FKIE_CVE-2026-104795
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-14 11:16 - Updated: 2026-10-30 05:16
Severity
Summary
The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)
that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a
container, the coordinator:
1. **fork()s** a child process
2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root
filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)
4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving
the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted
capability set**
5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability
set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**
6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with
`process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from
`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**
7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()`
— executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount
namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**
The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor
container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.
## Affected Code
### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)
**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`
```rust
// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
.expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
```
```rust
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}
```
### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)
**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`
```go
// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]
func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {
out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(out), nil
}
```
### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)
**File:** `version_executable.rs`
```rust
// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint
return Some(vec![
fpr_kind_executable,
out_dir.to_string(),
String::from(&process.command_line[0]),
String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),
]);
```
## Attack Pattern
**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)
**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet
**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node
**Attack sequence:**
1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured
versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,
or contains `java`)
2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious
executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root
3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the
attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0
4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user
namespace
5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.19::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1792771524",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.20::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1792849665",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.21::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1792008935",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.22::el9"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22",
"vendor": "Red Hat",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "1792844435",
"versionType": "rpm"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:5"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift5/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)\nthat scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a\ncontainer, the coordinator:\n\n1. **fork()s** a child process\n2. **setns()** into the target container\u0027s PID and mount namespaces\n3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor\u0027s own root\n filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)\n4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** \u2014 changing the effective UID but leaving\n the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted\n capability set**\n5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability\n set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**\n6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with\n `process.command_line[0]` \u2014 the target\u0027s argv[0], read from\n `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**\n7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()`\n \u2014 executing the **workload\u0027s own binary** inside the workload\u0027s mount\n namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**\n\nThe executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with\n`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor\ncontainer\u0027s filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust \u2014 extractor coordinator)\n\n**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 139-146 \u2014 seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers\njoin_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;\nchange_dir(current_dir);\nswitch_user(*process.uid)?;\nif *process.uid != 0 {\n perms::check_no_privileged_perms()\n .expect(\"Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints\");\n}\nfingerprint::run_fingerprints(\u0026config, out_dir, \u0026process);\n```\n\n```rust\n// Lines 182-185 \u2014 only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0\nfn switch_user(uid: u32) -\u003e Result\u003c(), ScannerError\u003e {\n debug!(\"... Becoming user: {uid}\");\n seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go \u2014 fingerprint)\n\n**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`\n\n```go\n// Lines 75-80 \u2014 executes a path taken verbatim from workload\u0027s argv[0]\nfunc GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {\n out, err := exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()\n if err != nil {\n return \"\", err\n }\n return string(out), nil\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust \u2014 version_executable)\n\n**File:** `version_executable.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 29-34 \u2014 workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint\nreturn Some(vec![\n fpr_kind_executable,\n out_dir.to_string(),\n String::from(\u0026process.command_line[0]),\n String::from(\u0026version_executable.runtime_kind_name),\n]);\n```\n\n## Attack Pattern\n\n**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)\n**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet\n**Trigger:** Automatic \u2014 the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node\n\n**Attack sequence:**\n\n1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured\n versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,\n or contains `java`)\n2. The pod\u0027s main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious\n executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root\n3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the\n attacker\u0027s mount namespace, and executes the attacker\u0027s binary with ruid=0\n4. The attacker\u0027s code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user\n namespace\n5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket \u2192 full node compromise"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-104795",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T05:16:57.997",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.0,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-104795",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-14T15:25:50.103511Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-10-14T11:16:59.937",
"references": [
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:83702"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:89198"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:89341"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:89655"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-104795"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2543917"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "secalert@redhat.com",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-250"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
Loading…