FKIE_CVE-2026-107503
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-08 10:17 - Updated: 2026-10-15 14:17
Severity
Summary
In Eclipse Ditto versions 3.6.0 to 3.8.13 and 3.9.0 to 3.9.7, the Ditto Explorer UI loads its complete environment configuration, including the Ditto API URI and the OpenID Connect (OIDC) provider settings, from an arbitrary
cross-origin URL supplied in the environmentsURL query parameter. It adopts this configuration without user confirmation and persists it in the browser's localStorage. A crafted link can therefore set an attacker-controlled OIDC
authority with autoSso enabled. The UI then automatically starts a login at the genuine identity provider but exchanges the returned authorization code together with its PKCE code_verifier at an attacker-controlled token
endpoint. This lets the attacker redeem the code for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Alternatively, an attacker-controlled api_uri causes the UI to send the victim's bearer token or Basic credentials to the attacker. Because
the configuration is persisted, later visits to the UI without the crafted link repeat the token theft. In versions 3.9.0 to 3.9.7, the Swagger UI OIDC integration of the Helm chart and the Docker Compose deployment is affected in
the same way, but requires the user to start the login. The issue is fixed in 3.8.14 and 3.9.8.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Ditto Explorer UI",
"repo": "https://github.com/eclipse-ditto/ditto",
"vendor": "Eclipse Ditto",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3.8.14",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.6.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.9.8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.9.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "emo@eclipse.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In Eclipse Ditto versions 3.6.0 to 3.8.13 and 3.9.0 to 3.9.7, the Ditto Explorer UI loads its complete environment configuration, including the Ditto API URI and the OpenID Connect (OIDC) provider settings, from an arbitrary\ncross-origin URL supplied in the environmentsURL query parameter. It adopts this configuration without user confirmation and persists it in the browser\u0027s localStorage. A crafted link can therefore set an attacker-controlled OIDC\nauthority with autoSso enabled. The UI then automatically starts a login at the genuine identity provider but exchanges the returned authorization code together with its PKCE code_verifier at an attacker-controlled token\nendpoint. This lets the attacker redeem the code for the victim\u0027s access and refresh tokens. Alternatively, an attacker-controlled api_uri causes the UI to send the victim\u0027s bearer token or Basic credentials to the attacker. Because\nthe configuration is persisted, later visits to the UI without the crafted link repeat the token theft. In versions 3.9.0 to 3.9.7, the Swagger UI OIDC integration of the Helm chart and the Docker Compose deployment is affected in\nthe same way, but requires the user to start the login. The issue is fixed in 3.8.14 and 3.9.8."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-107503",
"lastModified": "2026-10-15T14:17:15.317",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-107503",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-08T14:24:20.513382Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-08T10:17:08.457",
"references": [
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://eclipse.dev/ditto/release_notes_3814.html"
},
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://eclipse.dev/ditto/release_notes_398.html"
},
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-ditto/ditto/commit/71061f0b01df596fad80fb24502eb1e852ea6909"
},
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-ditto/ditto/commit/d4e51ba20e53c73e3b24e64d4aca57f6079d9ca1"
},
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-ditto/ditto/commit/ee65b8cd9b7219401dcac2c25b79adc8cee4a5ba"
},
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-ditto/ditto/security/advisories/GHSA-8767-g5qv-9jcf"
},
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/380"
},
{
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/work_items/1207"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "emo@eclipse.org",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-15"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-346"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-522"
}
],
"source": "emo@eclipse.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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