FKIE_CVE-2026-110653
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-17 03:16 - Updated: 2026-10-19 15:16
Severity
Summary
The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Race Condition in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.4. This is due to a non-atomic read-modify-write on the OTP verification attempts counter in the `verifyOTP` function: the counter is incremented using a stale in-memory value with no conditional `WHERE attempts < 10` guard on the `UPDATE` and no `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` row lock, creating a TOCTOU window that allows concurrent requests to bypass the 10-attempt lockout. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers — who know a target customer's registered email address or phone number — to fire concurrent requests to the `auth__verify_otp` endpoint, defeat the lockout cap, brute-force the 6-digit OTP code, and authenticate as the targeted LatePoint customer, gaining full access to their account, bookings, and personal data. The nonce check present on the endpoint (`otp_verify_otp_nonce`) does not mitigate this issue, as the nonce is publicly emitted by the unauthenticated `request_otp` and `resend_otp` endpoints and is trivially obtainable by any unauthenticated attacker prior to launching the race.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Appointment Booking Plugin \u2013 LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress",
"vendor": "latepoint",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.7.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Appointment Booking Plugin \u2013 LatePoint | Calendar \u0026 Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Race Condition in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.4. This is due to a non-atomic read-modify-write on the OTP verification attempts counter in the `verifyOTP` function: the counter is incremented using a stale in-memory value with no conditional `WHERE attempts \u003c 10` guard on the `UPDATE` and no `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` row lock, creating a TOCTOU window that allows concurrent requests to bypass the 10-attempt lockout. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers \u2014 who know a target customer\u0027s registered email address or phone number \u2014 to fire concurrent requests to the `auth__verify_otp` endpoint, defeat the lockout cap, brute-force the 6-digit OTP code, and authenticate as the targeted LatePoint customer, gaining full access to their account, bookings, and personal data. The nonce check present on the endpoint (`otp_verify_otp_nonce`) does not mitigate this issue, as the nonce is publicly emitted by the unauthenticated `request_otp` and `resend_otp` endpoints and is trivially obtainable by any unauthenticated attacker prior to launching the race."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-110653",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T15:16:45.150",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-110653",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-18T11:09:42.337028Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-17T03:16:28.480",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.4/lib/controllers/auth_controller.php#L14"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.4/lib/controllers/auth_controller.php#L30"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.4/lib/helpers/otp_helper.php#L185"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.4/lib/helpers/otp_helper.php#L228"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.4/lib/models/model.php#L773"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/latepoint/tags/5.7.5/lib/helpers/otp_helper.php"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/61fbc1dd-06c9-409b-8cad-3f350b38dfc3?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-287"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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