FKIE_CVE-2026-115693
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-26 14:16 - Updated: 2026-11-02 20:17
Severity
Summary
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.
The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.
This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_ssl"
],
"packageName": "hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_ssl.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_ssl:ssl_opts/2"
},
{
"name": "hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3"
},
{
"name": "hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.9.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.24.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"hackney_ssl"
],
"packageName": "benoitc/hackney",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney",
"product": "hackney",
"programFiles": [
"src/hackney_ssl.erl"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "hackney_ssl:ssl_opts/2"
},
{
"name": "hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3"
},
{
"name": "hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"vendor": "benoitc",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.\n\nThe hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-115693",
"lastModified": "2026-11-02T20:17:30.660",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-115693",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-02T18:28:45.483074Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-26T14:16:31.853",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115693"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-295"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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