FKIE_CVE-2026-95822
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-17 20:17 - Updated: 2026-11-17 20:17
Severity
Summary
The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5_tcp_connect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from the address family of the proxy (proxy->sa_family) while reading the bytes out of the destination address supplied to connect(). A SOCKS5 request encodes the destination independently of the transport used to reach the proxy, so the two families are unrelated and nothing in the path forces them to agree: set_context_proxy() only requires the proxy family to match the socket, and zsock_connect_ctx() enters the SOCKS branch before any destination validation. With an IPv6 proxy and an AF_INET destination the code treated an 8-byte struct net_sockaddr_in as a struct net_sockaddr_in6 and copied the 16-byte sin6_addr from it, reading 12 bytes past the end of the object and transmitting them to the proxy.
With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, z_vrfy_zsock_connect() copies only addrlen user bytes into a stack-resident struct net_sockaddr_storage and enforces no per-family minimum length, so the oversized read stays within the storage but returns stale, uninitialised kernel-stack bytes. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore open an AF_INET6 stream socket, point setsockopt(SO_SOCKS5) at a proxy it controls, and call connect() with a short AF_INET destination to have the kernel send it 12 bytes of supervisor stack residue per attempt. Without CONFIG_USERSPACE the read runs past the end of the caller's own struct net_sockaddr_in, disclosing adjacent memory to the proxy; the family mismatch can arise unintentionally when a destination is obtained from DNS while an IPv6 proxy is configured.
Impact is limited to information disclosure of at most 12 bytes per connect() call, with no write primitive; the leak is delivered to whoever operates the SOCKS5 proxy. The mirrored pairing (IPv6 destination through an IPv4 proxy) is memory-safe but encoded the destination as SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 from the first four bytes of the IPv6 address, causing the proxy to connect to an unrelated host. Exploitation requires the non-default CONFIG_SOCKS option, a socket with SO_SOCKS5 configured, and both IPv4 and IPv6 support in the image.
The fix moves the encoding into a helper that selects the address type from dest->sa_family and validates dest_len against the matching struct net_sockaddr_in/struct net_sockaddr_in6 before copying, rejecting under-length or unsupported destinations with an error.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"product": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "socks5_tcp_connect"
}
],
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.3.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.5.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.4.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5_tcp_connect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from the address family of the proxy (proxy-\u003esa_family) while reading the bytes out of the destination address supplied to connect(). A SOCKS5 request encodes the destination independently of the transport used to reach the proxy, so the two families are unrelated and nothing in the path forces them to agree: set_context_proxy() only requires the proxy family to match the socket, and zsock_connect_ctx() enters the SOCKS branch before any destination validation. With an IPv6 proxy and an AF_INET destination the code treated an 8-byte struct net_sockaddr_in as a struct net_sockaddr_in6 and copied the 16-byte sin6_addr from it, reading 12 bytes past the end of the object and transmitting them to the proxy.\n\nWith CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, z_vrfy_zsock_connect() copies only addrlen user bytes into a stack-resident struct net_sockaddr_storage and enforces no per-family minimum length, so the oversized read stays within the storage but returns stale, uninitialised kernel-stack bytes. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore open an AF_INET6 stream socket, point setsockopt(SO_SOCKS5) at a proxy it controls, and call connect() with a short AF_INET destination to have the kernel send it 12 bytes of supervisor stack residue per attempt. Without CONFIG_USERSPACE the read runs past the end of the caller\u0027s own struct net_sockaddr_in, disclosing adjacent memory to the proxy; the family mismatch can arise unintentionally when a destination is obtained from DNS while an IPv6 proxy is configured.\n\nImpact is limited to information disclosure of at most 12 bytes per connect() call, with no write primitive; the leak is delivered to whoever operates the SOCKS5 proxy. The mirrored pairing (IPv6 destination through an IPv4 proxy) is memory-safe but encoded the destination as SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 from the first four bytes of the IPv6 address, causing the proxy to connect to an unrelated host. Exploitation requires the non-default CONFIG_SOCKS option, a socket with SO_SOCKS5 configured, and both IPv4 and IPv6 support in the image.\n\nThe fix moves the encoding into a helper that selects the address type from dest-\u003esa_family and validates dest_len against the matching struct net_sockaddr_in/struct net_sockaddr_in6 before copying, rejecting under-length or unsupported destinations with an error."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-95822",
"lastModified": "2026-11-17T20:17:59.873",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 3.3,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-95822",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-17T20:12:29.255208Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-17T20:17:59.753",
"references": [
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/b066e8a6ae1706cd0b3a6dbc61a5861f62944f95"
},
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xvvw-v57r-7rwm"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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