FKIE_CVE-2026-97043
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-11 05:19 - Updated: 2026-11-12 22:09
Severity
Summary
Building a malicious package that uses cgo could bypass "#cgo LDFLAGS" validation and cause unexpected code execution at build time, or cause the go command to panic, via crafted quoting in "//go:cgo_ldflag" directives. When "cmd/cgo" generates "_cgo_gotypes.go", it quotes each "#cgo LDFLAGS" argument with strconv.Quote in a "//go:cgo_ldflag" directive, but "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" parsed those directives by splitting on raw quote characters without handling backslash escapes or unquoting the string. This mismatch allowed disallowed linker flags or unvalidated linker search paths to be smuggled past the go command's flag checks and passed to the external linker. In addition, deduplicating LDFLAGS in the go command could panic with an out-of-bounds slice index when a prefix of the flag list matched near the end of the slice. "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" now properly handle backslash-escaped quotes and unquote "//go:cgo_*" pragma strings with strconv.Unquote, and the slice bounds check in processCgoOutputs has been fixed.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "cmd/go",
"product": "cmd/go",
"vendor": "Go toolchain",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.26.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "cmd/compile",
"product": "cmd/compile",
"vendor": "Go toolchain",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.26.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@golang.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Building a malicious package that uses cgo could bypass \"#cgo LDFLAGS\" validation and cause unexpected code execution at build time, or cause the go command to panic, via crafted quoting in \"//go:cgo_ldflag\" directives. When \"cmd/cgo\" generates \"_cgo_gotypes.go\", it quotes each \"#cgo LDFLAGS\" argument with strconv.Quote in a \"//go:cgo_ldflag\" directive, but \"cmd/compile\" and \"cmd/go\" parsed those directives by splitting on raw quote characters without handling backslash escapes or unquoting the string. This mismatch allowed disallowed linker flags or unvalidated linker search paths to be smuggled past the go command\u0027s flag checks and passed to the external linker. In addition, deduplicating LDFLAGS in the go command could panic with an out-of-bounds slice index when a prefix of the flag list matched near the end of the slice. \"cmd/compile\" and \"cmd/go\" now properly handle backslash-escaped quotes and unquote \"//go:cgo_*\" pragma strings with strconv.Unquote, and the slice bounds check in processCgoOutputs has been fixed."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-97043",
"lastModified": "2026-11-12T22:09:39.233",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-11T05:19:58.750",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/862156"
},
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/82567"
},
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/iY8TY0wWgbM"
},
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6848"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@golang.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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