:\n\n1. When grp-\u003ebc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast\n ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already\n acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked \u003e m-\u003ebc_acked\n passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-\u003ebc_ackers.\n Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing\n tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking\n all future group broadcasts on the socket.\n\n2. During an active broadcast round (grp-\u003ebc_ackers \u003e 0), the sender\n transmits packet S and advances grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers\n increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,\n so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly\n acked == grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt.\n\n However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member\u0027s\n m-\u003ebc_acked to prev = grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).\n This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.\n An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor\n prevented from decrementing grp-\u003ebc_ackers if an unexpected or stale\n value (such as S) is received. A member sending acked = S followed\n by acked = S + 1 could decrement grp-\u003ebc_ackers twice in the same\n round, prematurely clearing bc_ackers or underflowing it.\n\nFix this by:\n- Dropping GRP_ACK_MSG immediately if grp-\u003ebc_ackers is zero.\n- Requiring acked == grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt and rejecting duplicates where\n m-\u003ebc_acked == acked. Because replicast broadcast rounds are strictly\n sequential, only grp-\u003ebc_snd_nxt can be acknowledged, and each member\n can acknowledge at most once per round.\n\nNote that a related pre-existing issue in tipc_group_delete_member()\n(where grp-\u003ebc_ackers decrementing to zero upon member departure does\nnot restore *grp-\u003eopen or trigger a socket wakeup) will be addressed\nin a separate patch."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98550",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T14:16:47.290",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:07.030",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12cc3a1eac5a2a06b67a7b85f0f48ff241a94d1b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/478fb08d0c2a53002a721d22b8d6681ec971d90f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/507a27435b2bb1f22e3a3674f6a6553eb815021b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80a9ccfc24d3776ef6753a57315e726475fac7d7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99cc2a62e07a44a22254d7beca9ef1f8ad886d0d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b94a90651e1fa573c6ac6a5a6b269d5874df2c0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0e517961f09b9f60d338d1ea4e17aacdbf206f0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edc6593c442278fceff0120e8cc58bc592168c35"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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