FKIE_CVE-2026-98547
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-18 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 10:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()
prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic:
mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user
controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0
as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through
(and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it).
0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps
(div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047.
The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1,
so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and
[1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster
links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this
doesn't blow up for everyone.
What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc():
p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...));
hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback
unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns
the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution:
if (interval < hrtimer_resolution)
interval = hrtimer_resolution;
So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding
sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the
socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone.
The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with
TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer
implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net:
af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not
as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned
short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a
0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly
as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer
conversion turned it into.
(Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path
returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.)
Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by
default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works):
int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, ...);
int v = TPACKET_V3;
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v));
struct tpacket_req3 req = {
.tp_block_size = 0x10000000,
.tp_block_nr = 1,
.tp_frame_size = 2048,
.tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048,
.tp_retire_blk_tov = 0,
};
setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req));
Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the
existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a
different fix, just say so and I'll respin.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/packet/af_packet.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "02afd75649a4e001031ed82153a5c39312ec0737",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "eb5b3838b9200dac04bfe33483db0ee8287456fb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "297acc571d5813db76b147c745b91031d5f9c960",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "be1aacff399d519cc48d6b34354a54dd79041140",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b2bcc6a254d6f27823a56787668ae4ee8cdb6e71",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6279211e7d2456ecd195d236c9ee5e5c6fa5a17a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "218a944b9e035d4b47d59c69af6ca13319da15fb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "56d82862a0a243ac14ba11b6d7b57ddc2d064b95",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f6fb8f100b807378fda19e83e5ac6828b638603a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/packet/af_packet.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.271",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.222",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.55",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naf_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()\n\nprb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic:\n\n mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);\n\nIf I\u0027m reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user\ncontrolled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are \u003c= 0\nas int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through\n(and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it).\n0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps\n(div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047.\n\nThe condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 \u003e= 2^31 \u0026\u0026 div == 1,\nso the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and\n[1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster\nlinks divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this\ndoesn\u0027t blow up for everyone.\n\nWhat makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc():\n\n p1-\u003einterval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...));\n hrtimer_start(\u0026p1-\u003eretire_blk_timer, p1-\u003einterval_ktime,\n HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);\n\nA negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback\nunconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns\nthe negative interval into hrtimer_resolution:\n\n if (interval \u003c hrtimer_resolution)\n interval = hrtimer_resolution;\n\nSo the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding\nsk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the\nsocket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone.\n\nThe overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with\nTPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 (\"af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer\nimplementation.\"). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa (\"net:\naf_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation\", v6.18) was not\nas clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned\nshort retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a\n0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly\nas detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer\nconversion turned it into.\n\n(Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path\nreturning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.)\n\nReproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by\ndefault) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works):\n\n int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));\n bind(fd, ...);\n int v = TPACKET_V3;\n setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, \u0026v, sizeof(v));\n struct tpacket_req3 req = {\n .tp_block_size = 0x10000000,\n .tp_block_nr = 1,\n .tp_frame_size = 2048,\n .tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048,\n .tp_retire_blk_tov = 0,\n };\n setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, \u0026req, sizeof(req));\n\nCompute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the\nexisting validation, so nothing else changes. If you\u0027d prefer a\ndifferent fix, just say so and I\u0027ll respin."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98547",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T10:19:10.717",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-18T16:17:06.630",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02afd75649a4e001031ed82153a5c39312ec0737"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/218a944b9e035d4b47d59c69af6ca13319da15fb"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/297acc571d5813db76b147c745b91031d5f9c960"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56d82862a0a243ac14ba11b6d7b57ddc2d064b95"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6279211e7d2456ecd195d236c9ee5e5c6fa5a17a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2bcc6a254d6f27823a56787668ae4ee8cdb6e71"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be1aacff399d519cc48d6b34354a54dd79041140"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb5b3838b9200dac04bfe33483db0ee8287456fb"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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