FKIE_CVE-2026-118599
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-31 10:16 - Updated: 2026-11-06 14:17
Severity
Summary
A file overwrite vulnerability exists in Epiphany when installing WebExtension packages from .xpi files.
In src/webextension/ephy-web-extension-manager.c, decompress_xpi_thread() used libarchive with archive_read_support_format_all() (and filters), so the installer did not require a real ZIP. A TAR file named *.xpi was extracted. TAR supports hard-link entry types; with Epiphany's archive_write_disk options (including ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM), a crafted hard-link target can cause an attacker-chosen existing user-writable file to be truncated and overwritten with attacker-controlled content and mode bits, without a dedicated warning dialog, when the user installs or opens the crafted .xpi.
This is related to but separate from the ZIP-slip path traversal fixed as CVE-2026-77679 (#2922 / MR !2143).
Requirements: the victim must install or open a malicious WebExtension (.xpi).
Affected: Epiphany >= 47.0 (WebExtension XPI install path).
Fixed: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2248 (commit 0cc9ab55 — only enable ZIP format support).
Upstream: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2988
Reporter acknowledgment: Fernando Munoz
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "epiphany",
"product": "Epiphany",
"vendor": "GNOME",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "47.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "patrick@puiterwijk.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A file overwrite vulnerability exists in Epiphany when installing WebExtension packages from .xpi files.\n\nIn src/webextension/ephy-web-extension-manager.c, decompress_xpi_thread() used libarchive with archive_read_support_format_all() (and filters), so the installer did not require a real ZIP. A TAR file named *.xpi was extracted. TAR supports hard-link entry types; with Epiphany\u0027s archive_write_disk options (including ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM), a crafted hard-link target can cause an attacker-chosen existing user-writable file to be truncated and overwritten with attacker-controlled content and mode bits, without a dedicated warning dialog, when the user installs or opens the crafted .xpi.\n\nThis is related to but separate from the ZIP-slip path traversal fixed as CVE-2026-77679 (#2922 / MR !2143).\n\nRequirements: the victim must install or open a malicious WebExtension (.xpi).\n\nAffected: Epiphany \u003e= 47.0 (WebExtension XPI install path).\nFixed: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2248 (commit 0cc9ab55 \u2014 only enable ZIP format support).\nUpstream: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2988\nReporter acknowledgment: Fernando Munoz"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-118599",
"lastModified": "2026-11-06T14:17:10.253",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "patrick@puiterwijk.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-118599",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-06T13:50:04.899341Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-31T10:16:38.060",
"references": [
{
"source": "patrick@puiterwijk.org",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-118599"
},
{
"source": "patrick@puiterwijk.org",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2562969"
},
{
"source": "patrick@puiterwijk.org",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2248"
},
{
"source": "patrick@puiterwijk.org",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2988"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "patrick@puiterwijk.org",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-59"
}
],
"source": "patrick@puiterwijk.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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